Industry & transport decarbonisation

În pofida recalibrării discursului european către competitivitate și reziliență, acțiunea climatică rămâne un obiectiv strategic al UE, întrucât contribuie la reducerea dependenței de importurile de combustibili fosili, la diminuarea vulnerabilității la volatilitatea prețurilor la energie și la scăderea costurilor pe termen lung prin electrificare și eficiență energetică; tranziția este astfel aliniată cu obiectivele economice și industriale ale UE, ceea ce a permis adoptarea unei noi ținte climatice pentru 2040, cu condiția integrării flexibilităților și amendamentelor necesare pentru o tranziție echilibrată, care să sprijine redresarea economică și industrială europeană. Pentru România, ținta UE de -90% emisii până în 2040 nu reprezintă un nou nivel de ambiție, întrucât PNIESC și Strategia pe termen lung prevăd deja reduceri comparabile sau mai ridicate; în baza propriilor angajamente, România ar trebui să poată contribui la atingerea țintei pentru 2040 fără a recurge la flexibilitățile privind creditele internaționale. România se află într-o poziție favorabilă, față de alte state membre, pentru a atinge țintele de decarbonizare asumate prin PNIESCpentru2030și de a contribui la ținta de decarbonizare a UE pentru 2040. Emisiile de GES au scăzut semnificativ față de 1990, și chiar dacă România are a doua cea mai mică țintă din UE în cadrul Regulamentului privind partajarea eforturilor (ESR), există provocări majore pentru atingerea ei. Principalele provocări sectoriale se găsesc în sectorul transporturilor și cel al clădirilor. Emisiile din transporturi sunt în creștere, în contextul unui grad redus de electrificare a parcului auto, iar în sectorul clădirilor consumul de energie pe cap de locuitor converge către media Uniunii Europene, ceea ce determină o creștere a emisiilor și a necesarului energetic. Decarbonizarea necesită un efort coordonat: eficiență energetică în locuințe, electrificarea transporturilor și a industriei, creșterea aportului de energie regenerabilă în producția de electricitate până în 2030. În acest context, sectorul LULUCF reprezintă un avantaj în termeni de absorbții ridicate la nivel UE, dar cu incertitudini privind claritatea acestor date și sustenabilitatea lor pe termen lung. Descarcă slide deck-ul integral Constantin Postoiu, EPG Head of Data Analytics Constantin Postoiu is the Head of Data Analytics at EPG, coordinating the process of collecting, processing and managing the data needed in EPG’s research projects. In addition, he coordinates data intensive projects that need advanced statistics or modelling techniques.  For the past nine years, using extensive knowledge in data analysis, Costin provided support for data-driven decision making both in the public and private sector. He is also a member of the Consultative Council for the Impact Assessment of Normative Acts (CCEIAN) within the Romanian Government, where he analyses the compliance of the supporting documents that accompany the draft normative acts, the impact studies and the reports on the implementation of the normative acts with the requirements and standards provided by the legislation in the field of impact assessment. Costin holds a PhD in Economics, thesis Endogenous regional growth in Romania, from the Bucharest University of Economic Studies. During this time, he published several papers on refereed journals, mostly on regional development. He also holds a Master and Bachelor in Economics from the Bucharest University of Economic Studies. Contact: constantin.postoiu@epg-thinktank.org

Romania has a major opportunity to strengthen its transport system and boost long term competitiveness by moving towards low emission mobility. A new analysis by the Energy Policy Group (EPG), titled Powering Clean Mobility – Pathways for the Future of Transport in Romania, outlines how the country can align with European climate goals while improving energy security and supporting economic growth. Clean mobility as a driver of competitiveness The study shows that cleaner transport is not only essential for cutting emissions. It can also lower operating costs, reduce dependence on imported fuels and encourage innovation in modern technologies. These benefits help Romania shift towards a more sustainable and resilient economy. Romania’s Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan for 2025 to 2030 sets out clear sectoral targets for expanding renewable fuels, developing sustainable infrastructure and promoting clean mobility in line with EU objectives. Yet despite progress in recent years, Romania still lags behind the decarbonisation path outlined in the national plan. The pace of transport electrification remains too slow, which highlights the need for stronger public policy and more effective market measures. Key findings from the EPG analysis EPG stresses that a balanced energy mix and the wider use of zero emission vehicles will be central to Romania’s transition. The study calls for practical solutions to improve access to clean mobility, including social leasing schemes that make electric vehicles more affordable for low income households. After assessing global, European and national transport trends, EPG offers a set of recommendations designed to help Romania build a cleaner, more competitive mobility system: • Create a national strategy for electric vehicle charging with fast charging options, full territorial coverage and forward looking capacity planning consistent with EU rules.• Increase the use of renewable fuels in road and aviation transport by 2030 through better supply chains and clear certification systems.• Speed up the adoption of zero emission vehicles with measures that support low and middle income households and encourage fleet electrification in companies.• Build an integrated maintenance ecosystem for electric vehicles by training technicians and setting up recycling rules that ensure responsible recovery of critical materials.• Introduce support programmes that help the Romanian automotive industry remain competitive, such as production incentives, research and development funding and preferential tax regimes for locally produced electric vehicles.• Apply stricter efficiency standards for new internal combustion vehicles and link subsidies and taxes to real vehicle performance indicators, including fuel efficiency and carbon footprint. A coordinated path forward EPG concludes that Romania can accelerate its shift to a sustainable and competitive transport system by bringing together policymakers, industry and the private sector. A coordinated approach will help cut emissions, spark innovation and meet both European climate targets and domestic economic needs. Download the full Policy Paper Luminița Gabriela Horga, EPG Senior Researcher Luminita Gabriela Horga is a Senior Researcher in industrial decarbonisation within the Clean Economy Department of EPG. Luminita has cross-sectoral experience spanning strategy consulting, private equity, venture capital, and academic research. She brings a multidisciplinary perspective to the EPG team, with a strong commitment to evidence-based work and a focus on green technologies, sustainable innovation, and policies that support industry’s transition toward a just and climate-resilient future. Luminita holds a PhD in Biotechnology, undertaken in collaboration with industry, from the University of Manchester, UK. Before joining EPG, she worked at Roland Berger, a global strategy consulting firm, where she contributed to multiple industrial projects with large companies in Romania and abroad, with a focus on the CEE and GCC regions. She also gained experience in venture capital, working with climate and sustainability start-ups and developing early exposure to the evolving innovation landscape. Contact: luminita.horga@epg-thinktank.org

The expansion of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) through a dedicated system for the buildings and road transport sectors (ETS2) is one of the most impactful and contentious decisions in EU climate policy in recent years. These sectors are major sources of emissions: buildings account for approximately 36% of the EU’s energy-related GHG emissions, while road transport contributes around 20%, with emissions rising in Romania over the past threedecades. The ETS2 is designed to complement existing regulatory instruments, most notably the Effort Sharing Regulation, which has so far been the main policy setting emissions targets on the transport and building sectors, among others. Under the ETS2, fossil fuel suppliers will be required to purchase emissions allowances, with the overall supply of allowances diminishing progressively over time. This mechanism is intended to introduce a carbon price signal to households and businesses, encouraging a shift towards lower-emission alternatives for heating and transportation. To address the potential burden on lower-income households, the EU has created a EUR 65 billion Social Climate Fund. The fund would primarily support investments aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from heating systems and road transport, and, to a limited extent, provide direct income support. The ETS2 is expected to have a considerable impact on the short term on vulnerable households, exacerbating fuel poverty, if not addressed in a timely manner. Similarly, certain companies, especially transport service providers and small industrial producers are expected to be impacted, prompting the need for protective measures. Even though it is a policy of considerable impact on the citizens, no large-scale public information campaigns have yet been organised in Romania. Studies on the domestic impact are also scarce, with only two having discussed the Romanian context so far. The timing is also tight, as the ETS2 is scheduled to be fully operational from 2027. However, during the Environment Council of 4th November, Member States agreed to a postponement of one year, with the new starting date in 2028. The extra time could give governments more room for preparing the implementation and ensuring a smooth start, but may increase costs in the long run. Romania has transposed the revised directive with a delayed start of the ETS2 in 2031, as per the Government Decision no. 907 from 23 October 2025. This entails serious consequences, such as the potential loss of financial allocations under the Social Climate Fund and foregone ETS2 revenues, delaying crucial investments targeted to the vulnerable households, as well as likely leading to an infringement procedure. As the Just Transition Fund will end in 2027 with no foreseen continuity in the new Multiannual Financial Framework, the Social Climate Fund (SCF) stands as the only available financial instrument to deliver a just transition. At a time of high fiscal deficit, losing an important source of funding and revenue would be a missed opportunity, especially for the transition to cleaner and future-proof heating and transport, but also for stimulating domestic production of low-carbon technologies. The SCF and ETS2 revenues are also one of the only sizeable opportunities to ensure that lower income socio-economic groups can feel the benefits of the transition through improved living conditions and modern, clean and efficient transportation. Download the full Policy Paper Ana-Maria Niculicea, EPG Researcher Ana-Maria Niculicea is a Researcher at Energy Policy Group, in the Clean Economy Department. She coordinates research activities on climate governance with a focus on  enhancing national climate governance and the social acceptance of the transition to a low carbon economy. Additionally, she conducts research on social acceptance of CCUS technologies in the Horizon2020 ConsenCUS project.   She holds a MSc in Politics, Economics and Philosophy from University of Hamburg and a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from National University of Political Studies and Public Administration. Contact: ana.niculicea@epg-thinktank.org

The European Union has introduced a set of instruments that support the deployment of CCUS technologies. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) remains a central pillar, and its upcoming inclusion of carbon removals will have direct implications for CCUS deployment. For industrial operators in hard-to-abate sectors, this shift increases the importance of permanent CO₂ storage as a cost-effective compliance strategy. In this context, CCUS becomes a necessary solution for maintaining competitiveness under stricter emissions rules.  The Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), in force since June 2024, reinforces these dynamics by setting a binding EU-wide target of 50 million tonnes of annual CO₂ injection capacity by 2030. It mandates open-access storage and contributions from oil and gas producers, aiming to address one of the major barriers to CCUS scale-up: the lack of accessible, shared CO₂ storage infrastructure.  Complementary initiatives such as the Clean Industrial Deal, the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) framework, and the Innovation Fund are also designed to support new CCUS projects by improving access to funding. They aim to streamline and simplify permitting procedures through the Net Zero Industry Act and foster cross-border cooperation. These instruments can benefit Romania, provided national frameworks are aligned and capable of absorbing such support.  At the same time, the general landscape of CCS project development in the EU remains uneven. Infrastructure and investment are heavily concentrated in Western and Northern Europe, leaving Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries dependent on storage capacity developed in other Member States – a solution that is not desirable in Romania’s case. While the EU-level framework offers a strong foundation, its effective implementation depends on national action. The following assessment analyses how Romania is responding to these developments and what remains to be done to enable CCUS deployment at scale.   In this regulatory context, Romania’s three main oil and gas operators, OMV Petrom1, Romgaz2, and Black Sea Oil & Gas3, must collectively account for over 20% of the EU’s total CO₂ storage targeti, despite Romania’s currently limited domestic CO₂ storage infrastructure. While the NZIA obligation has been introduced without a fully defined business model, feasibility studies, or established financial instruments to ensure cost recovery, it marks an important step forward for accelerating CCS deployment in the EU. By creating a clear demand signal, it encourages investment in CO₂ infrastructure that might not have progressed otherwise. Nonetheless, successful implementation will require greater clarity on cost recovery mechanisms, regulatory conditions, and long-term viability to support industry commitment.  The delegated regulation defines who must contribute but leaves enforcement and penalties to individual Member States, potentially resulting in inconsistent implementation and legal uncertainty for cross-border operators. In Romania’s case, the lack of precedent and administrative readiness in this area could further delay the development of a clear and predictable compliance environment. Without guidance on proportionality, timelines, or acceptable justifications for delays, companies may struggle to assess their risk exposure and investment timelines, potentially discouraging timely engagement in CO₂ storage development.  The environmental and safety aspects of CCS storage in the EU are governed by three key directives. First, the CCS Directive establishes the core framework. Second, the Environmental Liability Directiveii addresses environmental damage from CO₂ storage, excluding climate impacts covered under the EU ETS. Third, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directiveiii ensures thorough ex-ante evaluation, public consultation, and regulatory oversight for CCS projects.  At national level, the Romanian Energy Strategy outlines two possible scenarios available to the economic operators concerned, in line with NZIA’s provisions:  Scenario 1: Invest in the development of their own CO₂ storage projects;  Scenario 2: Enter into agreements with existing storage project developers or third-party investors (mainly from other countries) to meet their storage target.  This paper was written as part of the GreenHorizon CEE Project: Industrial Carbon Management for a Sustainable Future in CEE. The project is funded by the European Climate Initiative (EUKI) of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.   Download the full REPORT Ioana Vasiliu, EPG Senior Researcher Ioana Maria Vasiliu is Senior Researcher within the Clean Economy Department at EPG, where she leverages her extensive expertise in climate policy. She holds a bachelor’s degree in public administration management and a post-university diploma in sustainable development, both from the Economic Academy of Bucharest.   Before joining EPG, Ioana worked as a European Affairs Advisor in the Climate Strategies and Reporting Department at the Romanian Ministry of Environment, Waters and Forests, where she was responsible for developing policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing climate resilience. Her work reflects a strong focus on climate change, sustainable development and international cooperation.  Notably, Ioana played a key role in formulating Romania’s national position on EU climate legislation, helping align the country’s climate goals with broader EU objectives. She actively participated in expert-level EU negotiations, advocating for Romania’s specific needs and ensuring they were represented in final policies. She also coordinated Romania’s climate-focused efforts during its accession to the OECD, representing the country in key working groups, including the Environment Policy Committee, the Working Party on Climate, Investment and Development, and the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches.  She also played a role in preparing international reports on Romania’s environmental performance, such as the UNECE Environmental Performance Reviews and the OECD Economic Surveys 2024, with a focus on decarbonizing Romania’s industry and the EU report on Strengthening cultural heritage resilience for climate change – Where the European Green Deal meets cultural heritage and she contributed to the development of the UNIDO Strategy for Climate Change.  In addition to international work, Ioana supported significantly the development of Romania’s National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change, the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Climate Change Strategy for Ministry of National Defense. She also served as Romania’s rapporteur for Articles 17 and 19 of EU Regulation 2018/1999.  Further, as a member of the interministerial Working Group for the Social Climate Fund, Ioana provided recommendations to address energy poverty and the socio-economic impacts of Romania’s green transition. She also contributed to the review and amendment of Romania’s Emergency Ordinance 64/2011, ensuring it remained aligned with EU legislation and national...

