There are few areas of economic policymaking in which the returns to good decisions are so high – and the punishment of bad decisions so cruel – as the management of natural resource wealth,” noted Philip Daniel, a reputed expert of the IMF. One of the most important tools in the management of natural resources is the fiscal regime of petroleum exploration and production.
Petroleum fiscal policy is a key instrument through which producing countries aim at getting as large a share of the economic rent generated by oil and gas extraction as possible.
Governments also promote socio-economic objectives: jobs, technology transfer, infrastructure projects, macroeconomic stability by means of steady budgetary incomes etc. Under concession regimes, title holders seek to obtain profits that are proportional with the degree of risk they take when investing in exploration and production. In order to achieve such objectives on the long term, it is paramount to have a transparent, predictable and internationally competitive regulation environment.
However, fiscal stability seems to be harder and harder to achieve, as in the past 15 years international oil markets have become unprecedentedly volatile. Between 2002 and 2008 the Brent barrel price rose fivefold to the historical level of $147, only to fall to $46 within the following three months; then, it went up again to reach $127 at the beginning of 2011, where it stayed relatively stable until the summer of 2014; the price then collapsed 60% from $114 till the year’s end, hovering under the $50 dollar level at present.
The volatility of international oil quotations has challenged the stability of petroleum fiscal frameworks. Thus, starting in the mid-2000s, several producing countries showed their frustration at the fact that fiscal terms failed to generate the expected economic rent. Such governments wanted to renegotiate the fiscal terms in their favor. By the same token, cheap oil pushes companies to ask for milder fiscal treatment, in order to be able to pursue their investment plans. Given that the economic cycle of petroleum projects is about 30 years on average, it is quite a challenge for a petroleum fiscal framework to remain stable for so long, under high oil markets’ volatility.
A good deal of the political and media environment in Romania continues to promote or to dwell in confusion when it comes to the Romanian state’s gain from petroleum activities, popularly known as „the regime of oil royalties”.
So far nobody has managed to identify a logical, legal and economic reasoning, a true “substantiation note” of the public interest based on which the initiatives to revise the tax system applicable to oil companies are promoted.
The most rumored idea is that “the current royalties expired on December 31st, 2014 therefore a new royalties system must be enacted” and naturally, the quotas of these royalties must be higher. It remains to be seen what the applicable legislation will provide in Romania (“as rule of law”).
The rational and legal solution would be for Romania to engage in transparent, well argued and direct discussions with petroleum companies in order to find solutions to the benefit of both parties (and not by the so-called “public debate” over a draft law which, as we all know, has become a superficial and purely formal exercise). In other words, although Romanian petroleum concessions include freeze stabilization clauses, the Romanian government must prove common sense and vision and pursue the mechanism specific to certain “economic stabilization” clauses. Also, the Romanian government must reflect upon its long term administrative and political capacity, considering that it is very likely to end up implementing various legal regimes according to the legislation based on which the petroleum concessions were concluded. Establishing new taxes and royalties at this time to amend them in a few years depending on the political and electoral struggles or on the lack of capacity at administrative level will destroy the credibility of the investment environment in Romania.
During the evolution of the Romanian oil industry, the refining sector emerged at the end of the 19th century by way of a massive import of foreign capital and advanced technology. In 1895 the construction of Steaua Română refinery started in Câmpina, one of the largest in Europe of that time, with capital of Deutsche Bank. In 1904, Standard Oil founded the Romanian-American Company and Deutsche Bank commissioned in Ploiești the Vega refinery. A year later, Rotschild banking group founded the French-Romanian Aquila Company, which upgraded the Plopeni refinery.
In 1908, Royal Dutch Shell founded Astra Company, which in 1911 merged with Regatul Român Company under the name of Astra Română. In 1910, the Orion refinery was built with British capital, and the French-Romanian Aquila opened the Columbia refinery in Ploieşti.
During the interwar period and in the decades of socialist economy, new refining units were built: in 1934, the Petrobrazi refinery, in Ploiești; in 1949, the Dărmănești refinery (Bacău County); in 1966, Rafo Onești; in 1969, Suplacu de Barcău (Bihor County); in 1975, Petromidia (Năvodari). Thus, after 1989 as many as 10 refineries were operational and they continued to work based on the demand of oil and petro-chemical products from the traditional markets and from the energy-intensive industrial sectors. Gradually, though, a big part of the refining units were closed as the demand of oil products diminished and the international competition became tougher.