Methanol (CH3OH) is a primary chemical found in many everyday products, such as plastics, paints, car parts, construction materials, as well as pharmaceuticals. It is the feedstock used by wood processing factories to produce formaldehyde, which is then used as a binding agent in resins. The large refineries also use methanol as a blending component, while other chemical manufacturers would require it to produce amines, that are subsequently used by the defence industry in ammunition production. Methanol can also serve as a clean energy carrier for powering road and maritime transportation, fuel cells, boilers and cook stoves. Methanol presents some advantages over ammonia or hydrogen. For instance, its energy density is higher compared to that of ammonia and therefore storage can be done in smaller spaces, and ships would not have to refuel as often. Methanol also has a head start within the technological emergence phase. More than 60 methanol-capable vessels are already on the water, with more than 300 on order, being in the initial scale phase as shipping fuel. By contrast, ammonia is in the proof-of-concept phase, having passed initial pilot tests. Furthermore, infrastructure already exists for methanol, as globally 100 ports already have methanol available and almost half of those also have storage capacity. Traditionally, methanol is produced from natural gas and coal, accounting for about 10% of global CO2 emissions of the chemical and petrochemical sectors. To reduce its carbon footprint, it can also be synthesised from alternative feedstocks. These include captured CO28 combined with clean hydrogen, a process known as e-methanol, or from biomass sources such as agricultural waste, forestry residues, and municipal solid waste, referred to as biomethanol. These alternatives to conventional fossil-based methanol are generally referred to as green methanol. Compared to conventional methanol, e-methanol using renewable electricity can reduce CO2 emissions by up to 95%.10 Similarly, biomethanol derived from woody biomass can emit approximately 0.2 kg CO2/kg, significantly less than natural gas (1.6 kg CO2/kg) or coal-based (3.8 kg CO2/kg) production methods. Download the full Policy Paper Mara Bălașa, EPG Associate Mara is an Associate within the Clean Economy department of the EPG. With a background in economics and political science (BSc University of Warwick), applied economic analysis, and data analysis (MSc Stockholm School of Economics), she is currently researching the green transition with a focus on industrial policy. Mara has been a PhD Fellow at the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication, Stockholm School of Economics, since 2022. During her master’s degree, she was the recipient of the UniCredit Foundation Masterscholarship for top students. Previously, Mara was a market operations analyst at the European Central Bank and a research executive in public affairs in Brussels, focusing on energy and transport. She has also briefly worked in public administration at the Ministry of Economy in Romania and at the Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union. Contact: mara.balasa@epg-thinktank.org

At a time when reducing import dependence is taking centre stage, green hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels are a large piece of the puzzle, as they play a key role in decoupling hard-to-abate sectors from fossil fuel dependence. By 2050, hydrogen is expected to be implemented at scale in long-distance transport and heavy industries, accounting for 80% of the final energy consumption in shipping and aviation, and used to produce 44% of the iron needed for steelmaking. Hydrogen can contribute to the strategic autonomy of the European Union in several ways. First, it can do so directly by reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels and thus strengthening the region’s energy security. Second, the industries that will be its main consumers have strategic importance, as for instance steel contributes to the defence sector, while ammonia safeguards food security through its use in fertiliser production. Enabling their adoption of hydrogen comes as a support measure, as they gain access to a flexible and secure energy source which also lowers their carbon-related bills, since the free allocations within the Emissions Trading System are soon to be phased out. At the same time, hydrogen contributes to tackling climate change through decarbonisation, as heavy industries and long-distance transport are major sources of global greenhouse gas emissions. Inaction or delayed action in this regard can become a national security threat in the face of the potential future natural disasters and extreme weather events. What is currently missing, however, is a market and some degree of certainty that there will be willingness to pay for green hydrogen, given its price premium and the current lack of infrastructure. A way to unlock demand and ensure a real commitment of stakeholders is through ensuring a time-efficient build-out of infrastructure and lowering the price premium. The electricity price is the main driver of this premium, as electrolysis (i.e. the process of producing hydrogen from splitting the water molecule) is energy-intensive and requires a clean energy source for hydrogen to be labelled as green. In the EU, some regions such as Scandinavia and the Iberian Peninsula have advantages in this regard, the former especially through its abundant hydropower and the latter through a mix of electricity market design and high renewable output, thus enabling lower electricity prices. However, the electricity prices across the EU are heterogenous, meaning not all regions can benefit from this level of affordability. In this instance, lowering the electrolysis costs could be achieved to some extent through energy efficiency. Investing more in research and development can support new technological solutions that enable electrolysers to become cheaper to purchase and more energy efficient, consume less electricity and have a longer stack durability. In addition, committing funds to other measures such as investments in renewable energy infrastructure, grid modernisation and energy storage would also indirectly facilitate the scale-up of hydrogen, provided these measures achieve lower electricity costs. Decreasing the costs could be complemented by more ambitious targets at state-level, for instance when transposing the Renewable Energy Directive (RED III) into law. While RED III requires a minimum of 1% of all transport fuel to be renewable fuel of non-biological origin by 2030, the Member States could go above that level and require a more ambitious target to accelerate hydrogen-related progress and provide more certainty about future end-users. Developing hydrogen supply chains is a long-term and complex process that requires sustained commitment and clarity of purpose. Progress remains uneven across the EU, often hindered by fragmented policies and a lack of coherent investment signals. To accelerate deployment, stronger and more targeted commitments are needed within national energy and industrial strategies. Clearer objectives, robust implementation frameworks, and cross-sectoral alignment are essential to move beyond pilots and announcements towards scalable and resilient ecosystems that serve both economic and security interests. Given the increased attention of EU Member States towards defence, and the increased funding allocated for that sector, now is the time to think strategically about the long-term role of hydrogen in this regard. This is a story of self-sufficiency, a story of energy security and strategic autonomy, which could therefore be included in defence spending as a national security-related investment. Mara Bălașa, EPG Associate Mara is an Associate within the Clean Economy programme of the EPG. With a background in economics and political science (BSc University of Warwick), applied economic analysis, and data analysis (MSc Stockholm School of Economics), she is currently researching the green transition with a focus on industrial policy. Mara has been a PhD Fellow at the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication, Stockholm School of Economics, since 2022. During her master’s degree, she was the recipient of the UniCredit Foundation Masterscholarship for top students.  Previously, Mara was a market operations analyst at the European Central Bank and a research executive in public affairs in Brussels, focusing on energy and transport. She has also briefly worked in public administration at the Ministry of Economy in Romania and at the Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union.  Contact: mara.balasa@epg-thinktank.org

Industrial carbon management (ICM) has seen an increasing uptick in supportive policies, commercial-scale projects, and innovation action in the EU in recent years. Policy frameworks under the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), the Clean Industrial Deal, and the ICM Strategy are poised to further direct resources towards ICM projects as part of the EU’s technological portfolio for achieving climate neutrality by 2050. Despite these promising advances, important barriers remain in the deployment of ICM at pace and scale in Europe. With many of the challenges faced by ICM being increasingly acknowledged by policymakers, the ongoing Horizon 2020 ConsenCUS project can provide additional policy insights. As an innovation action, it brings learnings for the roll-out of ICM, but also for the advancement of innovation in net-zero technologies in general. These findings are summarised in five polic recommendations and complement those issued in a previous policy paper published under the ConsenCUS project. Firstly, the EU will require a balanced approach to supporting ICM technologies, both enabling next-generation technologies and deploying existing mature technologies. Secondly, the EU’s research and innovation (R&I) frameworks must acknowledge the importance of demonstrating, not just developing, innovative ICM technologies, and allocate appropriate financial resources to demonstrator projects. This must include an appreciation of fostering “learning-by-doing”, providing resource flexibility to react to unexpected challenges and aligning project success indicators with the long timelines for demonstrating new technologies in real operational conditions, including permitting requirements and technical challenges. Thirdly, policies and mechanisms to mitigate the high energy costs faced by industry, while still maintaining climate ambition, will be essential to ensure the operational feasibility of carbon capture. Fourthly, support for ICM demonstration and deployment must acknowledge the trade-offs between technology characteristics such as cost, environmental footprint, capture efficiency, energy consumption, scalability potential, and others. Finally, R&I frameworks for developing and demonstrating ICM technologies must be relatively unbureaucratic and allow flexibility for project consortia to recruit expertise with minimal administrative constraints, supported by appropriate human and knowledge resources from EU agencies to match the scale of the EU’s ambitions on ICM. This will help ensure that ICM not only contributes to EU climate neutrality, but also to the reduction of an innovation deficit which has placed the Union in a challenging position with regards to its competitiveness To enable CCS projects that contribute to Romania’s climate mitigation efforts in a cost-effective way, ambitions must be increased in national strategies, hard-to-abate sectors must be prioritised for CO2 capture, and the potential for negative emissions through carbon removal projects should be explored This policy paper was written as part of the ConsenCUS project, funded through the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and Innovation programme under grant agreement N° 101022484. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She oversees the work of the Clean Economy division, including industrial decarbonisation, building energy efficiency, and climate governance and policy. Luciana also conducts in-depth research and stakeholder engagement primarily in the field of industrial decarbonisation and carbon capture and storage.  Luciana is an expert in industrial decarbonisation and building energy efficiency, with a focus on consumer behavior, systems thinking and policy. She is also trained in renewable energy engineering and a highly skilled communicator with significant experience in stakeholder engagement on sustainability projects. Luciana has extensive experience in data collection and analysis, including conducting nationally representative surveys and statistical analysis and modelling in STATA. She is also well-versed in behavioral frameworks and socio-technical systems approaches to sustainability.  She holds a PhD in energy efficiency from Imperial College London, and an MSc in Sustainable Energy Systems and BSc in Environmental Science from the University of Edinburgh. Her PhD thesis has resulted in 3 publications in peer-reviewed journals, including Energy Policy and Energy Research and Social Science.   Luciana is passionate about youth engagement in the energy transition, and is one of the founders of the European Youth Energy Network, the first network of youth-led, energy-focused organisations in the EU. She is a native speaker of Romanian and English, is fluent in French and has basic knowledge of German and Danish.   Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

Romania’s fertiliser production is struggling Despite a long history stretching back to the early 20th century, Romania’s fertiliser industry has significantly contracted since the end of the communist regime. Before 1989, Romania had 11 fertiliser plants, which have since then closed down as part of a prolonged deindustrialisation. Today, only the Azomureş plant in central Romania is still operational, and is considered pivotal to the national agricultural sector. It has an annual production capacity of 1.8 million tonnes of nitrogen-based fertilisers and mostly serves domestic consumers. Against the background of an already-increasing Europe-wide dependence on imported fertilisers, Romania’s dependence on imports from non-EU countries, including Russia, has also been increasing, and Azomureș is no exception. This highlights the importance of Romanian domestic fertiliser production for strategic autonomy as well as food security. Azomureș is Romania’s largest industrial natural gas consumer, accounting for 10% of total national consumption, and a major carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter. As with all fertiliser producers, natural gas acts as the main feedstock and an important source of industrial heat for plant operations. Its reliance on natural gas has caused significant production issues in recent years, and in 2024, the plant temporarily halted production due to the surging gas prices. At the same time, as an industrial CO2 emitter it will be exposed to the full market price of carbon by 2034, when free allowances under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) are phased out. By 2050, Azomureș could be paying as much as €640 million in annual carbon costs to continue business-as-usual production. Continuing fertiliser production based on current methods, with its natural gas dependency and associated CO2 emissions, is becoming increasingly challenging. An opportunity emerges to rethink conventional production processes to keep Romanian fertilisers competitive in a low-carbon world. However, transforming fertiliser production is a technological challenge, as it requires a change in the process of producing ammonia, the most important precursor to nitrogen-based fertilisers. Today, ammonia is manufactured using hydrogen conventionally produced through the steam methane reforming of natural gas. Overall, producing one tonne of ammonia consumes approx. 900 m3 of natural gas and generates approx. 1.6 tCO2, making it one of the most carbon-intensive production processes in the chemicals industry. The two most prominent alternatives for ammonia production are “blue ammonia” (capturing the emissions from steam methane reforming to produce “blue hydrogen” as a precursor to ammonia), or “green ammonia” (producing “renewable hydrogen” through electrolysis using clean energy and using it to produce ammonia). Both alternatives come with challenges, not least the required capital investment and price premium associated with low-emissions hydrogen production. For now, the strategic objective of Azomureş is to continue conventional ammonia production. However, the company has pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 60% by 2030, compared to 1990, and has indicated an interest in carbon capture and green hydrogen within the Territorial Just Transition Plan of Mureș county. Against a background of European self-sufficiency and low-carbon competitiveness, transforming fertiliser production at Azomureș will be essential to maintain domestic production, reduce dependence on fossil fuels and raw material imports, and place Romania as a key supplier in new business areas such as low-carbon shipping fuels. A clear vision will be needed for managing the trade-offs between the two main transition pathways and to weather both short-term shocks and ensure long-term viability. Download the full commentary Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She oversees the work of the Clean Economy division, including industrial decarbonisation, building energy efficiency, and climate governance and policy. Luciana also conducts in-depth research and stakeholder engagement primarily in the field of industrial decarbonisation and carbon capture and storage.  Luciana is an expert in industrial decarbonisation and building energy efficiency, with a focus on consumer behavior, systems thinking and policy. She is also trained in renewable energy engineering and a highly skilled communicator with significant experience in stakeholder engagement on sustainability projects. Luciana has extensive experience in data collection and analysis, including conducting nationally representative surveys and statistical analysis and modelling in STATA. She is also well-versed in behavioral frameworks and socio-technical systems approaches to sustainability.  She holds a PhD in energy efficiency from Imperial College London, and an MSc in Sustainable Energy Systems and BSc in Environmental Science from the University of Edinburgh. Her PhD thesis has resulted in 3 publications in peer-reviewed journals, including Energy Policy and Energy Research and Social Science.   Luciana is passionate about youth engagement in the energy transition, and is one of the founders of the European Youth Energy Network, the first network of youth-led, energy-focused organisations in the EU. She is a native speaker of Romanian and English, is fluent in French and has basic knowledge of German and Danish.   Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

The EU industry is at a crossroads, and will undergo a profound transformation to maintain long-term competitiveness. For Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the urgency of this transformation is enhanced by the continued economic and strategic importance of heavy industry and the potential to become a hub for clean industrial production. Among a portfolio of tools to support industrial transformation, lead market creation emerges as a key instrument to improve predictability of demand for clean industrial products and solidify the business case for switching to low-carbon industrial production. Green Public Procurement (GPP) could be a key tool in this sense, making the state and subnational procurement bodies the first big buyers of clean industrial products, particularly steel and cement which are extensively used in public construction and whose low-carbon transformation requires financial support and revenue certainty. With many CEE countries investing heavily in public infrastructure (roads, railways, bridges, and others) and a growing stock of public buildings, GPP could be an essential instrument to trigger the domestic production of clean steel and cement, two of the most emissions-intensive industries, helping to position CEE countries as key suppliers in industrial value chains as well as reduce the footprint of their booming construction sectors. Following a period of rapid deindustrialisation after 1990, the CEE region currently produces just under one-fifth of the EU’s steel and one-third of its cement. It is an important consumer of these industrial products, contributing nearly one-third of EU consumption in 2023 and one-third to cement consumption. This is accompanied by a rapidly-expanding CEE construction sector, faster-than-average growth in the buildout of transport and utilities infrastructure, and a continued key importance of the automotive industry, a major steel consumer. Certain CEE countries are significant and growing importers of steel and cement: Poland had steel imports equivalent to over two-thirds of its consumption in 2023, while cement imports in Romania saw a nearly 500% increase between 2016 and 2023. This shows potential opportunities for reducing import dependency by enhancing domestic production of steel and cement, particularly once the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism provides a level playing field for low-carbon European industry to compete with cheaper, emissions-intensive imports. To estimate the potential for using GPP to stimulate clean industrial production in CEE, this study provides a first-level estimate of the volume of steel and cement used in public construction in 12 CEE countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria). It uses a tailored methodology and a combination of data sources to estimate the quantities of flat and long steel products and cement purchased by public authorities, calculate the potential emissions reductions enabled by mandating carbon footprint thresholds in public procurement, and estimate the impact on national budgets for public procurement. We estimate total annual steel and cement consumption by public construction in the study countries to be 4.5 million tonnes (Mt) and 15.6 Mt, respectively. This is equivalent to 3.1% and 9.5% of all steel and cement consumption in the EU, respectively. Steel consumption is likely underestimated due to conservative estimates on the amount of steel typically consumed in European construction. Mandating near-zero emissions thresholds in CEE public construction results in estimated emissions reductions of 9.9 Mt CO2 annually across study countries, or €616 million in EU allowance (EUA) costs at current prices of €62/tonne CO2. The impact of near-zero steel and cement procurement on public budgets is difficult to ascertain, given the substantial uncertainty around the premium of clean steel and cement production. First-level estimates in our study indicate a cost impact ranging from 0.11% (Austria) to 1.35% (Romania) as a share of the total public procurement budget. The accuracy of these estimates will depend on the variations in industrial production costs across countries, driven by input prices (e.g., renewable electricity prices) and revenue support mechanisms for industrial producers (e.g., subsidies). The potentially sizable market of CEE public construction, to which private construction, vehicle manufacturing, shipbuilding, and other sectors could contribute additionally, indicates a key role for lead market creation mechanisms. To leverage the opportunities for launching a market for clean steel and cement in CEE, EU and national policymakers may want to consider several recommendations: Improve monitoring and data collection on public procurement, to allow the tracking of spending on construction materials and eventually compliance with environmental and/or local production criteria. Develop clear labels for green steel, cement, and concrete, based on ambitious decarbonisation trajectories and going beyond the existing benchmarks of the EU Emissions Trading System. Make GPP an integral part of other support instruments for industrial transformation, recognising the key role of infrastructure development and funding under the Cohesion Policy, as well as the automotive and shipbuilding sectors as sources of steel demand. Ensure that institutional capacity is sufficient to implement GPP robustly, guaranteeing sustainability of compliance and monitoring while avoiding disproportionate burdens on industrial producers (particularly SMEs). Increase regional cooperation across the CEE region to link supply and demand for clean steel and cement across the region, as well as for essential inputs for low-carbon industrial production such as renewable hydrogen and CO2 transport and storage. This report has been funded by the Bellona Foundation. The views expressed in the report are the sole responsibility of their authors, and do not necessarily represent Bellona’s position. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She oversees the work of the Clean Economy division, including industrial decarbonisation, building energy efficiency, and climate governance and policy. Luciana also conducts in-depth research and stakeholder engagement primarily in the field of industrial decarbonisation and carbon capture and storage.  Luciana is an expert in industrial decarbonisation and building energy efficiency, with a focus on consumer behavior, systems thinking and policy. She is also trained in renewable energy engineering and a highly skilled communicator with significant experience in stakeholder engagement on sustainability projects. Luciana has extensive experience in data collection and analysis, including conducting nationally representative surveys and statistical analysis and modelling in STATA. She is also well-versed in behavioral frameworks and socio-technical systems approaches to...

CCUS narratives and why they matter Carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) is a suite of technologies to capture, transport, and utilise carbon dioxide (CO2) or store it underground. CCUS has emerged internationally as a key technical measure for climate change mitigation, in particular for reducing the amount of CO2 ultimately emitted into the atmosphere by industries such as cement production and oil refining. These industries have much fewer viable options than others to deeply reduce their emissions at the pace needed to stay competitive in a low-carbon world. Capturing a portion of their emissions will therefore be unavoidable to reach net zero. Despite the urgency of deploying CCUS at a large scale in the European Union (EU), the project pipeline is lagging significantly. As large, complex projects with long lead times, CCUS is fraught with regulatory, financing, and infrastructure challenges–but one lesser-discussed challenge which may prove to be a key bottleneck is social resistance. Particularly for CCUS projects where the CO2 is ultimately stored underground, public concerns over real or merely perceived risks, poorly addressed by institutions or project developers, have sometimes led to the abandonment or severe delay of projects. Given the current turmoil faced by heavy industry and Europe’s ambitious CCUS targets for 2030, understanding the dynamics of public opinion about these technologies is a condition for their success. This is where we come to the role of narratives. Narratives are essentially “stories” developed around a particular issue, where events unfold as part of a plot, complete with characters, symbols, and dramatic moments. They are universally important elements of human cognition, highly persuasive compared to mere statement of facts, and used on a regular basis to convince an audience (sometimes subtly) to adopt a certain position or opinion. While research is still emerging, there is evidence that narratives around CCUS are evolving as the subject enters the public discussion, including in the media. Besides, given the current very low level of public awareness about CCUS, public opinion is likely to be much more volatile and susceptible to persuasion by strong narratives, even if they are misinformed. Stories of CCS across Europe Our research on has found that CCUS narratives vary significantly across countries. A distinct difference emerges between North-Western Europe and South-Eastern Europe (SEE), with many more media articles, institutional statements and emergent stories in the former, and not just dry facts. Indeed, North-Western Europe is much more advanced in deploying CCUS, and the subject has been part of the public debate for longer than in South-Eastern Europe. This does not mean that CCUS will stay out of the public realm for much longer in SEE. In fact, media reporting on CCUS has increased significantly in recent years, and is shifting from neutral and informative tones, with little original content, to actual narratives portraying heroes, villains, conspiracies, and positions on CCUS. Sensationalism is not absent either: a “dream team” heroically is innovating on CCUS in Greece, while in Romania CCUS would just “bury in toxins.” While North-Western European media is more sober, it also politicises the topic, for example linking CCUS to “climate offenders” conspiring with the Danish government for tax breaks. CCUS is still much less talked about than other topics of the clean energy transition, such as renewable energy or electric vehicles, yet European narratives around it are replete with warning signs that social resistance is not negligible. First, institutions shift their narratives depending on the mot du jour of public concern: whereas CCUS stories used to be almost exclusively in the context of climate change, they are now increasingly about economic and job security (i.e., helping industries stay competitive by relieving them of the financial pressure of their CO2 emissions). The issue is that CCUS is expensive, regulation around it is still catching up, and especially in SEE the political commitment around it is nowhere near what it needs to be. If CCUS continues to be portrayed by institutions in a “techno-optimistic” way, promising economic revival but failing to create an enabling environment to deploy it in the first place, this risks a harder fall from grace in terms of public trust when the promised benefits fail to materialise. Denmark is an example of good practice, having implemented regulation, funding, and infrastructure planning at a rapid pace, so that its increasingly confident institutional narratives have real substance. Second, the media will play a very important role in shaping public opinion, especially in countries where institutions withdraw or waver in response to media criticism. Across all the analysed countries, there was a variation in how likely the media was to create CCUS stories. For example, the Danish media are much more informative and neutral than the Romanian or the Greek media, use more scientific evidence, and are better-anchored due to the relative transparency of government actors on the topic. On the other hand, in countries lacking institutional positioning on CCUS and healthy debate by government actors, the media become the only source of information (and indeed, more trusted than government), and in many cases will create the stories of CCUS that serve its readership expectations, including by politicising the topic and imbuing it with sensationalism. Thus, rather than being seen as a technology with its own set of benefits, costs, and risks, CCUS risks being etched into the public imagination as a villain, a conspiracy, or an outright lie. What does the future hold? The future of CCUS in Europe depends on multiple factors, and the stories developing around it are just one piece of the puzzle. However, ignoring the narratives risks missing the opportunity to anticipate public opinion and concerns and engage effectively in transparent debate about the implications of deploying CCUS. The most important first step in this sense is to not withdraw from the debate before it has even started. In countries where CCUS is planned and/or needs to happen, institutional actors must adopt firm and transparent positions based on evidence and acknowledge the magnitude of challenge of keeping industry competitive. The EU can help by communicating expectations on government...

The industrial base of Central and Eastern Europe is a key driver of the region’s economy, and its transformation will be essential for maintaining regional manufacturing in the long term. Transforming it will require concerted action by CEE states as well as a regional approach to exploit synergies, improve cost-effectiveness, and cooperate on mutually beneficial solutions. However, to date there has been insufficient action and regional coordination to enable an industrial transformation which capitalises on the region’s strengths. This publication presents a bird’s eye view of the region and its countries, reflects on the opportunities for cooperation, and puts forward concrete suggestions for anchoring the new industrial reality of Central and Eastern Europe in clean industry hubs fit for the future.​ Introduction and aims of this study: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has significant potential to become a pole of clean industrial production, but lacks the regional coordination essential for an efficient industrial transformation​ The current nationally siloed approach misses key opportunities to deliver industrial transformation, including coordinated infrastructure planning to leverage key resources across the region, and exploiting a regional market for industrial products​ The need for regional coordination comes in a time of pressure for CEE heavy industry to transform by decarbonising existing manufacturing and enabling new cleantech manufacturing, which will be essential to maintain the regional industrial base long-term, even if it poses challenges in the short-term​ Rising carbon prices, an incoming phase-out of free allowances under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), new regulations to nudge the consumption of lower-carbon industrial products, and an aggressive global cleantech race all mean that CEE countries must act now​ At the same time, the industrial policy landscape of the EU is undergoing a massive shift in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which exacerbated the existing pressure of high energy prices, and the 2024 Draghi report, which highlighted major gaps in the EU’s industrial competitiveness further addressed in the recently-published EU Competitiveness Compass​ Competitiveness will be a major driver for industrial transformation in the EU, and the forthcoming Clean Industrial Deal is expected to lay down rules and incentives for decarbonising industrial production in the EU, anchored in competitively advantageous sectors and promoting a coordinated approach​ Given the current context, it will be key for CEE to unlock cost efficiencies for its industrial transformation and align its national priorities to ensure that advancing EU competitiveness does not come at the expense of strategic considerations for autonomy and cohesion​ The purpose of this study is to reflect on the specificities of CEE countries which contextualise their outlook for industrial transformation, and to provide a high-level assessment for the benefits of a regional approach anchored in competitive and strategic industrial clusters​

În urma alegerilor parlamentare din decembrie 2024 și a negocierilor ulterioare, s-a format o nouă coaliție de guvernare compusă din PSD, PNL, UDMR și grupul minorităților. Prezența în coaliție a două partide care au făcut parte și din guvernarea anterioară indică o relativă continuitate la nivel politic, însă nu și în ceea ce privește politicile climatice și de decarbonizare. Acest lucru reiese din programul de guvernare al noii coaliții, publicat la finalul lui 2024, care oferă o privire de ansamblu asupra priorităților la nivel național pentru următorii patru ani. Viziunea noului guvern este influențată inclusiv de noua realitate politică determinată de rezultatele alegerilor parlamentare și anularea alegerilor prezidențiale de către Curtea Constituțională. Deși economia europeană a resimțit puternic efectele pandemiei de Covid-19 și ale crizei energetice, iar discursul global cu privire la schimbările climatice devine treptat mai ostil, Uniunea Europeană și-a reafirmat poziția și intențiile de a fi un lider climatic la nivel global. Noul mandat al Comisiei Europene urmărește să continue procesul de tranziție climatică pentru continent, printr-o abordare pragmatică ce ar îmbina obiectivele de decarbonizare, competitivitate și creștere economică prin revitalizarea producției industriale. Uniunea are deja o țintă de reducere a acestor emisii cu 55% până în 2030 și urmează să adopte o țintă pentru 2040, pornind cel mai probabil negocierile de la o țintă de reducere cu 90% a emisiilor. Aceste ținte ambițioase trebuie, însă, cuplate cu nevoia de creștere a competitivității industriale, sinonimă cu transformarea proceselor de producție și lansarea de noi industrii  ale tehnologiilor curate. Așadar, dezvoltarea economiei și reindustrializarea României ar trebui să meargă în tandem cu aceste angajamente, poziționând România ca un lider în tranziția spre o economie curată. Aceste obiective însă nu pot fi atinse fără un program ambițios de investiții publice și scheme de susținere, care sunt necesare într-o perioadă cu spațiu fiscal redus la nivel național. Actualul program de guvernare nu reflectă pe deplin aceste provocări și priorități.  Guvernanța schimbărilor climatice, pe plan secund în lista priorităților de guvernare La momentul actual, România se află în plin proces de aderare la Organizația pentru Cooperare și Dezvoltare Economică (OCDE) cu obiectivul de a deveni membru până în anul 2026. În anul 2024, OCDE a recomandat întărirea sistemului de guvernanță climatică prin adoptarea unei legi cadru a climei și înființarea unui consiliu științific consultativ pentru schimbări climatice. Aceste recomandări au fost integrate în programul de guvernare 2023-2024, însă au fost doar parțial implementate: înființarea unei legi a climei nu s-a concretizat, iar recomandarea privind consiliul științific consultativ a avut un parcurs anevoios până la legiferare, nefiind nici acum înființat. Astfel, aceste obiective, deși asumate de fostul guvern, rămân nerealizate.  Schimbările climatice sunt menționate sporadic în noul program de guvernare, iar adoptarea unei legi-cadru a climei nu mai este menționată. În domeniul schimbărilor climatice, noul guvern își propune doar continuarea asigurării surselor de finanțare pentru „implementarea proiectelor actuale în domeniile reducerii de emisii și adaptarea la schimbările climatice, în contextul îndeplinirii de către România a obligațiilor privind reducerea emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră”. Această formulare vagă lasă semne de întrebare, mai ales având în vedere că țintele de reducere a emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră diferă între documentele principale de planificare climatică strategică, Strategia pe Termen Lung a României de Reducere a Emisiilor de Gaze cu Efect de Seră, (SLT) și Planul Național Integrat pentru Energie și Schimbări Climatice (PNIESC).  STL, care setează obiectivele și programele României pentru abordarea schimbărilor climatice pe termen lung, este deja învechită. Neconcordanța acestei strategii cu PNIESC, recent actualizat, evidențiază lipsa coerenței între politici, pe care o lege cadru a climei ar putea-o rezolva. Pe lângă această abordare insuficientă a atenuării schimbărilor climatice, nici adaptarea la schimbările climatice nu beneficiază de mai multă atenție. Impactul schimbărilor climatice este din ce în ce mai vizibil, dar nu există referințe clare la implementarea Strategiei Naționale de Adaptarea la Schimbările Climatice, care fără o susținere politică puternică riscă să întâmpine deficiențe de punere în aplicare. Programul de guvernare prezintă lacune și în ceea ce privește impactul socio-economic al politicilor climatice, și conștientizarea publicului asupra acestuia. Spre exemplu, coaliția nu prezintă un plan pentru a gestiona potențialul impact asupra cetățenilor al noului sistem de comercializare a certificatelor de emisii (ETS2), adoptat la nivel de Uniune în 2023, ca parte a revizuirii directivei ETS. Această directivă prevede, în esență, impunerea unui preț asupra emisiilor de CO2 care rezultă din consumul de combustibili fosili în sectoarele transportului rutier și al clădirilor. Atenuarea impactului asupra consumatorilor vulnerabili este prevăzută la nivel de Uniune printr-un Fond Social pentru Climă (FSC), care ar urma să fie gestionat de statele membre prin Planuri Sociale pentru Climă. Programul de guvernare menționează doar că 30% din fondurile din FSC alocate României vor fi distribuite până în 2028, fără a oferi alte detalii. ETS2 este un instrument cu beneficii importante la nivelul UE (reducerea emisiilor cu 42% până în 2030), astfel contribuind la atenuarea schimbărilor climatice și stimularea adoptării de alternative cu emisii reduse de CO2 în gospodării și în transportul rutier. Potențialul impact al ETS2 asupra gospodăriilor, chiar dacă nu va fi dramatic în primii ani, riscă să creeze probleme de acceptare socială cu privire la necesitatea unor astfel de politici climatice. Fondul Social pentru Climă reprezintă o oportunitate pentru decidenți de a răspunde mai multor provocări socio-economice existente. Măsurile desemnate ar putea preveni potențialul impact asupra celor vulnerabili în urma introducerii ETS2, dacă sunt formulate și țintite corespunzător în urma unui dialog constructiv cu publicul și părțile interesate. În general, dialogul cu publicul despre politicile climatice trebuie ancorat în cele mai noi dovezi științifice, întărind legitimitatea măsurilor climatice la nivelul opiniei publice și contracarând narativele false și dezinformarea. O mai bună utilizare a expertizei științifice, spre exemplu prin consiliul consultativ pentru climă, ar putea contribui la îmbunătățirea politicilor climatice prin intermediul consilierii independente a experților și sporirea capacității instituționale. Programul de guvernare menționează doar susținerea cercetării în domenii strategice și provocări societale precum schimbările climatice, dar nu menționează concret ariile de cercetare și integrarea acestei munci în procesul de dezvoltare de politici publice. Reindustrializarea economiei...

Heavy industry, an engine for development The EU’s heavy industry is under enormous pressure. Across the continent, producers of steel, cement, chemicals, and other essential materials are announcing expensive transformation plans to maintain their competitiveness in a low-carbon world, while struggling to compete with cheap imports and to overcome the current sluggish demand for green products. Said transformation plans are often dependent on state-led infrastructure development – both for enabling their execution (such as carbon dioxide transport infrastructure for carbon management projects) and for creating lead markets to increase the certainty of investment payback (for example, long-term contracts for purchasing green steel at a premium price tag). They are also costly, both in terms of capital and operational expenses, and will require innovative financial and fiscal instruments, including private sector mobilisation, to ensure deployment at the pace required to keep EU industries operating and competing within emissions and resource constraints. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), heavy industry is both more emissions-intensive and more economically important than in the rest of the Union. Transforming it to a low-carbon industry could bring a significant payoff in terms of economic development and safeguarding of jobs than in other countries. The demand for carbon-intensive products is also unquestionable, with the rapid economic development of CEE countries requiring large volumes of construction materials. However, the CEE countries’ climate policy push is also weaker, public purses are more constrained, and the recent fomenting of far-right agendas may put social “green-lash” high on the list of challenges facing industrial transformation. Under stringent EU climate targets, CEE border countries such as Romania and Bulgaria also face a higher risk of incurring an industrial trade deficit due to their proximity to cheap extra-EU industrial production - even in regional markets judged to have low trade intensity (such as cement). Transforming CEE industry is therefore as challenging as it is necessary – and its dependence on both infrastructure development and creative funding mechanisms, outlined above, may just be the key to achieving it. The Cohesion Policy, a facilitator of development The progress of CEE countries in reducing their industrial emissions over the last three decades has been mostly driven by downsizing or shutting down legacy economically inefficient industrial facilities from the communist regime. As in the rest of Europe, concerns about competitiveness are reshaping the decarbonisation agenda to a dual “joint decarbonisation and development” approach. For Central and Eastern Europe, this notion of development is still very much predicated (though likely not for much longer) on regional convergence with wealthier EU regions. This offers an opening into combining the economic development imperative with the need to mobilise finance for industrial decarbonisation in a way that can foster regional economic cohesion: the EU Cohesion Policy. The EU Cohesion Policy, the “prime investment policy of the EU” is a broad funding mechanism aiming to reduce the economic, social, and territorial disparities still evident between more developed and less developed European countries. It is delivered through four main funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), and Just Transition Fund (JTF). The majority of this funding is allocated to CEE countries: of a total of €392 billion in the 2021-2027 financial period, Poland alone was allocated nearly €80 billion, and remaining CEE countries and Greece a total of €150 billion. A substantial share of Cohesion Policy funding goes towards infrastructure, particularly transport. In the 2014-2020 period, the single largest direct beneficiaries of funding were the Polish and Romanian national companies for roads and highways, receiving just over €13 billion. Total funding for network infrastructures in transport and energy amounted to €66 billion, while funding for low-carbon transformation totalled €50 billion, out of a total of €531 billion planned. The primary funding instruments for investment in these domains are the CF and ERDF. The substantial share of Cohesion Policy funding available for investment in CEE infrastructure and low-carbon transformation highlights two things. Firstly, there is a well-established funding instrument for the economic development of less developed European regions, much of which goes to large construction projects requiring substantial volumes of steel, concrete, and other construction products. Secondly, there is an opportunity to improve the efficiency of Cohesion Policy funding (already a heated topic in Brussels), by conditioning infrastructure spending on climate performance and mobilising investments in low-carbon products and services as part of a broad industrial transformation. Aligning development with climate through public procurement criteria How could climate conditionalities be implemented within Cohesion Policy infrastructure spending? One solution is to leverage the role of public entities as buyers of the products and services needed to develop new infrastructure. With the vast majority of CEE countries directing most of their funding to public entities, public procurement criteria applied to Cohesion Policy spending could unlock demand for industrial products meeting certain specifications – including their environmental and climate impact, with strong social safeguards in place. Incorporating climate and environmental criteria into public procurement is far from a new idea, but is not legally mandated at EU level. Instead, the EU has a voluntary scheme for Green Public Procurement (GPP), covering fourteen categories of products – two of which are suitable for generating demand for clean industrial products to the scale required for a genuine transformation of heavy industry (office building construction and road construction). While some Member States have adopted their own Green Public Procurement frameworks at national level, these are mostly absent in Central and Eastern Europe (with some exceptions, for example Lithuania), or where they do exist, they include relatively vague criteria on the emissions and environmental performance of industrial products (e.g., Romania’s recently published GPP action plan). Leveraging the existing framework for GPP criteria could serve as a starting point for introducing climate conditionalities in the disbursement of Cohesion Policy funding instruments. This means that Member States, who are responsible for selecting projects to be funded under these instruments, can introduce product-level or project-level criteria into their funding contracts, ensuring that beneficiaries (public and private alike) implement such criteria to reduce the life-cycle...