At present, there are four operational refineries in Romania, three of which produce transport fuels. They belong to international vertically integrated oil consortia. Ranked by refining capacity, they are the following: Petromidia (Năvodari), property of Kazakh company KazMunayGas (KMG), operated by Rompetrol Refining, with a processing capacity of 5 million tons (mt) annually – capacity increased in 2012 as a result of an investment program of €300 million; Petrobrazi (Ploiești), owned and operated by OMV Petrom, with an annual capacity of 4.5 mt, following a wide-scale investment program of €600 million; Petrotel (Ploiești), owned and operated by the Russian Lukoil, with an annual capacity of 2.4 mt. Vega refinery (Ploiești) is also operational and owned by KMG, and specializes in the processing of naphtha, fuel oil and other oil fractions for the production of solvents and other special petroleum products.
Closing refining capacities as well as streamlining the operational ones also meant cutting a significant number of jobs in the industry – high skilled and well remunerated.
Comisia Europeană îşi doreşte o nouă piaţă a energiei electrice, în care consumatorul final să simtă mai acut decât până acum fluctuaţiile de preţ, inclusiv cele determinate de instabilitatea producţiei din surse regenerabile. Mai devreme sau mai târziu, industria regenerabilelor ar trebui să devină competitivă, fără a mai avea nevoie de subvenţii.
Într-un amplu document aflat încă în dezbatere publică, Comisia Europeană vorbeşte despre noul proiect al pieţei de energie electrică, care să ţină cont de faptul că, în orizontul anului 2030, 50% din energie va proveni din surse regenerabile.
Principala problemă este instabilitatea preţului energiei, generată de fluctuaţiile de producţie şi consum. Pentru moment, acest aspect este reglat de autorităţile naţionale prin intermediul unui sistem complex de reglementări, astfel încât preţul la consumatorul final să fie predictibil şi relativ suportabil. Creşterea ponderii energiei regenerabile face ca actualul mecanism să devină dificil de aplicat pe termen mediu şi lung.
Pentru a regla potenţialele dezechilibre generate de execesul sau penuria de energie e nevoie de mai multe interconectări fizice, pentru a transporta efectiv energie peste graniţele statelor membre, pentru a crea o piaţă mai mare de desfacere, unde cererea acoperă mai bine oferta. Comisia Europenă face însă şi pasul următor, previzibil de altfel, propunând o discuţie despre interconectarea funcţională a pieţelor de tranzacţionare a energiei, mai ales pentru tranzacţiile intra day şi de echilibrare. Asta cel puţin la nivel regional. Crearea unei pieţe regionale de echilibrare pune însă în discuţie, pe termen mediu şi lung, viabilitatea comercială a capacităţilor clasice de producţie a energiei electrice care asigură, la nivel naţional, acest serviciu.
Nowadays, the politicians and the mass media are passionately devouring, probably absent a strategic purpose, the amendments to the Fiscal Code. One can see yet again that 25 years later the government still sees and approaches taxation and tax policies not as economic tools but rather for fund raising, as social politics instrument. However, what’s kept aside from the frantically debating, are the envisaged fiscal amendments aimed at the mining and petroleum sector by changes brought to the Petroleum and to the Mining Law. One of the potential reasons would be that this topic lacks crucial significance for the future of Romania in the eyes of the political decisions makers.
Judging by a good deal of the population, for as long as the state collects money from what the collective mindset perceives as voracious companies plundering the country’s resources (“the property of the people”), there are no grounds for public debate. Also, it wouldn’t be a topic worthy of attention and, eventually, propaganda for the mass media unless petroleum companies would again report remarkable financial revenues or would embark on new ventures – the prospection or production of new deposits (that the propaganda would include in the potential shale gas category, thus inciting local communities).
Nobody can deny the sovereign right of states to charge taxes on any activity including petroleum activities. It is of utmost importance when, why and namely how such fiscal measures are established.
When a tax burden increase in the petroleum sector is sought
There couldn’t have been a more inappropriate timing.
The worldwide petroleum sector is confronted with the fiercest crisis of the past fifty years. These days, the oil barrel price reached historical low levels. Oil companies are reconsidering their investment strategy and business plans following the catastrophic financial revenues recorded lately. The drop in investment triggers a step back in the development of new technologies, portfolio strategies are going back to drawing board, along with mass layoffs and cascade effects at subcontractor and tax revenue level. Petroleum exporting countries are faced with the same dramatic effects, which might have an impact on global security. The shrinkage of large hydrocarbon consuming markets (China) and the outlook of a massive flooding of the market with abundant additional resources (Iran) can only aggravate the intricate state of affairs.