Achizițiile publice pot crea noi oportunități pentru dezvoltarea industriei cu emisii reduse de carbon  Ambițiile europene în materie de climă și mediu asumate prin Pactul Verde European responsabilizează statele europene, inclusiv operatorii industriali să își reducă în mod accelerat emisiile. Acest lucru presupune, printre altele, utilizarea de noi tehnologii inovatoare, înlocuirea combustibililor fosili cu surse curate de energie și eficientizarea consumului de resurse și  energie. Transformarea fundamentală a industriei va fi, prin urmare, un proces de durată, care va necesita investiții majore din partea operatorilor industriali, dar și suport din partea statului pentru acoperirea costurilor semnificative de investiții, pentru extinderea și dezvoltarea infrastructurii necesare. Există mai multe mijloace prin care decarbonizarea industriei ar putea fi susținută de către stat, fie că vorbim de facilități fiscale, granturi și subvenții sau mecanisme legislative de stimulare a cererii pentru produse cu emisii reduse de carbon, cum sunt sistemele de Achiziții Publice Ecologice (APE). Sistemele APE reprezintă procesul prin care autoritățile publice urmăresc să achiziționeze lucrări, bunuri sau servicii, care au un impact redus asupra mediului de-a lungul întregului ciclu de viață, în detrimentul produselor cu emisii ridicate de carbon. Potrivit economiștilor, este o alternativă mai eficientă pentru susținerea industriei în procesul de tranziție verde, cu impact mai limitat asupra bugetului național. Acest aspect este esențial pentru România, o țară cu spațiu fiscal redus comparativ cu state precum Germania și Franța, unde se acordă ajutoare de stat semnificative pentru decarbonizarea industriei. Prin implementarea unui sistem APE funcțional, industria din România ar beneficia de predictibilitate și susținere în procesul de decarbonizare, menținându-și astfel competitivitatea pe plan european și global. În contextul presiunii legislative europene de reducere graduală a emisiilor de carbon, implementarea unui asemenea mecanism va contribui atât la creșterea avantajului competitiv al României, pe termen mediu și lung, cât și la atingerea țintelor de reducere a emisiilor la nivel național. Care este legătura între competitivitatea industriei și APE? Ultimii cinci ani au fost marcați de dezvoltarea și actualizarea unor politici europene esențiale în transformarea industriei. Pe lângă multiplele directive europene din cadrul pachetului Fit-for-55, declarațiile Comisiei Europene, din ultimele luni, au adus în prim plan importanța decarbonizării industriei în menținerea competitivității pe piețele globale. Potrivit unui studiu EPG, în absența unor măsuri concertate de decarbonizare, până în 2030, costul total de emisii pentru industriile oțelului, cimentului și chimicalelor din România va crește de patru ori, comparativ cu 2024. Această creștere generează un risc real de mărire a costurilor de producție, reducerea sau chiar relocarea facilităților de producție. Impactul asupra României ar putea fi, prin urmare, unul semnificativ. Sectorul industrial contribuie cu 22,8% din Valoarea Adăugată Brută și asigură aproximativ 20% din actualele locuri de muncă. Mai mult, anumite industrii energo-intensive sunt importante din punct de vedere strategic pentru România, precum producția de oțel primar, care în alte țări din regiune dispare gradual, riscând astfel o dependență crescută de importuri. Pe de altă parte, emisiile generate de industrie însumează 14% din emisiile naționale, iar reducerea lor va implica în multe cazuri transformarea fundamentală a proceselor industriale, cu costuri investiționale semnificative. Sistemele de APE reprezintă un instrument de sprijin indirect în procesul de decarbonizare. Ca urmare a implementării planurilor complexe de transformare industrială, acestea pot aduce un plus de predictibilitate și certitudine în ceea ce privește cererea pentru produsele industriale verzi. Implementarea unui sistem de APE în România ar genera cerere previzibilă pentru produsele ecologice din partea unui cumpărător major (statul)dispus să achiziționeze cantități semnificative de materiale cu o amprentă redusă de carbon. Statul este cel mai mare achizitor: în 2023, ponderea achizițiilor publice la PIB-ul țării a ajuns la 19% în anul 2023 (aprox. 61 miliarde de euro), de la 8% în 2018. Mai mult, aproape un sfert din valoarea totală a achizițiilor publice este reprezentată de lucrările de construcții, care utilizează cantități semnificative de beton, oțel, și alte produse ale industriei energo-intensive, unde procesul de decarbonizare va fi cel mai complex. Achizițiile publice pentru aceste categorii de lucrări vor continua să crească (spre exemplu, România s-a angajat să aloce circa 2% din PIB anual pentru proiectele de infrastructură și transport, până în 2030). În plus, o proporție semnificativă a investițiilor în infrastructură este realizată prin fonduri europene, inclusiv prin Planul Național pentru Redresare și Reziliență, care condiționează realizarea proiectelor de îndeplinirea criteriilor verzi. Prin urmare, achizițiile publice ecologice pot influența în mod semnificativ evoluția și înverzirea economiei, iar investițiile în infrastructură și construcții ar putea deveni un instrument relevant de influențare a pieței pentru decarbonizarea industriei energo-intensive din România. Rolul Planului Național de Acțiune pentru Achiziții Publice Ecologice 2024 – 2027 Până în prezent, utilizarea achizițiilor publice ca instrument strategic de decarbonizare a fost sporadic aplicat în UE, unde prețul cel mai mic reprezintă cel mai important criteriu de evaluare pentru peste jumătate din achizițiile publice din statele membre. La nivelul UE, există un cadru voluntar de APE, prin intermediul căruia au fost definite criterii ecologice pentru 14 categorii de produse, servicii și lucrări. Aceste criterii au fost adoptate integral sau parțial de anumite state membre (precum Olanda, Suedia și Italia), fiind stabilite ținte progresive anuale în cadrul planurilor naționale de APE.  Criteriile se bazează pe instrumente precum evaluarea impactului pe întregul ciclu de viață (LCA) sau standarde și etichete ecologice, printre altele. Suplimentar față de criteriile voluntare, există câteva directive europene, cum ar fi Directiva privind Performanța Energetică a Clădirilor, ce includ criterii obligatorii care trebuie să se regăsească în achizițiile publice la nivel național. Deși au caracter voluntar, obiectivul planurilor naționale de APE este de a transmite semnale clare pieței că există cerere pentru produse și servicii cu emisii reduse, precum și de a pregăti autoritățile publice și operatorii economici pentru achiziții complexe, cum sunt cele ce prevăd criterii ecologice. România a adoptat Legea privind Achizițiile Publice Verzi în 2016, iar în 2023 a publicat Strategia Națională în domeniul Achizițiilor Publice (2023-2027). Recent, în septembrie 2024, Ministerul Mediului, Apelor și Pădurilor a lansat spre consultare publică noul Plan de Acțiune al României pentru Achiziții Publice Ecologice 2024-2027, care va înlocui planul expirat încă din 2013. Noul plan include o listă...

Transformarea industriei: o necesitate presantă În contextul geopolitic și economic actual, politicile industriale din Uniunea Europeană sunt esențiale pentru a asigura securitatea, prosperitatea și atenuarea schimbărilor climatice. Un nou val de politici și scheme de suport, axate pe transformarea sustenabilă a industriilor statelor membre, reflectă o reorientare a gândirii strategice atât la nivel european cât și național. Astfel, mult-așteptatul raport al lui Mario Draghi a propus o abordare duală a problematicii tranziției industriale axată pe obiectivele de decarbonizare și competitivitate, două dimensiuni strâns întrepătrunse, care trebuie abordate concomitent. În acest sens, este nevoie de un mix de politici și stimulente economice care să permită operatorilor industriali, mai ales din industriile energo-intensive, să se transforme și să poată concura pe piețele europene și globale, cu o expunere cât mai redusă la vulnerabilități pe lanțul de producție. Aceste semnale au fost preluate de către decidenții din România, rezultând în noi angajamente de susținere și finanțare a marii industrii.Deși binevenite, mecanismele propuse abordează doar parțial provocările de competitivitate ale industriei românești și cel mai probabil, în forma actuală nu vor reuși să prevină decalajul României față de alte state europene. Cum susține România transformarea industriei sale? Istoricul schemelor de suport pentru industria grea din România reflecta, până recent, o abordare monolitică și prea puțin mulată pe complexitățile tehnologice, comerciale, și sociale ale tranziției industriale. Din 2010 și până în prezent, schemele de ajutor de stat destinate industriei au vizat în principal reducerea costurilor indirecte de emisii și a costurilor de energie, fără a stimula în mod eficient transformarea industrială. Pentru a susține continuarea activității industriale pe termen mediu și lung, ajutoarele de stat ar trebui condiționate de cerințe de reducere a emisiilor dar și țintite către noi tehnologii și procese de producție industrială. Asemenea scheme de suport trebuie lansate urgent, având în vedere calendarul de eliminare a alocărilor gratuite de certificate de emisii pentru industria energo-intensivă, conform reviziei Directivei EU ETS. Din 2034, aceste sectoare industriale vor plăti integral pentru emisiile generate.   În septembrie 2024, Guvernul a lansat prima schemă amplă de ajutor de stat destinată tranziției industriei românești, ca parte a “Planului Național pentru Marea Industrie”. Schema de ajutor, în valoare de 1 miliard de euro, este destinată investițiilor în măsuri de reducere a emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră, și va acorda un sprijin de până la 100 de milioane de euro per beneficiar. Anunțul schemei vine la puțin timp după lansarea în consultare publică a Programului-Cheie 7 din Fondul de Modernizare, de asemenea destinat susținerii operatorilor industriali prin finanțarea investițiilor de modernizare și eficientizare energetică a instalațiilor. Bugetul total al programului este de 150 de milioane de euro, cu sprijin maxim de 30 de milioane de euro per beneficiar. Deși schemele reprezintă un semnal binevenit din partea decidenților români, acestea nu vor reuși să stimuleze transformarea profundă a industriei grele, dacă nu sunt bine calibrate la magnitudinea acestei transformări. Măsurile de sprijin ar trebui țintite către proiecte de impact în sectoarele cele mai vulnerabile în procesul de tranziție și care prezintă un avantaj competitiv. Schemele de ajutor de stat ar trebui să fie dimensionate proporțional cu efortul financiar necesar pentru transformare și suficient de flexibile pentru a absorbi volatilitatea costurilor pe termen lung asociate transformării, inclusiv prețul carbonului din piața EU ETS. În caz contrar, Planul Național pentru Marea Industrie riscă să cheltuiască în mod ineficient resursele publice, scăzând totodată șansele industriei românești de a ține pasul cu competitori din alte țări europene. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. She is passionate about volunteer work, being one of the founding members of European Youth Energy Network and a professional speaker for conferences dedicated to the role of youth in energy transition. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

With the adoption of its Long-Term Strategy and the drafting of a revised National Energy and Climate Plan, Romania has made significant strides in planning the decarbonisation of its economy. Current strategic documents can be enhanced through more comprehensive and detailed plans for implementing cost-optimal decarbonisation pathways, backed by clear policy and financing instruments. To this end, Carbon-Free Europe, Evolved Energy Research and Energy Policy Group have prepared a detailed model outlining eight scenarios for decarbonising Romania’s economy. The results of the model point to the following high-level conclusions: The reduction of final energy consumption is a primary decarbonisation lever, especially in the buildings and transport sectors. Romania must increase its ambitions for the development of clean energy capacities, with a focus on solar energy coupled with storage in the medium term, and on onshore and offshore wind energy in the long-term. Nuclear energy can also play a key role especially if the technology sees significant cost reductions in the long run. Electrification must be accelerated through the deployment of heat pumps for residential heating and electric mobility. The electrification of industry and foreseen expansion in industrial activity will further increase electricity demand. While a short-term expansion in natural gas consumption is projected, especially driven by the power sector, demand across sectors is expected to gradually contract post-2030, with remaining consumption in 2050 coming mainly from residual use in industry. Developing Romania’s electricity infrastructure is essential, including transmission and distribution grids, interconnectors, and storage capacities. Hydrogen use must be prioritised for hard-to-abate industries and some segments of the transport sector. The cost effectiveness of hydrogen consumption in the power sector and for heat production is expected to be low. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) infrastructure must be deployed immediately to facilitate industrial decarbonisation. No CCS applications are foreseen in the energy sector. Interconnection capacity must be strengthened and developed for electricity, hydrogen and CO2, with Romania being expected to be a key regional player. Romania is well placed for capturing CO2 from biofuels production, generating negative emissions and supporting the development of geological storage capacities. 10.Approximately €6 bn/year of investments are estimated until 2050 for electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels production, electricity and hydrogen storage, and carboncapture. With most EU funding sources being available only until 2032, Romania needs to plan how it can mobilise other public and private sources to maintain the pace of investments Mihnea Cătuți, EPG Head of Research Mihnea is the Head of Research at EPG, coordinating the research strategy and activities within the organisation. His expertise includes EU climate and energy policy and the transition in South-East Europe.He is also an Associate in E3G’s Clean Economy Programme, contributing to the work on industrial decarbonisation. In the past, Mihnea was an associate researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), where he led the work on the future of hydrogen in the EU. He was also an associate lecturer in Public Policy at the University of York. Mihnea has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Bristol and a Masters in European Public Policy from the University of York and the Central European University. He was awarded a PhD from the University of York with a thesis focusing energy and climate governance in the EU. Contact: mihnea.catuti@epg-thinktank.org

Romania’s industrial production is essential for the national economy, but faces multiple challenges. At one-fifth of Gross Value Added and workforce employment, Romania’s industry is a significant economic contributor. Heavy industry (steel, cement, chemicals and others) will face rising emissions costs and major competitiveness issues in the EU’s transition. At the same time, decarbonising heavy industry comes with significant capital and operational costs, as well as competition for high-value resources such as hydrogen. The costs and benefits of overcoming the transition challenge are significant. This study presents a high-level cost assessment of decarbonisation pathways for Romania’s primary steel, cement, and chemical sectors. In the cement sector: Deep decarbonisation will be unachievable without carbon capture and storage, which will require state support until green clinker becomes competitive However, without decarbonisation clinker will cost 10 times more in 2050 than today due to emissions costs, significantly outweighing any green clinker cost premium o At an estimated €900 million per average facility total payout under a simulated Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) scheme running 2030-2044, cement will need other support instruments, such as Green Public Procurement, to bear the cost of its decarbonisation In primary steel production: The capital investments and increased OPEX costs of green steel could drive an increase in liquid steel costs of 25% by 2030, with green steel only becoming competitive with conventional steel towards 2050. But transitioning to green steel would save nearly €1.7 billion/year in emissions costs by 2050, and could yield revenues from surplus emissions allowances o The cost and availability of green hydrogen will be a major driver for successful decarbonisation of primary steel o The state support required until green steel becomes competitive could take the form of OPEX support under a CCfD scheme. In the chemicals sector: Electrifying industrial heat in the basic chemicals sector could bring significant energy cost savings and abate at least 17-25% of emissions The production of fertilisers will need to transition to green ammonia and apply additional decarbonisation measures to remain competitive, with public support likely required to cover a green ammonia premium and maintain competitiveness in the face of potentially cheap imports Affordable renewable hydrogen will be essential for Romania to minimise import dependence of fertilisers and even potentially become a green methanol producer. Without support for decarbonisation investments, there is a real risk of delocalising domestic production and increasing import dependence If no immediate action is taken, there is a risk of breaking up domestic supply chains and delocalising emissions-intensive production abroad (liquid steel, clinker, and ammonia production) However, importing green industrial products offers relatively limited cost advantages, at the expense of jobs, economic growth, and strategic autonomy for Romania An equitable combination of state support and private investment will be required to offset the cost advantages of relocating production and importing green products, and a mix of funding, fiscal, and market creation mechanisms will be required To maintain competitiveness, safeguard jobs, and become a green industrial production hub, Romania must take key actions: Trial a Green Public Procurement system for key infrastructure projects (including the use of steel and concrete), and evaluate the potential to expand to products such as vehicles and ships Chart a new course for its industrial policy, aligning with the Green Deal and forthcoming EU framework on industrial decarbonisation Evaluate detailed transition costs and set a clear target for public investment in industrial decarbonisation by 2030, both anchored in concrete and mature decarbonisation plans which must be communicated by industrial operators Design and implement a Carbon Contracts for Difference scheme for the cement and steel sectors Publish a detailed infrastructure deployment plan, including CO2 transport and storage and hydrogen infrastructure

Regulamentul privind industria net-zero (NZIA), adoptat la sfârșitul lunii mai, marchează o nouă abordare a politicii industriale în Uniunea Europeană. Noul regulament vine ca răspuns la o îngrijorare crescândă că industria Uniunii își va pierde competitivitatea într-o lume cu emisii reduse de dioxid de carbon (CO2). Fiind încă dependentă de industria grea, dar având și un mare potențial de a dezvolta noi industrii născute din nevoia de decarbonizare, România ar trebui să privească NZIA ca pe o șansă de a deveni un jucător în industria cu emisii reduse de dioxid de carbon, precum și de a depăși barierele instituționale care împiedică de prea mult timp această dezvoltare. Potențialul românesc acoperă un număr de industrii-cheie, cum ar fi energia regenerabilă, producția de hidrogen verde și captarea și stocarea carbonului (CCS), unde dispozițiile NZIA privind accelerarea proceselor de autorizare pot stimula semnificativ investițiile. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

The public discourse is still flooded with faulty narratives on the future of hydrogen, especially on the doubtful expectation that hydrogen can either replace the use of natural gas in most current uses and it can therefore provide a lifeline for the continued use of fossil fuels throughout the following decades. To counter such narratives, this paper dispels a set of nine myths that are still pervasive in national discussions on hydrogen.

Revizuirea Planului Național Integrat privind Energia și Schimbările Climatice (PNIESC) reprezintă o oportunitate de a explora opțiunile României pentru reducerea cu 99% a emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră (GES) până în 2050 și cu 78% până în 2030, ținte stabilite în Strategia pe Termen Lung (STL) și incluse în forma draft a PNIESC.

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) agreement between the Council and the European Parliament establishes a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net zero technologies and manufacturing ecosystem. The regulation aims to boost domestic production of clean technologies so that EU member states may develop a more even, competitive and green industrial sector fit for a carbon-free world.  Still, Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act, agreed upon last month, both delivers and underdelivers, according to EPG’s experts. While the new provision to speed-up permitting for production sites for clean technologies and the introduction of net zero acceleration valleys will for sure be beneficial to enabling cleantech manufacturing in the EU, many implementation details are left for the member-states to figure out on their own.  Quotes Luciana Miu – EPG Head of Clean Economy, on NZIA's meaning for Romania: "The European Parliament and Council have reached an agreement on the NZIA, a key policy underpinning the EU’s transition to net zero. Its effect on Member States will no doubt be profound: if appropriately implemented, the Act will enable a new paradigm of green growth and industrial transformation in the global race to scale up net zero technologies.  For Romania, opportunities abound to become a low-carbon hub for Central and Eastern Europe. The NZIA’s obligations on speeding up permitting can help remove longstanding administrative barriers for Romania’s development of clean energy projects, while non-price resilience criteria can trickle down to enable nearshoring and local economic development. Through its obligation to develop geological CO2 storage, the NZIA will also launch carbon capture and storage in Romania, crucial to decarbonising the cement industry and enabling future negative emissions.  The NZIA is not without its flaws. Its relatively vague definitions of net zero technologies can lead to superficial application, without due consideration of actual life-cycle climate and economic impact. Romania must ensure that implementation of the NZIA follows a clear strategy for smart, sustainable growth and transformation in line with nationally adopted climate targets." Contact Person Luciana Miu – EPG Head of Clean Economy: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

It is difficult to overstate the urgency and magnitude of Romania’s industrial transformation. Heavy industry sectors such as steel, cement, and chemicals employ thousands of workers and are key contributors to the national economy. But their conventional, carbon-intensive processes are becoming increasingly obsolete in a world rapidly moving towards sustainable forms of production, as the competitive edge in industry slowly shifts from cheap to green. Transforming these processes is a sizeable challenge, but also an opportunity of significant proportions. By 2034, Romania’s steel, cement, and chemicals manufacturers, all sectors deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage, will no longer benefit from exemptions from paying for their emissions. In today’s carbon prices, this could mean costs of €60 million per year just for emissions for a plant producing 1 million tonnes (Mt) of cement; close to double if EU carbon prices rise as predicted by some models. There is one decade left for Romania’s heavy industry to slash its emissions in order to continue operating and competing. This is just about enough time to assess feasibility, make an investment decision, secure new equipment and technologies from an increasingly oversubscribed market, install, test, and phase in these new technologies and processes, and reskill the workforce. All this under the optimistic assumption that Romania’s existing infrastructure is fit for purpose, new infrastructure has been deployed to the required scale, and state support is forthcoming to leverage the massive required investments. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

The decarbonisation of primary steel production is one of the most pressing challenges for the future of Romania’s industry. A highly carbon-intensive process, conventional primary steelmaking faces increasing pressure to transform in the context of the EU’s climate commitments: a phase-out of free allocation under the EU Emissions Trading System, upcoming regulations on sustainable products, and a rapidly rising carbon price. This pressure is insufficiently recognised in Romania’s industrial and climate strategies: its Long-Term Strategy, draft National Energy and Climate Plan, and draft national Industrial Strategy all fail to account for the scale of the transformation challenge and the associated opportunities for green steelmaking. While Romania’s steel sector has shrunk since 1990, it still contributes significantly to the national economy and employment, and emits approx. 6.3% of total national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. These contributions are centred on Liberty Galați, Romania’s only remaining primary steel producer, which employed nearly 5,000 people in and emitted 4.39 mega-tonnes (Mt) of CO2 (5.9% of Romania’s total CO2 emissions) in 2021. It is a major contributor to economic activity in the Galați county, a Just Transition region, and is an essential part of any attempt to revive Romania’s upstream manufacturing sector and any ambition to supply domestic and foreign downstream sectors, such as the auto industry, with high-quality, low-carbon steel. The main pathway to deeply decarbonise conventional primary steelmaking is conversion of the conventional blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) process to the direct reduction of iron, coupled with melting in electric arc furnaces (DRI-EAF). To achieve deep decarbonisation, the DRI process must use low-carbon hydrogen as a reducing agent, and the whole steelmaking process must be supplied by renewable electricity. Transitioning from BF-BOF to hydrogen-based DRI-EAF production will shift the fuel mix of primary steelmaking from fossil-based to using primarily electricity and hydrogen, and will change raw material requirements, including an increased consumption of scrap steel. Other decarbonisation pathways include a complete conversion to secondary steel production (using scrap steel or imported green iron) or carbon capture, all with their own challenges. Liberty Galați has publicly announced a decarbonisation pathway involving a conversion from BF-BOF to DRI-EAF, using natural gas as a transitional DRI agent and fully switching to renewable hydrogen by 2030. This deep decarbonisation plan (the “GREENSTEEL plan”) will accompany a doubling in production, reaching 4.1 Mt of liquid steel by 2030. According to our estimates, executing the GREENSTEEL plan could slash emissions from the production of liquid steel (responsible for 81% of emissions in primary steel production) by 93% by 2030, a reduction of 3.26 Mt CO2 per year. This could give Liberty Galați a significant competitive edge as a green steel supplier, meeting increasing demand from downstream sectors such as the auto industry. It could also spur a local green economy, including for the production of renewable electricity and hydrogen to supply the DRI-EAF pathway, which will consume over 160,000 tonnes of hydrogen per year. To truly achieve deep decarbonisation, the transformation of Liberty Galați under the GREENSTEEL plan will require a massive mobilisation to deploy renewable energy capacities, invest in renewable hydrogen production, and secure a reliable supply of scrap steel. Electricity consumption of the steelmaking process alone would increase ten-fold, and even if hydrogen production is outsourced abroad, meeting the target specific emissions of the GREENSTEEL plan will require the carbon intensity of Romania’s electricity grid to halve. Using domestically-produced renewable hydrogen will require an additional 6.35 GW of renewable electricity capacity, 136% of Romania’s total installed wind and solar energy in January 2024. The renewable hydrogen requirement of Liberty Galați in 2030 would be more than currently stipulated in Romania’s national Hydrogen Strategy for the entire Romanian economy, and scrap steel consumption would increase four-fold, amounting to 80% of Romania’s current scrap exports. The investment cost of the transformation itself, including the operating costs of using renewable hydrogen, will likely require state support both directly and indirectly to increase investment certainty. If Romania’s primary steelmaking is to spearhead industrial transformation and revive the competitiveness of manufacturing, urgent action must be taken to provide concrete, detailed transformation plans which are accounted for in national industrial and climate strategies. Targeted and carefully sized public financing instruments, including Green Public Procurement and Carbon Contracts for Difference, will be essential to meet upfront investment costs, especially in the coming decade as industrial operators begin to strain under increasing carbon prices. Infrastructure development will also be crucial, most importantly the deployment of renewable electricity capacities, strengthening of Romania’s national electricity grid, installation of electrolysers and construction of hydrogen transport infrastructure. New supply chains for raw materials will also be needed, particularly a rethinking of Romania’s export-oriented scrap steel sector. These actions will be necessary regardless how Liberty Galați decarbonises and require a shift in the approach of policymakers to the challenges of Romania’s industrial transformation. A correction was made to this report on 14/03/2024. The increase in direct electricity consumption quoted in the Conclusions and Recommendations section (page 33) was corrected to 1,000%. A further correction was made to this report on 03/06/2024. Figure 4 (page 17), Table 5 (page 16), and Table 4 (page 15) were updated with small corrections to the values for electricity and natural gas consumption. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

The Commission released a comprehensive impact assessment outlining potential approaches to reach the established objective of achieving climate neutrality in the European Union by 2050. In accordance with this assessment, the Commission suggests a 90% net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2040, relative to 1990 levels. It also articulates several imperative policy conditions for achieving this target, including meeting 2030 goals, industrial competitiveness, and an inclusive dialogue on post-2030 climate action. In particular, a just transition with adequate measures for energy price affordability and the mitigation of social impact will be essential.     Quote Ioana Vasiliu - EPG Senior Researcher: "Romania, as a member of the EU, should align with this target and play a significant role in contributing to the overall climate action.  To set its commitment and ensure accountability, the implementation of Climate Law, including clear emissions goals for 2030, 2040, and 2050, is imperative. This legal framework will play a pivotal role in addressing essential aspects, including industrial competitiveness, where sectoral emissions reduction plans will be crucial for Romania’s industries to compete in a low carbon world. Enshrining energy efficiency targets into a Climate Law will also be key to increasing the rate and depth of renovation in Romania’s building stock, which are struggling to keep up with the pace required to meet the EU's climate goals.  Recognizing the socio-economic impact of the transition to climate neutrality, especially in terms of energy poverty, a just transition is crucial. Given the ambition of reducing EU-wide emissions by 90% until 2040, Member States must devote substantial attention to putting in place effective measures for managing the subsequent impact on jobs and local economies, which will be vital for a smooth transition towards a sustainable future.  To fully align with the EU's more ambitious 2040 climate targets, Romania also needs to intensify efforts in critical areas such as transportation and land use. By implementing policies that support sustainable agriculture and protect natural ecosystems, Romania can contribute to the EU's climate targets while also safeguarding its natural heritage."   Contact person: Luciana Miu – EPG Head of Clean Economy: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org Ioana Vasiliu – EPG Senior Researcher: ioana.vasiliu@epg-thinktank.org

The European Commission’s first ever strategy governing carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) – the Industrial Carbon Management Strategy – is an important step for the deployment of CCS in Europe. For Romania and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with potentially significant carbon storage capacity and important industries that will need to capture their emissions, this long-awaited Strategy sets a strategic direction which should enable firmer and quicker action on making CCUS a reality, and enabling a fair geographical spread of new technologies and infrastructure across a currently West-centric Europe.    Quote Luciana Miu - EPG Head of Clean Economy: "The Strategy does well to broach the subject of actual climate benefits of CCUS projects, including a focus on “process emissions” in the decade to 2030 and a chapter on the removal of atmospheric and biogenic CO2. However, the incoming Commission can be bolder in differentiating climate-positive use cases of CCUS, particularly given the vague language around capturing CO2 in the power sector in the EU’s 2040 climate target.  While restrictive lists of eligible capture sites may be counterproductive, there is really no such thing as “clean carbon”, and facilities should be required to conduct a thorough assessment of their technological options for reaching a clear emissions target, before requesting public funding for carbon capture.  Importantly, the Strategy also addresses the issues of CO2 transport, a key part of the CCUS value chain, and we hope to soon see an associated dedicated regulatory package on this complex issue, as indicated in the Strategy. Funding will also be available, with a call forthcoming for cross-border CO2 transport infrastructure under the Connecting Europe Facility. This is a good opportunity for CEE countries to plan regional CO2 transport, developing storage hubs in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea areas to balance the North Sea-focused CCS landscape in Europe. The commitment to develop minimum standards for CO2 streams is also welcome.  For an efficient decarbonisation of EU industries, it is vital that CCUS projects demonstrate climate benefits in line with emissions targets. Carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) pathways which do not allow for carbon recycling (including e-fuels and Enhanced Hydrocarbon Recovery) should be subject to rigorous accounting to avoid unnecessary sunk costs and greenwashing. The Strategy’s promise to start addressing these issues in the 2026 EU ETS revision may not be enough to firmly direct EU CCUS sector towards projects with durable climate benefits. Indeed, this is the original remit of the CCUS Observatory, a watchdog project proposed by EPG and now being piloted by the European Commission.  It is disappointing to see the ever-neglected issue of public perception of CCUS only briefly addressed in the Strategy. As co-chair of the CCUS Forum’s Working Group on public perception of CCUS, EPG heard consistently from a wide range of stakeholders about the importance of considering public perception, particularly at community level, and engaging in earnest public dialogue for upcoming projects. The lack of a clear mandate for project developers to conduct transparent public engagement is a missed opportunity. It risks leading to a fragmented approach in aligning CCUS project deployment with social needs and concerns, and ensuring that CCUS is part of a Just Transition."   Contact person: Luciana Miu – EPG Head of Clean Economy: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

La finalul anului 2023, Guvernul României a publicat mult-așteptata Strategie industrială a României 2023-2027, promisă în programul coaliției de guvernare. Publicarea acestei strategii este un pas important în coagularea unui cadru instituțional capabil să gestioneze provocările multiple și intersectate ale industriei din România și să asigure o tranziție digitală și verde, atât durabilă, cât și justă. Cu toate acestea, în forma sa actuală strategia industrială oferă mai multe semne de întrebare decât răspunsuri spre soluționarea acestor provocări, și are nevoie de o abordare mai riguroasă pentru a funcționa drept piatra de temelie a tranziției industriei românești.