The Energy Policy Group (EPG) organized on 21 May 2015, with the support of the Romanian Black Sea Titleholders Association (RBSTA), a roundtable on The Romanian Offshore Petroleum Fiscal Regime. Participants included representatives of relevant public institutions (the Romanian Government, the National Agency for Mineral Resources, the Romanian Parliament), representatives of RBSTA member companies, fiscal and legal consultants, academia and specialized press. Talks were held in accordance with Chatham House rules. The roundtable was organized in the context of the Romanian Government being in full process of drafting a new oil and natural gas (O&G) fiscal framework. Clarifications in this area are necessary and expected by investors and public opinion alike.
The fiscal system is a decisive factor for O&G operators. It is the main tool for distributing revenue between state and investors and it must offer a fair, win-win outlook on the long term. The investment cycle of an oil project is long-term – typically 25-30 years, or longer for offshore projects. In addition, offshore projects in particular require large upfront exploration capital investments. Also, the investment risk for offshore exploration activities is high, and the cost recovery timeframe can be over a decade. Therefore, the details of the upstream fiscal framework will be extremely important as companies are hoping to move towards commerciality, since it will generate major long-term effects.
This policy paper summarizes the talks at the roundtable and puts forward, based on presented data and arguments, recommendations for political decision-makers in the Government, the National Agency for Mineral Resources (ANRM) and the Romanian Parliament. It also aims to offer the interested public clear and useful information on a topic that frequently raises emotional and disproportionate assessments.
Our case study of worst practices involves two-state owned businesses, Hunedoara Energy Complex and Oltenia Energy Complex. They are both nearly insolvent, while the Government continues to pump money into their rescue, without, however, any real assurance that the effort will be worth it.
Romania extracts coal from two regions, both in the South of the country. Pit coal, with a caloric power of 3,650 kcal/kg, is produced in the Jiu River Valley, in seven mines. Three of them – Petrila, Paroșeni and Uricani – have been nominated for closure by 2018. This will be done by a specially designated company, tediously called The National Company for Closing Down Jiu River Mines.
The remaining four mines (Lonea, Livezeni, Lupeni and Vulcan), along with two thermoelectric power plants in the vicinity (Electrocentrale Paroșeni and Electrocentrale Deva), have been grouped together under the umbrella of the Hunedoara Energy Complex (CEH) under a 2012 governmental decision. CEH, responsible for around 5% of the country’s electricity production, employs over 7,000 people and produces the most expensive electricity in the country at Lei 270/MWh (€60.5/MWh), while electricity is currently being traded at an average of Lei 170/MWh (€38/MWh) on the Romanian energy exchange. However, this is the least of its worries, as CEH has been struggling to survive for some years now, with little respite.
Energy has always fueled progress. Electricity has become as essential as sunshine, air or water. There have been endlessly innovative ways to generate it, but when it comes to storing the energy, innovation seems to have stalled.
The problem with renewable energy is the lack of continuous supply: solar power works only when it’s sunny, wind power only when it’s windy and wave power only when the sea is not too rough. Photovoltaic is a unique concept, if looked at how fast this technology has been growing. In the next decade, global demand could be significantly fueled by solar power.
Today, just 0.5% of the electricity comes from photovoltaics worldwide. It may seem like a small number, but in 1998 this was 0.003% and if the trend continues, in 2028 it will grow to 50%. Therefore, by then half of the energy demand could come from solar powered plants. However, there is a big problem that needs to be solved: the problem of demand between day and night peaks.
To close that gap, conventional power was always kept by the grid operators in such an amount that exactly matched the difference. But then, a lot of solar energy can and is going to waste, absent a solution for storage. The first solar power-tower station that can produce electricity 24 hours a day has been built in the south of Spain. Its scale, however, is enormous, spreading over 185 ha.
Biogas production in the EU in 2013 was 566 PJ (157 TWh), accounting for almost 7% of total renewable energy use, but only 0.8% of total primary energy demand and 3.5% of natural gas demand. The situation varies considerably between countries. Half of all EU biogas production takes place in Germany (287 PJ) and another 27% is equally split between the UK and Italy (76 PJ each). Other important biogas producers are the Czech Republic, France, Spain and the Netherlands, totalling 66 PJ (Eurostat 2014). Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic have registered the highest growth rates over the past 5 years, but they are all currently slowing down, with changes to their biogas incentive schemes.