În 2024 România ar trebui să își regândească modelul de dezvoltare economică printr-o reorientare către tehnologiile viitorului și tranziția către o economie cu emisii reduse de gaze cu efect de seră. Pentru aceasta este necesară renunțarea la apatia clasei politice și la căutarea soluțiilor în trecut și reorientarea priorităților naționale către o economie bazată pe utilizarea surselor de energie curată, dezvoltarea infrastructurii energetice, atragerea lanțurilor valorice pentru tehnologiile verzi și susținerea capacității de cercetare și inovare pentru crearea de locuri de muncă bine plătite, care să poată răspunde provocărilor următoarelor decenii. Mihnea Cătuți, EPG Head of Research Mihnea is the Head of Research at EPG, coordinating the research strategy and activities within the organisation. His expertise includes EU climate and energy policy and the transition in South-East Europe.He is also an Associate in E3G’s Clean Economy Programme, contributing to the work on industrial decarbonisation. In the past, Mihnea was an associate researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), where he led the work on the future of hydrogen in the EU. He was also an associate lecturer in Public Policy at the University of York. Mihnea has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Bristol and a Masters in European Public Policy from the University of York and the Central European University. He is currently finalising his PhD at the University of York focusing on energy and climate governance in the EU. Contact: mihnea.catuti@epg-thinktank.org

A successful negotiation is one that leaves no one fully satisfied with the result, but also not fully disappointed. From this viewpoint, the final COP28 statement can be considered an achievement. The text is arguably balanced and inclusive of the needs of all members. As COP28 in Dubai came to an end, some labeled it a failure, while others marked it as a significant advancement in climate action. It's probably a bit of both. Even before its start, COP 28 was marked by the suspicions surrounding the vested interests of the oil-rich hosting country. This time, a different and more ambitious set of expectations were publicly set compared to, say, COP24, which was hosted by Poland, a fossil-fuel-dependent country – even as it came after some controversies surrounding statements made by the COP28 president. This marks an evolution in the advancement of the global conversation on climate change. The conference started with strong commitments for the Loss and Damage Fund – a topic discussed for over 30 years, since COP13 in Bali, which was center-stage at last year’s COP in Sharm el-Sheikh. The Fund is meant to compensate climate-vulnerable developing countries for climate change impacts that have not or cannot be addressed through mitigation and adaptation measures. Importantly, an agreement was reached on the operationalization of the Fund and funding arrangements. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been promised within the first days of the event, with the total pledges reaching $792 million by the closing of the conference. The World Bank has been chosen to host the fund for the first four years. Among COP28’s main achievements were the global call for tripling renewable generation and doubling the annual energy efficiency improvement rate by 2030. While the implementation of these efforts will need to be defined more granularly through the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), the urgency of a faster-paced transition has not been disputed. Another one – arguably even more impactful – was the pledge of 50 oil companies to address carbon emission in their operations and, more importantly, to reach near-zero methane emissions and to end routine flaring in their activity by 2030. As expected, the most controversial topic, given the host of this year's COP, was the language on phasing-down (instead of the expected phasing-out) fossil fuel utilization. The “transition away” wording of the final statement was celebrated by some as historic and caused dismay for the more climate ambitious Parties. The final statement certainly hinted to the knotty negotiations and, ultimately, to the complexity of giving up fossil fuel production and consumption (especially in emerging markets). In fact, fossil fuels are embedded in so many of the fundamental processes underpinning both developed and developing economies, that transitioning away to low emissions alternatives will take much more than words in the COP final agreement. Nonetheless, decarbonisation cannot be achieved without a near-complete elimination of fossil fuel use, and the final text marks a small step forward in this gargantuan challenge. One of the most important levers to accelerate the transition, particularly in developing countries, is finance. Several announcements were made at COP28. Multilateral Development Banks announced additional climate finance commitments worth $180 billion through various programs and country platforms. Finance pledges were also announced for nature-based solutions and green industrialization in Africa. On the private sector side, UAE announced the launch of Alterra – a catalytic fund worth $30 billion, meant to mobilize $250 billion in private investments in developing countries through blended finance instruments. In addition, several other initiatives were launched including a philanthropy-backed early stage climate venture fund, the Green Guarantee Company backed by USAID, the Green Climate Fund and others, and a new reinsurance scheme for smallholder farmers in Africa.   Romania’s contribution to the initiatives developed in Dubai were also notable: The country joined the Carbon Management Challenge – an initiative launched by the US Department of Energy (DOE) – which focuses on deploying carbon capture, utilization, and storage and carbon dioxide removal, as key elements of keeping the 1.5-degree goal within reach. The Global Methane Pledge Ministerial has made notable progress over the last year, since COP27. More than $1 billion new grant funding have been mobilized, with new national commitments and legislation from main emitters, including oil and gas operators. Romania was welcomed as new member, bringing the total participants to 155. The nuclear sector’s revival of last year(s) has reached a landmark at COP28, with more than 20 countries – including Romania - launching the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy – an effort of signatory countries to increase threefold the global installed electrical capacity from 2020 to 2050. While not among the Ministerial officials attending the High-Level Roundtable on Hydrogen, Romania and its ambitious hydrogen plans can benefit from the outcomes of this initiative, which closed with a mutual recognition of certification schemes for hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives, with an ISO methodology as a global benchmark for GHG emissions, and with advancements in the cross-border trade corridors. The 1.5C target is most likely out of reach at this point, based on current pledges. Moreover, whether ambitious or not, the agreements reached are not binding, being subject to more granular cross-national and national policies, regulations, and targets. Pledges also merely represent an indication of the effort levels needed, as measures such as tripling renewable investments or doubling energy efficiency efforts depend on very diverse starting points and contexts – technically, socially, and economically. That being said, while highly symbolic and performative, COP28 delivered a clear message: all countries now agree that the world needs to transition away from fossil fuels. It may seem like common knowledge, but the intense negotiations needed to reach this conclusion stand as proof that it was a remarkable achievement.

Energy Policy Group (EPG) apreciază faptul că varianta revizuită a Proiectului Strategiei Naționale a Hidrogenului include o serie din observațiile emise în cadrul procesului de consultare publică din luna mai 2023.   Concret, noua versiune a propunerii Strategiei include prioritizarea producției de hidrogen din surse regenerabile, poziția EPG privind ineficiența utilizării hidrogenului în încălzirea din sectorul rezidențial, evitarea utilizării hidrogenului regenerabil în CCGT-uri, precum și analiza decarbonizării treptate a producției de hidrogen din gaze naturale.   Considerăm, totuși, că documentul cuprinde încă o serie de aspecte care necesită revizuiri. În contextul în care Strategia va trebui finalizată în anul 2023, conform obiectivelor din cadrul Planului Național de Redresare și Reziliență, multiple aspecte ar trebui avute în vedere pentru actualizările viitoare ale documentului.   Citate Radu Dudău - EPG President: „Revizuirea Proiectului Strategiei Naționale a Hidrogenului și a Planului de Acțiune pentru utilizarea hidrogenului în România prezintă îmbunătățiri concrete față de varianta anterioară, înaintată spre consultare publică de Ministerul Energiei în luna mai a anului curent. Observăm cu satisfacție că autoritățile au preluat o parte din observațiile EPG.   O asumare importantă a Ministerului Energiei privind politicile publice în domeniul hidrogenului este aceea de a evita (chiar elimina) utilizarea hidrogenului regenerabil în CCGT-uri, așa cum mențioanează noua variantă a Strategiei. EPG a evidențiat, de-a lungul procesului de consultare publică, ineficiența utilizării hidrogenului regenerabil în centrale pe gaze în ciclu combinat.   Proiectul revizuit al Strategiei propune o abordare relativ corelată cu obiectivele de decarbonizare a economiei naționale, însă ar trebui armonizată cu țintele asumate în diferitele documente strategice și legi. Vom continua să monitorizăm parcursul proiectului și să facem recomandări de politici, astfel încât România să dezvolte economia hidrogenului într-un mod eficient.”  Mihnea Cătuți – EPG Head of Research: „EPG privește noua formă a Strategiei ca pe un pas înainte spre o bună valorificare a hidrogenului în România. Rămâne însă problema subestimării necesarului de hidrogen pentru consumul din industrie. Cu toate că utilizarea hidrogenului în producția primară de oțel este de departe cea mai eficientă conform datelor prezentate în documentul strategic, ea este prevăzută doar pentru producerea a 0,5 milioane tone (Mt) oțel verde în 2030. Ca să punem numărul în context, trebuie menționat faptul că Liberty Galați, singurul producător de oțel primar, a produs în anul 2021 2,35 Mt de oțel lichid. Conform planurilor companiei de decarbonizare, aceasta ar putea ajunge să producă 4,1 Mt în 2030.   Având în vedere importanța strategică de a menține și chiar readuce capacitatea de producție primară de oțel la un nivel al anilor precedenți, ar trebui vizată o cantitate de hidrogen măcar pentru menținerea producției actuale. Luând în considerare faptul că alocările gratuite de certificate de emisii pentru producția industrială vor fi eliminate în proporție de 50% în 2030, iar prețul certificatelor este prognozat să crească la valori peste 100 euro/tonă, trecerea de la BF-BOF la H2-DRI-EAF ar trebui realizată înainte de finalul deceniului.   Nu în ultimul rând, având în vedere adoptarea și publicarea în Monitorul Oficial a Legii nr. 237/2023 privind integrarea hidrogenului din surse regenerabile și cu emisii reduse de carbon în sectoarele industriei și transporturilor” în vara acestui an, considerăm importantă armonizarea estimării necesarului de consum în transporturi cu țintele din cadrul legii.”  Alina Arsani – EPG Head of Energy Systems: “EPG apreciază noua variantă a Proiectului Strategiei, implicit prioritizarea producției de hidrogen din surse regenerabile. Cu toate acestea, considerăm necesară revizuirea și transparența estimărilor cu privire la cererea de hidrogen în anul 2030, precum și prezentarea mai multor scenarii de consum. Având în vederea perioada relativ scurtă până în anul 2030, ar fi recomandată explorarea mai multor scenarii privind utilizarea hidrogenului, care să ofere o înțelegere detaliată a ipotezelor luate în considerare și a impactului asupra sectoarelor economice vizate.   Totodată, documentul necesită clarificarea noilor ipoteze privind reducerea cererii de hidrogen în raport cu reducerea emisiilor de CO2 și implicit revizuirea costului total al implementării strategiei. Mai mult, în ceea ce privește costul total al implementării strategiei estimat la aproximativ 4,8 mld. euro, încă nu sunt luate în considerare o serie de costuri importante precum costurile dezvoltării și modificării infrastructurii de transport și distribuție, costurile cu stațiile de comprimare, costuri privind capacitățile de stocare a hidrogenului.   De asemenea, în cadrul viitoarelor actualizări este necesar ca documentul strategic să includă informații referitoare atât la dezvoltarea infrastructurii/rețelei de transport, cât și la divizarea între producție/import și/sau export de hidrogen pentru acoperirea necesarului de consum estimat, respectiv oportunitățile de parteneriate comerciale privind hidrogenul verde cu alte state (membre UE). Pe baza estimărilor de costuri de producție ale documentului, România riscă să nu fie competitivă pe piețele regionale. Dacă estimările privind costurile de producție rămân neschimbate, strategia ar trebui să exploreze și oportunitățile de import de hidrogen.“  EPG a transmis către Ministerul Energiei, în procesul de consultare din noiembrie 2023, atât observațiile menționate mai sus (în formă extinsă), cât și o serie de elemente suplimentare care ar trebui avute în vedere în cadrul viitoarelor actualizări ale documentului, precum:   Cuantificarea utilizării energiei nucleare pentru producția de hidrogen.  Revizuirea ecosistemelor de hidrogen, prin includerea dimensiunii socio-economice.   Clarificarea obiectivului privind stimularea activităților de cercetare dezvoltare și inovare în domeniul tehnologiilor hidrogenului.  Dezvoltarea Obiectivului General 5 prin intermediul unei direcții de educare și informare a populației asupra necesității dezvoltării unei astfel de economii a hidrogenului.  Includerea aspectelor privind dezvoltarea unei ramuri economice noi, centrată pe producerea și utilizarea hidrogenului din surse regenerabile, cu cuantificarea numărului de locuri de muncă nou create, precum și o evaluare a specializărilor necesare.  Cartografierea surselor de finanțare a investițiilor necesare până în anul 2030.  Persoane de Contact Radu Dudău - EPG President: radu.dudau@epg-thinktank.org Mihnea Cătuți - EPG Head of Research: mihnea.catuti@epg-thinktank.org Alina Arsani – EPG Head of Energy Systems: alina.arsani@epg-thinktank.org

Carbon pricing is widely seen as an effective policy option to pursue reductions in GHG emissions. Either through carbon taxes or emissions trading systems (cap and trade), carbon pricing reduces the negative externality of GHG emissions. By putting a price on emissions, economic agents can incorporate this cost in their investment, production, and consumption decisions. In time, this leads to lower emissions. At the same time, this policy can have negative effects on the economy and households, associated with the additional cost of emissions. Research shows that the negative effects can be alleviated or even reversed through revenue redistribution. The sums collected by Governments can be directed toward investment in low-emissions alternatives and support for low-income households. The European Union’s Emissions Trading System represents a significant example of carbon pricing. It covers emissions from industry and electricity generation and has been effective at achieving emissions reductions. Recently, a separate Emissions Trading System has been introduced for buildings and road transport (ETS2), with the aim of generating similar results in these sectors. There is concern that ETS2 may affect low-income households and the economy in general by purposely increasing the prices of emissions-intensive goods. To address this, the EU also adopted the Social Climate Fund, which uses part of the revenue collected by auctioning emissions allowances to finance investments in low-carbon technologies and support for low-income households. In this context, this paper adds to the extensive body of evidence on the economic impact of carbon pricing with revenue redistribution. It presents the results of a simulation model of a hypothetical carbon tax in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The macroeconomic impact is evaluated by calculating the effects of this carbon tax on GDP and employment by sector. At micro level, the focus is on households budget, namely on welfare losses across deciles and energy poverty, before and after revenue redistribution. This project is part of the European Climate Initiative (EUKI). EUKI is a project financing instrument by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK). The EUKI competition for project ideas is implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. It is the overarching goal of the EUKI to foster climate cooperation within the European Union (EU) in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. For more details, please visit: www.euki.de. Constantin Postoiu, EPG Head of Data Analytics Constantin is the Head of Data Analytics at EPG. He holds a PhD in Regional Development and a Master Degree in European Economics, both from Bucharest University of Economic Studies. From 2015 to 2017 he worked as advisor to the Chancellery of Prime Minister Dacian Ciolos where he led data driven policies and advised on education, poverty and public administration reform. Prior, he was a trainee at the EU Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020 Monitoring Platform. Passionate about data analysis and data-based policies, he is also a member of the Advisory Council for the Evaluation of the Impact of Normative Acts, in the Romanian Government. Contact: constantin.postoiu@epg-thinktank.org

Deși capacitățile de producție industrială s-au micșorat semnificativ în ultimele 3 decenii, acestea păstrează o contribuție de 16.5% la valoarea adăugată brută națională, și asigură aproximativ o cincime din forța de muncă activă din România. Având în vedere această importanță economică strategică, producătorii de oțel, ciment, chimicale și produse petroliere trebuie să se adapteze rapid la noua realitate a industriei europene, marcată de constrângeri în privința emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră.

Romania’s industry will need to transform fundamentally to align with climate commitments and remain competitive in a low-carbon world. With increasing pressure from EU policy and a race to decarbonise industrial production in EU Member States, there are progressively fewer windows of opportunity for implementing the new processes and technologies required for greening heavy industry. A fragmented national policy framework and a narrow fiscal space mean that Romania will face significant difficulties in keeping its industry competitive. However, it also has key advantages it can capitalise on to become a low-carbon industry leader. To achieve economy-wide net zero emissions by 2050, the main pathways for industrial decarbonisation are electrification, continuous improvements in energy and resource efficiency, the uptake of renewable hydrogen and other low-carbon fuels, and carbon capture, utilisation, and storage. Romania’s primary steel, cement, and chemicals production (particularly fertilisers) require the deepest transformation to enable industrial emissions reductions. The technologies needed to achieve these changes are costly, have long lead times, and in some cases imply new materials and supply chains. Furthermore, industrial transformation is not just technological – concerted action will be needed to safeguard the rights of workers in industrialised regions and prepare them for meaningful employment in Romania’s decarbonised industries and in those new industries which may emerge. To decarbonise Romania’s industry sustainably and justly, three main areas of action must be addressed: industrial policy, funding and market creation, and infrastructure development. Firstly, Romania needs a cornerstone industrial strategy anchored in long-term climate commitments and driven by selective support rather than across-the-board crisis management. This industrial strategy must clearly assign responsibilities to competent authorities, commit to funding and financing instruments, and address socio-economic impact, supply chain management, and research, development, and innovation. Romania’s wider domestic policy framework, as well as its positioning in EU negotiations, must also be consistent with the commitments and goals of its industrial policy. Secondly, industrial transformation in Romania will require a massive mobilisation of funding and the stimulation of new markets for green industrial products. As a country with a comparatively low fiscal space, Romania cannot rely excessively on state aid granted to industrial producers, as done in countries such as Germany and France. Instead, eventual state aid schemes targeted at competitive industries should be complemented by the use of EU funding opportunities, including the Modernisation Fund and the Innovation Fund, the unlocking private financing, and the implementation of green public procurement to stimulate a reliable lead market for products such as low-carbon steel and concrete. There are significant opportunities in this space, given Romania’s massive planned spending on large-scale infrastructure projects. Finally, decarbonising Romania’s industry will require huge infrastructure for enabling renewable electricity, hydrogen transport, and carbon dioxide (CO2) transport and storage. The scale of the challenge is significant: electricity consumption will increase and its geographical distribution will change, straining an unprepared transmission grid; new pipelines will be needed for hydrogen and CO2 transport; and CO2 storage capacities must be developed very rapidly. Romania must thus invest significantly in the expansion and strengthening of the electricity transmission grid, and in essence start from scratch in developing a network of hydrogen and CO2 pipelines, as well as CO2 storage. These key actions for decarbonising Romania’s industry will not be easy. They will require massive investment, coordination within the state apparatus and with industry, and significantly more political engagement on the subject. However, the benefits are undeniable: increased industrial competitiveness, a well-prepared workforce, reliable infrastructure, and a significant contribution to Romania’s climate ambitions. Reaping these benefits will depend first and foremost on understanding the magnitude of the challenge, and subsequently on internalizing it in concrete policy, funding, and infrastructure measures to enable decarbonisation at the required scale and pace. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

Currently, Romania does not have a comprehensive climate policy framework and relies mostly on transposed EU legislation to formulate targets and plans. Institutional responsibilities on climate change tend to be scattered, with insufficient coordination, weak accountability mechanisms, and a lack of long-term planning based on scientific evidence.