Portrayed as a key element to Romania’s sustainable energy future, biomass should be the object of intense debate in connection with the future national energy strategy. Solid (wood, charcoal) and liquid (biodiesel, bioethanol) forms of biomass are rather well known, but it is also possible to derive significant amounts of valuable, clean energy by burning (upgraded) biogas. This article briefly discusses the prospects of biogas production and use in Romania, in a European context.
Biogas is a valuable methane-based, gaseous fuel, derived from various biogenic sources. While conventional (fossil) natural gas forms from the decomposition of organic matter at high temperature and pressure in the lithosphere over millions of years, biogas forms close to ground surface or in special plants, within weeks or months, in a four-stage process called anaerobic digestion. Due to the speed of biogas synthesis by anaerobic digestion, its methane content is lower (35-70%) than for natural gas (80-96%) and its CO2 content rather high (15-50%). The solid residue of anaerobic digestion, called digestate, can partly become fertilizer.
The major trends of 2015´s world energy have been largely set in the second half of 2014. Undoubtedly, the stunning oil price plunge since past June is the overwhelming development, with major economic and political effects of global scale. Ample consequences have already followed, concerning the patterns of energy consumption and the prospects of technology and infrastructure investments, as well as the economic and geopolitical standing of quite a few oil and gas producing nations.
A distinctive factor is the expectation that a global agreement on binding carbon emission targets be reached in November 2015 upon the Paris COP21 conference on climate change. This expectation is driven by goals largely opposed to the current fossil fuel-based world economy. However, the energy market trends are affecting the efficacy of climate policies, since the attractiveness of investments in renewable energy sources (RES) and energy efficiency diminishes in a market of cheap and plentiful diesel and gasoline.
In 2015, Romania will be further on dominated by debates about the natural gas price liberalization and the taxation regime in the oil and gas industry. The contentious topic of the past couple of years – shale gas – has uncertain geological prospects. The elements of a final investment decision for the Black Sea deep-water gas will likely come to a head, provided geology goes along and a sound transport solution of that gas output will have been worked out. The oil and gas price slump
The 50% fall of the Brent oil barrel since June 2014 to slightly over $50 in early January 2015 has stunned through its magnitude. In general terms, the root causes are familiar: oil oversupply resulting from abundant non-OPEC sources (American shale, Canadian oil sands, Brazilian presalt, but also record-level Russian oil) and weak demand in China and the EU.
Some oil producers have suffered tremendous costs. The more they relied on price expectations over $100 a barrel in their state budgets, the worse they were affected. Venezuela and Iran are certainly in that category, although most eyes are on Russia´s plight. Nigeria and Angola are threatened by default, and Libya and Iraq are still marred in internal military conflict.
To be sure, not just oil producing states and their NOCs have miscalculated, but also top-tier banks and consulting companies in the West, who deemed a persistent fall under $100 as inconceivable. In fact, such inflated expectations may well have fed into the producers own overconfidence.
2015 can be a year of opportunity for Romania if its regional role is better understood and acted upon by its own decision-makers Many a pundit have been inclined to read an American plot into the oil price plunge, aimed at punishing Russia and possibly other defiant countries. However, the unignorable facts are that OPEC resolved, on its November 2014 summit in Vienna, to maintain a production level of 30 million barrels a day (mb/d), about 1.5 mb/d above its “call” – that is, the share of global output that would match current demand. To wit, the move has reflected Saudi Arabia´s decision to fight for market share and challenge non-OPEC producers, deemed unable to withstand a protracted price competition with the Gulf nations, whose barrels are much cheaper to extract.
Saudi Arabia itself has had to absorb much pain in the process, as the Kingdom´s ambitious social spending plans relied on $100 a barrel. Nonetheless, while a number of US shale companies announced plans to reduce the number of operating rigs, the economics of shale energy has proven more resilient than initially estimated, with significant output still expected at prices as low as $40. This is a significantly lower breakeven of shale activities than previously thought. In the meanwhile, OPEC countries outside of the Arabian Peninsula are already hurting much more than many non-OPEC producers.