Asociația Energy Policy Group (EPG) apreciază faptul că Ministerului Energiei a publicat spre consultare Proiectul de Lege privind măsurile necesare pentru exploatarea energiei eoliene offshore în intervalul de timp asumat. Guvernul dovedește astfel angajamentul privind  dezvoltarea producției de energie eoliană offshore în România și atingerea obiectivelor de decarbonizare. De asemenea, EPG consideră benefic faptul că dezvoltarea capacităților eoliene offshore este stimulată prin intermediul unei scheme de sprijin de ajutor de stat de tipul CfD. Totuși, experții EPG au propus o serie de sugestii de revizuire în cadrul consultării publice, pentru o mai bună corelare a proiectului cu obiectivele de decarbonizare. În primul rând, asociația propune o revizuire în sus a țintei asumate privind capacitățile eoliene offshore instalate, respectiv 3GW până în anul 2035. Considerăm că, în contextul creșterii țintelor de decarbonizare asumate la nivelul UE până în 2030, România ar trebui să își asume o țintă de cel puțin 3GW capacități eoliene offshore instalate încă din anul 2032. Asociația mai atrage atenția și asupra procedurii anevoioase de obținere a avizelor necesare pentru proiectele de exploatare a energiei eoliene offshore și propune înființarea unui one-stop-shop. De asemenea, EPG consideră că proiectul înaintat trebuie să ia în calcul cooperarea transfrontalieră cu Bulgaria pentru dezvoltarea noilor capacități.  EPG va continua să se implice în procesul de consultare al Proiectului de Lege privind măsurile necesare pentru exploatarea energiei eoliene offshore, prelungit de curând până la 1 septembrie 2023. Citate Radu Dudău - EPG President: "Este lăudabil efortul Ministerului Energiei de a pune în consultare publică Proiectul de Lege privind exploatarea energiei eoliene offshore. Proiectul prezintă un calendar al etapelor dezvoltării energiei eoliene offshore, ceea ce asigură claritate și predictibilitate. Totuși, anul 2035 reprezintă un termen mult prea extins pentru o capacitate offshore de 3GW. Considerăm că etapele prezentate pot fi scurtate, pentru a se fixa ca țintă anul 2032. De asemenea, ținta de capacitate ar trebui să fie mai ambițioasă.  După cum arată studiul EPG, Offshore wind – the enabler of Romania’s decarbonization (2023), România va trebui să dezvolte 15GW de capacități eoliene offshore în Marea Neagră pentru a atinge neutralitatea climatică în anul 2050, din care 5GW ar trebui instalați până în anul 2030.  În competiția de a oferi investitorilor energie electrică verde și accesibilă ca preț, România trebuie să susțină accelerarea investițiilor în surse regenerabile. Electrificarea economiei, trecerea la electro-mobilitate, dezvoltarea sectorul hidrogenului fără emisii – toate au nevoie de surse regenerabile de energie. Acestea sunt argumente pentru a trata eolianul offshore drept o șansă economică și o prioritate a sectorului energetic național." Mihnea Cătuți – EPG Head of Research: "Propunerea legislativă este bine structurată, iar atribuțiile autorităților competente au fost identificate cu atenția cuvenită, totuși considerăm esențială simplificarea procesului de obținere a avizelor pentru construirea centralelor eoliene offshore. Acesta este anevoios și greu de manevrat, având în vedere numărul mare de instituții diferite care trebuie contactate de potențialii dezvoltatori. Pentru a asigura o parcurgere mai facilă a proceselor administrative, recomandăm înființarea unui one-stop-shop în cadrul ACROPO sau al Ministerului Energiei care să ghideze dezvoltatorii în procesul birocratic și să mențină legături instituționale cu toate autoritățile de la care trebuie obținute avize.   De asemenea, un aspect important asupra căruia dorim să atragem atenția este prevederea referitoare la punerea în funcțiune a centralei eoliene offshore, care dacă nu va avea loc în cel mult 7 ani de la data încheierii contractului de concesiune, acesta din urmă va fi reziliat. O astfel de prevedere ar pune o presiune majoră asupra dezvoltatorilor de proiecte, fără a-i asista sau stimula în dezvoltarea centralelor eoliene offshore. Înțelegem obiectivul decidenților privind ținta de dezvoltare a 3GW de capacități eoliene offshore, însă autoritățile trebuie să ia în considerare cel puțin două aspecte esențiale: (i) timpul necesar obținerii documentației obligatorii privind aprobarea de dezvoltare pentru construirea centralei electrice eoliene offshore, respectiv birocrația asociată în cazul în care nu este diminuată și (ii) potențiale șocuri pe partea ofertei, respectiv lanțul valoric, așa cum economia globală le-a suferit în perioada pandemiei Covid-19. Prin urmare, rezilierea contractului de concesiune trebuie să fie o opțiune de ultimă instanță, luată abia după epuizarea tuturor celorlalte mecanisme legale de mediere." Alina Chiriță (Arsani) – EPG Head of Energy Systems: "Publicarea Proiectului de Lege privind exploatarea energiei eoliene offshore reprezintă un pas important în dezvoltarea producției de energie eoliană offshore în România și în atingerea obiectivelor de decarbonizare. Totuși, documentul nu include nicio referire la colaborarea transfrontalieră dintre România și Bulgaria, respectiv a licitațiilor coordonate, în vederea dezvoltării capacităților eoliene offshore în Marea Neagră.  Conform studiului EPG, Offshore wind – the enabler of Romania’s decarbonization (2023), dezvoltarea unui proiect comun România-Bulgaria, pe bază de insulă energetică (energy island), cu o capacitate de 3GW de pentru fiecare dintre cele două state (6GW în total), ar reprezenta o variantă optimă până în anul 2030, atât din punct de vedere al securității energetice, cât și al costurilor asociate. Investițiile României într-un astfel de proiect sunt estimate la 8,4 miliarde euro, iar producția anuală de energie electrică la 9,8TWh.  Mai mult, EPG în parteneriat cu Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) din Bulgaria au pus bazele Black Sea Renewable Energy Coalition în luna iunie 2023. Obiectivul Coaliției este acela de a reuni actori relevanți în sectorul energiei eoliene offshore din România, Bulgaria, Ucraina și Turcia, cu precădere din rândul dezvoltatorilor de proiecte și asociațiilor relevante din domeniul mediului, în vederea armonizării pozițiilor acestora și implicit accelerării dezvoltării proiectelor. Astfel, considerăm necesară includerea referirilor cu privire la colaborarea dintre România-Bulgaria, cu atât mai mult cu cât planificarea și cooperarea regională dintre cele două state poate stimula dezvoltarea energiei eoliene offshore din Marea Neagră și, implicit, economiile de scară." Persoane de Contact Radu Dudău - EPG President: radu.dudau@epg-thinktank.org Mihnea Cătuți - EPG Head of Research: mihnea.catuti@epg-thinktank.org Alina Chiriță (Arsani) – EPG Head of Energy Systems: alina.chirita@epg-thinktank.org

Tehnologiile de captare, utilizare și stocare a carbonului (CCUS) vor fi elemente-cheie pentru decarbonizarea industriei grele din România, mai ales pentru sectoarele cu emisii de dioxid de carbon care nu pot fi reduse. Recent, EPG a analizat principalele bariere în calea implementării CCUS în România, printre care se numără lipsa unui cadru de reglementare și de finanțare adecvat și absența infrastructurii de transport și stocare. Pe lângă aceste obstacole, care împiedică dezvoltarea proiectelor CCS în România, EPG a identificat în cadrul proiectului european ConsenCUS (Horizon 2020) o serie de elemente suplimentare, mai puțin cunoscute, care trebuie abordate în politicile naționale privind decarbonizarea industriei prin CCUS.  O primă considerație se referă la unde și cum vor fi aplicate tehnologiile CCUS. În România, principalele sectoare pentru care captarea carbonului reprezintă o soluție indispensabilă sunt producția de ciment, sectorul chimic și rafinarea petrolului. Deși captarea emisiilor se poate face și în alte industrii, și chiar și în centralele energetice, pentru acestea sunt mai potrivite alte măsuri de decarbonizare, cum ar fi electrificarea. De aceea, tehnologiile CCUS nu sunt soluții miraculoase pentru toate sectoarele economiei, ci ele trebuie direcționate către sectoarele care nu au alte alternative, sau în scopul obținerii de “emisii negative”, prin captarea dioxidului de carbon direct din atmosferă.  Pe lângă alegerea cumpătată a sectoarelor pentru aplicarea CCUS, trebuie selectate și aplicațiile CCUS cu cea mai mare contribuție la prevenirea schimbărilor climatice. Spre exemplu, utilizarea dioxidului de carbon pentru producția de carburanți sintetici, care emit dioxid de carbon prin ardere, va avea per total un impact climatic mai mic decât stocarea permanentă în subteran. Aceste diferențe sunt nuanțate, iar pentru asigurarea unui impact climatic minim, care să justifice investițiile semnificative necesare, proiectele CCUS trebuie evaluate pe întreg lanțul de proces, de la sursa emisiilor captate până la destinația lor finală. Pe acest lanț de proces trebuie determinat atât impactul climatic, cât și cel asupra mediului înconjurător – spre exemplu, tehnologiile mature de captare a carbonului folosesc drept solvenți aminele, care pot avea un impact negativ asupra mediului dacă nu sunt bine monitorizate.  Optimizarea tehnologiilor CCUS nu se oprește la considerațiile legate de sectoarele beneficiare și de impactul climatic sau de mediu. În primul rând, tehnologiile CCUS sunt într-un proces continuu de cercetare, dezvoltare și inovare, unde experiența României în universități și institute de cercetare poate fi un atu important. De asemenea, România ar putea deveni un centru important pentru producția tehnologiilor CCUS în sine (de exemplu, unitățile de captare, conductele pentru transport, echipamentul de injectare), pe care Uniunea Europenă le favorizează pentru creșterea independenței față de importuri tehnologice.   Pentru a optimiza și proiectele CCUS, implementarea lor trebuie să aibă în vedere și potențialul de cooperare trans-sectorial și trans-național, prin care pot fi agregate fluxurile de dioxid de carbon captate de la diverși operatori, care să fie apoi transportate și stocate cu infrastructură comună. Acest lucru ar permite reducerea costurilor de infrastructură și partajarea riscului și a răspunderii operatorilor, în special în zonele puternic industrializate, unde sunt prezenți mulți operatori industriali – spre exemplu, zona Ploiești-Dâmbovița. În vederea formării acestor clustere pentru CCUS, trebuie stabilite modele clare de finanțare și de partajare a riscurilor, precum și un dialog transparent și susținut cu comunitățile locale.   Aceste considerente aferente tehnologiilor CCUS, mai puțin vizibile decât aspectele de regulament și finanțare, trebuie incluse de la început în politicile și planurile privind viitoarele proiecte de anvergură. Proiectele CCUS pot aduce beneficii economiei României nu numai prin susținerea decarbonizării industriei grele, ci și prin dezvoltarea producției de tehnologii de prevenire a schimbărilor climatice. Tocmai din acest motiv, oportunitățile semnificative prezentate de aceste tehnologii trebuie preluate cu o abordare holistică din punct de vedere al impactului.  Acest document a fost redactat în cadrul proiectului ConsenCUS, finanțat prin programul de cercetare și inovare Horizon 2020 al Uniunii Europene în cadrul acordului de finanțare nr. 101022484. Întregul Policy Paper poate fi consultat AICI. Luciana Miu, EPG Head of Clean Economy Luciana Miu is the Head of Clean Economy at Energy Policy Group. She holds a Master’s degree in Sustainable Energy Systems from the University of Edinburgh and a PhD in Energy Efficiency of Residential Buildings from the Imperial College London. Before joining EPG, Luciana worked for the UK Parliament and for the British Government’s Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), as well as a consultant for Climate-KIC and London City Hall. Contact: luciana.miu@epg-thinktank.org

Decarbonizarea industriei grele presupune de multe ori aplicarea de tehnologii la un nivel incipient de maturitate, care prezintă un risc comercial aferent, ceea ce le face greu finanțabile de către sectorul privat. Din acest motiv, intervenția statului pentru a finanța decarbonizarea industrială, cel puțin în stadiu incipient, este necesară, și este practicată deja în multe țări, precum Franța, Germania și Slovacia.

Asociația Energy Policy Group (EPG) apreciază faptul că Ministerul Energiei a publicat la finalul lunii mai Proiectul Strategiei Naționale a Hidrogenului, cât și un plan de acțiune privind utilizarea hidrogenului în România. Documentul, deși publicat după o serie de întârzieri, propune o abordare corelată cu obiectivele de decarbonizare ale economiei României. Este foarte important ca strategia Națională a Hidrogenului să promoveze utilizarea eficientă a acestei resurse. Energy Policy Group a transmis Guvernului României o serie de recomandări privind noua strategie, cât aceasta se afla în consultare publică. Experții EPG au transmis însă și o serie de recomandări privind secțiunile strategiei care pot fi îmbunătățite. EPG propune revizuirea estimărilor cu privire la necesarul de hidrogen pentru anul 2030, cât și dezvoltarea mai multor scenarii de consum cu un consum mai redus de hidrogen, având în vedere fereastra limitată de timp rămasă. În acest sens, EPG subliniază nevoia ca strategia să evite utilizarea hidrogenului în CCGT-uri din cauza lipsei de eficiență.  Asociația mai atrage atenția asupra previziunilor guvernamentale referitoare la necesarul de hidrogen utilizat în sectorul transporturilor și în sectorul siderurgic. De asemenea, înaintează propuneri de revizuire a costurilor prevăzute pentru hidrogenul verde cât și a costurilor necesare implementării proiectului de strategie.   EPG va continua să monitorizeze parcursul proiectului de Strategie a Hidrogenului, cât și să propună recomandări către Ministerul Energiei, astfel încât să ne asigurăm că această materie primă va fi utilizată cât mai eficient pentru a ajuta România în atingerea obiectivelor climatice ale anului 2030.   Citate Mihnea Cătuți - EPG Head of Research: "Publicarea Proietului de Strategie vine cu o veste extrem de bine-venită: o recomandare fermă din partea autorităților împotriva utilizării hidrogenului pentru încălzirea locuințelor, recunoscând ineficiența unui astfel de proces. Pentru utilizarea în încălzirea locuințelor, precum este încă prevăzut în PNRR, energia regenerabilă trebuie transformată în hidrogen prin electroliză, cu o pierdere de conversie de aproximativ 40%. Arderea în boilere în condensare are la rândul ei o eficiență de aproximativ 90%. Așadar, pentru fiecare 1 MWh de energie regenerabilă, s-ar produce 0,54 MWh de energie termică. Utilizarea directă a energiei regenerabile pentru încălzire prin pompe de căldură (cu o eficiență de 300-400%) ar însemna că 1 MWh de energie electrică produsă din surse regenerabile ar genera 3-4 MWh de energie termică, adică o eficiență de 7 ori mai mare decât utilizarea hidrogenului.  Vestea mai puțin bună este că strategia se bazează în continuare pe utilizarea hidrogenului în CCGT-uri, unde fiecare 1 MWh de energie regenerabilă ar fi convertit în 0,39 MWh de energie electrică, un proces chiar mai ineficient decât utilizarea hidrogenului în încălzire. Chiar conform datelor prezentate în Proiectul Strategiei, utilizarea hidrogenului în CCGT oferă cel mai mic beneficiu din punct de vedere al reducerii emisiilor raportat la cantitatea de hidrogen consumată  Cel mai bun raport dintre consumul de hidrogen și emisiile evitate este în industria siderurgică, unde strategia prevede însă cantități suficiente de hidrogen pentru producerea a doar 0,5 Mt oțel verde în 2030. Singurul producător primar de oțel din România, Liberty Galați, a produs în anul 2021 2,35 Mt de oțel lichid. Având în vedere că alocările gratuite de certificate de emisii pentru producția industrială vor fi eliminate în proporție de 50% în 2030, iar prețul certificatelor este prognozat să crească la valori pete 100 EUR/tonă, trecerea de la BF-BOF la H2-DRI-EAF ar trebui făcută înainte de finalul deceniului. Așadar, necesarul de consum pentru Liberty Galați ar trebui crescut de cel puțin 4 ori." Alina Chiriță (Arsani) – EPG Head of Energy Systems: "Apreciem faptul că Proiectul Strategiei Naționale a Hidrogenului prioritizează producția de hidrogen din surse regenerabile, însă costurile privind hidrogenul verde sunt supraevaluate comparativ cu estimările noastre. EPG a arătat faptul că hidrogenul verde poate fi produs cu €2,21-2,73/kgH2 într-un scenariu realist de preț pentru energia regenerabilă, dar acest lucru necesită o utilizare mai mare a electrolizorului (peste 5.500 ore pe an) și ipoteze mai ambițioase privind reducere costurilor de instalare.     Totodată, Proiectul Strategiei nu specifică divizarea între producție/import și/sau export de hidrogen pentru acoperirea necesarului de consum estimat și nici oportunitățile de parteneriate comerciale privind hidrogenul verde cu alte state (membre UE). Pe baza estimărilor de costuri de producție ale documentului, România riscă să nu fie competitivă pe piețele regionale. Dacă estimările privind costurile de producție rămân neschimbate, strategia ar trebui să exploreze și oportunitățile de import de hidrogen.    Un alt aspect important pe care l-am remarcat vizează necesitatea revizuirii costului total al implementării strategiei, estimat la aproximativ 10,36 mld. EUR În cadrul documentului nu sunt luate în considerare o serie de costuri importante precum costurile dezvoltării și modificării infrastructurii de transport și distribuție, costurile cu stațiile de comprimare, costuri privind capacitățile de stocare a hidrogenului, etc. Deși documentul prezintă potențialul teoretic, nu descrie situația sistemului românesc și care ar fi costurile necesare pentru adaptare și nu include o prezentare a necesarului de capacități de stocare a hidrogenului. Toate aceste elemente vor crește costurile implementării strategiei. " Mihai Constantin - EPG Researcher: "Deși proiectul Strategiei naționale a hidrogenului a fost publicat cu o întârziere semnificativă față de termenele asumate prin Planul Național de Redresare și Reziliență, ne bucurăm să avem în sfârșit pusă în dezbatere publică această strategie. Este de apreciat că pe anumite chestiuni, strategia identifică corect direcțiile și măsurile necesare a fi luate. Mă gândesc aici la faptul că se încurajează producția și utilizarea hidrogenului regenerabil, dar mai ales la faptul că s-a luat decizia a nu utiliza hidrogenul pentru încălzirea locuințelor cu boilere pe bază de hidrogen sau arderea acestuia la aragaz. Existau multe semnale că Guvernul va propune o astfel de abordare de utilizare ineficientă a hidrogenului, un exemplu fiind acel proiect privind rețeaua de gaze naturale-hidrogen prevăzut în PNRR, pentru zona Oltenia.   Hidrogenul va juca un rol important în decarbonizarea sectorului transporturilor. Însă, având în vedere evoluțiile tehnologice, este posibil să vedem o desfășurare a vehiculelor cu baterii chiar și în cazul transporturilor de mărfuri, iar hidrogenul să fie utilizat doar pentru vehicule grele, transport pe distanțe foarte mari sau aviație. Pe scurt, consumul de hidrogen în transporturi este probabil supraevaluat. Sunt destule aspecte de îndreptat în strategie și sperăm...

arbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) is increasingly in focus as a key contributor to reaching the EU’s net zero emissions target. However, major barriers such as lack of regulation and financing, low availability of CO2 transport and storage infrastructure, and low public awareness continue to pose challenges to the widespread deployment of CCUS technologies.

Săptămâna trecută, după o serie de amânări de la termenul limită inițial de 1 ianuarie 2020, Ministerul Mediului pus în consultare publică Strategia pe Termen Lung a României (STL), ghidul privind modul în care țara noastră va realiza decarbonizarea economiei până în 2050. Alături de Planul Integrat în domeniul Energiei și Schimbărilor Climatice (PNIESC), Strategia pe Termen Lung este unul dintre documentele cheie în sfera guvernanței climatice Uniunii Europene, pe care toate statele membre sunt obligate să îl formuleze. Tranziția verde presupune schimbarea structurală atât a economiei cât și a modului de viață, iar STL, care cuprinde scenarii de decarbonizare cu un orizont de timp mai îndelungat, stă la baza formulării unor ținte și politici pentru un parcurs coerent, predictibil și cât mai puțin disruptiv în atenuarea schimbărilor climatice. Totodată, STL are în vedere aliniera fiecărui stat membru la eforturile colective de decarbonizare ale UE și asumarea țintelor climatice. În baza întârzierii publicării Strategiei pe Termen Lung, în septembrie 2022, Comisia Europeană a declanșat procedura de constatare a neîndeplinirii obligațiilor (infringement) asupra României, iar la mai bine de doi ani de la termenul limită inițial, un prim draft a fost publicat. La consultarea publică pe noul document, Ministerul Mediului a prezentat invitaților, reprezentanți relevanți ai societății civile printre care și EPG, draftul strategiei care are la bază scenariul "România neutră 2050”. La dezbateri, EPG și-a exprimat îngrijorarea asupra faptului că scenariul ales de Guvern nu este unul cu adevărat neutru din punct de vedere climatic, din moment ce, conform calculelor din STL, ar rămâne emisii  nete de peste  3 milioane de tone de CO2 pe an. De asemenea, ar fi fost de preferat ca toate scenariile cu care a lucrat Ministerul Mediului să își propună neutralitatea climatică până în 2050 pentru România, iar autoritățile să aleagă traiectoria cea mai bună pentru a ajunge la această țintă. Dintre cele trei scenarii propuse de consultanți Guvernului, singurul care se apropie neutralitatea climatică a fost cel recomandat în STL. Mihnea Cătuți a punctat și o serie de neclarități regăsite în Strategie, precum faptul că anul de bază al modelării sectorului energetic pare să fie mai degrabă 2030, ceea ce nu permite analizarea utilității a multor investiții plănuite de autorități până atunci, precum cele în capacități de producere a energiei pe gaze naturale și cogenerare. Tot privind producția de energie, Strategia menționează că din anul 2036, toate capacitățile pe gaze vor fi înlocuite de hidrogen, a cărui sursă nu este însă specificată în modelare. La capitolul “Industrie” din STL, reprezentantul EPG a subliniat posibila nealiniere a Guvernului cu cele mai noi schimbări care se preconizează la nivel European privind certificatele de emisii (ETS) și de eliminarea alocărilor gratuite pentru industrie. Mai există neclarități și în privința clădirilor, cărora li se adresează un capitol, deoarece Strategia menționează doar 65% din necesarul de energie din sector, prin colectoare solare și pompe de căldură. Citate Radu Dudău - EPG President, despre prevederile STL și redactare: "Este lăudabil că Ministerul Mediului a prezentat, în sfârșit, draftul Strategiei de Decarbonizare pe Termen Lung (STL) a României, capitol la care guvernul nostru avea o restanță majoră în a explica direcțiile prin care economia românească poate atinge neutralitatea climatică până în 2050. Consultarea publică ar fi trebuit însă să fie mult mai substanțială și mai timpurie. Ar fi putut fi prevenite astfel o serie de incoerențe  și neclarități ale scenariului adoptat oficial, RO Neutră. Pentru sectorul energetic, este greu de explicat creșterea magică a ponderii hidrogenului verde după 2035, în condițiile în care ținta cea mai ambițioasă pentru regenerabile pentru 2030 (fără de care hidrogenul verde nu poate fi produs) este de doar 36,3% - mult sub procentul european de 45%. În încălzirea clădirilor, pompele de căldură ar urma să aibă o creștere mult mai moderată decât încălzirea pe bază de hidrogen, ceea ce este total lipsit de plauzibilitate economică. Dacă este ca STL să aibă cu adevărat un rol călăuzitor în planificarea tranziției energetice în țara noastră, documentul final va trebui să răspundă mult mai credibil unor astfel de critici." Luciana Miu – EPG Head of Clean Economy, despre impactul STL pentru industrii: “Este important că Strategia pe Termen Lung a României își asumă atingerea neutralității climatice până în 2050. Cu toate acestea, lipsește o abordare sectorială a politicilor și măsurilor concrete pentru a asigura scăderea emisiilor. În contextul politicilor europene și al competiției pentru produse cu emisii reduse de carbon, sectorul industrial are nevoie de măsuri concrete vizând combustibilii alternativi și captarea și stocarea carbonului (nu doar în sectorul cimentului și varului). Aceste măsuri presupun investiții masive, inclusiv în infrastructură, iar ferestrele de oportunitate pentru a efectua aceste investiții sunt din ce în ce mai reduse la număr în calendarul pentru 2050. Din acest motiv, Strategia pe Termen Lung trebuie să includă un plan clar de politici naționale care să deblocheze investițiile în decarbonizarea industriei din România. De asemenea, orice strategie pentru atenuarea schimbărilor climatice trebuie să aibă în vizor impactul social al măsurilor planificate. Acest impact nu se rezumă doar la locurile de muncă, ci și la indicatorii de performanță al economiilor locale, sărăcia energetică, mobilitatea socială, calitatea vieții și altele. Pentru implementarea de succes a Strategiei pe Termen Lung, măsurile de reducere a emisiilor trebuie implementate alături de comunitățile afectate de tranziția spre neutralitate climatică." Mihnea Cătuți - EPG Head of Research, despre țintele prevăzute în STL pe sectoare: “Publicarea draftului de strategie marchează un moment extrem de important pentru România - pentru prima dată autoritățile își asumă obiectivul politic de atingere a neutralității climatice până în 2050. Din păcate, însă, strategia nu prezintă niciun scenariu care să atingă cu adevărat emisii nete zero în 2050. Chiar și în scenariul RO Neutră, emisiile nete sunt de peste 3 MTCO2e pe an. Ne-am fi dorit să vedem 3 scenarii care să ajungă toate la net-zero și să prezinte mai multe opțiuni pentru atingerea acestui obiectiv. Pe lângă aceste aspecte, strategia are unele carențe care vor trebui rezolvate. Poate cea mai importantă problemă este ca toate scenariile consideră ca realizate o serie de investiții din domeniul energetic cu un aport climatic...

The European Commission has recently published the Net-Zero Industry Act, a proposal meant to boost the Union’s autonomy when it comes to developing and manufacturing “net-zero technologies”. The Act lists carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) as one of eight key net-zero technologies for achieving the EU’s climate neutrality goals, sets a goal for storing 50 million tonnes of CO2 per year in the EU by 2030, and mandates Member States to clearly state how they will enable carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Pe 16 martie, Comisia Europeană a propus „Regulamentul privind industria net-zero” (Net-Zero Industry Act), menit să reducă dependența Uniunii de importurile de tehnologii necesare pentru a atinge țintele de net-zero până în 2050. Concret, propunerea are în vizor consolidarea industriei prelucrătoare europene pentru a crește producția domestică de tehnologii necesare decarbonizării, prezentând ambiția de a produce în Uniunea Europeană 40% din necesarul tehnologic al tranziției până în 2030. Acest regulament și negocierile care vor urma merită urmărite din perspectiva României, deoarece prezintă oportunități semnificative pentru dezvoltarea industriei autohtone.

Ca stat membru al Uniunii Europene, România s-a angajat să participe în eforturile colective de atingere a neutralității climatice până în 2050. Acest angajament presupune o reducere drastică a emisiilor de dioxid de carbon la nivel național, care în 2021 se ridicau la 74 de milioane de tone pe an. Deși soluțiile pentru reducerea emisiilor sunt bine-cunoscute și competitive din punct de vedere economic în sectoare precum producția de energie electrică, în altele procesul de decarbonizare prezintă provocări mai complexe. Un astfel de sector este industria, mai precis procesele energointensive ale industriei prelucrătoare, precum producția de oțel, ciment, chimicale și alte materiale.

The steel, cement and chemicals manufacturing sectors are central to Romania’s economy. Operational facilities in these sectors consume significant amounts of electricity, natural gas, and water, as well as specific feedstocks such as coking coal, steel scrap, and limestone. The production landscape is dynamic, with some facilities closing and others reopening or planning to increase their production. Against this background, the challenge of decarbonisation is significant: for national emissions to reach net zero by 2050, Romania’s industry will need to reduce its energy consumption in half, undergo massive electrification and a switch to hydrogen and biomass, improve material efficiency, and implement carbon capture and storage.

Though this paper, we examine the literature for evidence on the effectiveness and economic and welfare impact of carbon pricing with revenue redistribution. We find that emissions reduction is moderate, unless carbon prices are high, while the economic and welfare impacts depend on the redistribution mechanism. With targeted redistribution, the policy tends to be progressive, helping reduce energy poverty and emissions at the same time. To add to the evidence base, we also present a modelling exercise of a theoretical carbon tax levied on all consumption goods.

Within this new reality and the ensuing global crisis, COP27 was seen by some as an “oasis of diplomacy”, to quote US Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm – a space where countries could come together to act on the global challenge that is climate change. But while countries did come together in some landmark agreements, they left Sharm-el-Sheikh without much progress on actual action to mitigate climate change.

ince the initial deadline of January 1st, 2020, several key events and EU-level strategies have unfolded, which should be taken into account in Romania’s upcoming LTS. The European Green Deal and the Fit-for-55 package brought forth a whole new level of ambition for GHG emissions reduction, while the REPowerEU will accelerate the pace of the climate transition in the short and medium-term, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Romanian LTS needs therefore to outline a plan for the rapid decarbonisation of the economy with the prospect of reaching climate neutrality before mid-century.

Long-Term Strategies are key instruments for Member States to meet their emissions targets. They vary in their concreteness, scope and level of detail, leading to uncertainties in how Member States will reduce their emissions to meet the EU's climate neutrality targets. This analysis reviews the Long-Term Strategy of Bulgaria and assesses how fit-for-purpose it is in providing a robust pathway for emissions reductions.

As part of the Climate Recon project, EPG has analysed the role of low-carbon district heating in the Long-Term Strategies for climate neutrality of 23 Member States.

As part of the ConsenCUS project, EPG is analyzing the narratives and perceptions surrounding carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) in Romania, where a novel carbon capture and conversion technology will be demonstrated in the near future.

Acest policy brief rezumă foaia de parcurs pentru avansarea captării și stocării carbonului (CCS) în România, dezvoltat de EPG în cadrul proiectului CCS4CEE. În această foaie de parcurs, EPG prezintă o serie de acțiuni concrete care trebuie implementate de către guvern, operatori economici și alți actori, pentru a realiza proiecte CCS și a contribui la atingerea țintelor de decarbonizare ale României.

This policy brief summarizes EPG’s roadmap for advancing CCS in Romania, written as part of the CCS4CEE project. In this roadmap, EPG presents a list of actions for implementation by government, economic operators and other actors, to make CCS projects a reality and contribute to Romania’s industrial decarbonization targets.

As part of the CCS4CEE project, EPG has produced a roadmap for advancing carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Romania, building on its analysis of the context and opportunities for CCS in Romania.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a heavily debated legislative proposal for a carbon tax on EU imports from five key sectors (aluminium, cement, fertilizer, iron and steel, and electricity). [1],[2] It has been proposed as part of the Fit for 55 package, with the purpose of preventing carbon leakage (the relocation of carbon-intensive production of tradable goods away from the EU, to avoid carbon costs).

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) refers to a chain of technologies deployed to capture, transport and store CO2 away from the atmosphere, mitigating its warming effect on the climate. For each step in the CCS process, a range of technologies has been developed and tested for different industries and operating conditions, making CCS a complex value chain rather than a single, “off-the-shelf” technology as it is sometimes portrayed

This executive summary provides a brief overview of the report “Assessment of current state, past experiences and potential for CCS deployment in the CEE region”, written as part of the CCS4CEE project.

In this study, EPG brings together the work of project partners in Work Package 3 of the CCS4CEE project. The resulting report is an in-depth analysis of the current context and opportunities for carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region.

Captarea și stocarea dioxidului de carbon (CCS) poate avea o contribuție importantă la decarbonarea economiei europene și române.

Acest raport prezintă o evaluare a contextului actual și a potențialului tehnologiilor de captare și stocare a carbonului (CCS) în România, condusă în cadrul proiectului CCS4CEE.

This report presents an evaluation of the current context and opportunities for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies in Romania, written as part of the CCS4CEE project.

The policy paper presents the main legislative provisions and European strategic objectives regarding low emission mobility and several recommendations for the transposition of European provisions in Romanian legislation.

For Romania to increase its biogas production 50-fold, a step change is necessary, even if the level of support is sufficient to make most investments profitable.