A brief list of winners and losers of the current supply glut has the large energy consuming regions of the world – North America, China and Japan, and the EU – as having obtained an unexpected boon. Obviously, Russia (which is also constrained by lack of access to the international capital markets, because of the Western economic sanctions over the Crimean annexation) and the Opec states are the losers, while the situation of oil producing industrial countries – the US, Norway, Canada, Australia, UK – is more complex, as these are both major demand and production centers. Depending on the relative economic weights of oil production vs oil demand, such countries have lower or higher net gains from cheap oil. There is every reason to expect that 2015 will see a drop in natural gas prices as well
Whether the oil price will continue to fall for a while – and if yes, for how long – or will bounce back later this year remains to be seen. It is though relevant to consider that given the intricate links of the oil trade throughout the financial system, the price slump reflects a deceleration of the global economy that may well take more than one year to recover. There is every reason to expect that 2015 will see a drop in natural gas prices as well. In the EU, Gazprom´s long-term supply contracts are indexed to the price of oil, with a usual time lag of about two quarters between the two price curves. Thus, what has kept Russian gas prices above the European hub levels in recent years will turn into more ballast for the already shaken Russian gas giant.
Besides, as suggested by Financial Times´ Nick Butler, it is likely that Japan will again progressively authorize the use of nuclear power, which will depress natural gas demand – hence prices – on the Asian markets. Indeed, the huge premium that post-Fukushima Asian markets paid for natural gas – almost $20/MMBtu, more than anywhere else in the world – triggered large investments in LNG production and transport capacity worldwide. This trend is likely to stall, however, mainly because of dwindling demand in Asia, but also because of Europe´s mix of forthcoming cheaper gas supplies and slumping consumption. The diminishing price spreads between the US, on the one hand, and the EU and Asia, on the other hand will probably restrain plans for large investments in American LNG plants. By the same token, Mozambique´s LNG plans will likely be stalled, while Australian LNG is going to face significant cost overruns. All in all, 2015 will see a “reality check for global LNG exports,” as recently put by Belfer Center´s (Harvard) Leonardo Maugeri. Low carbon energy and RES
Low fuel prices do not square well will high investments in (still) expensive RES. Indeed, SUV sales have sizably increased in the US in the second half of 2014, while hybrid cars were in lower demand than one year earlier. RES have grown substantially in the EU over the last few years, supported by generous subsidy schemes. The fact has contributed to diminished European demand for fossil fuel-based power generation. Yet presently, the economics of “green energy” is not so robust anymore. On the one hand, cheaper gas will probably expand its share of the electricity mix, while national concerns of the member states about industrial competitiveness, because of relatively high energy prices, have stifled enthusiasm about public subsidies for RES.
Nevertheless, clean energy investments are driven not only by market forces, but also by increasing international concerns about global warming. On November 20, China and USA – the world´s first and second largest carbon emitters – did announce the signing of a bilateral climate pact. The US committed to a target of greenhouse gas emission (GHG) cut of 26-28% as compared to 2005 levels by 2025. For its part, China has envisaged to peak its CO2 emissions around 2030 to 10 billion tons/year, and to strive to peak earlier. Also, Beijing intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in its primary energy mix to 20% by 2030. There is no way that coal can continue on the long-run to be burned with unmitigated carbon emissions, so that the carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology must come into its own
In December 2014, Lima hosted COP 20 – the 20th Conference of the Parties (over 190) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). COP20 raised high hopes for a global consensus on GHG binding targets. Nevertheless, the conference itself did not result in more than a framework agreement and the ground rules for countries to submit, in Q1 2015, proposals of national contributions to an overarching, legally binding agreement to govern climate action post-2020. This is anticipated to be agreed on at the COP21 conference in Paris, scheduled between November 3o and December 11, 2015.
There is little question that the oil and gas industry must adapt technologically and increasingly turn toward clean energy production, most likely in symbiosis with RES and clean transport and heating systems. There is no way that coal can continue on the long-run to be burned with unmitigated carbon emissions, so that the carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology must come into its own. At the same time, governments will find it increasingly difficult to subsidize RES: the more RES expand, the more they weight in the energy bills because of their own high capex and of growing network costs they generate. It is therefore paramount that RES come into their own and become economically independent from public subsidies.
However, as mentioned, in ages of cheap oil, investments tend to stagnate – not only in O&G production, but also in RES. The countercyclical way forward is to innovate and obtain cost-sinking technologies both in the O&G and in RES sectors. Such a scenario opens up a world of plentiful and affordable energy, in which consumers can chose not only based on the lowest price, but also on principles, values, and the best available environmental knowledge. 2015 will mark a step in that direction. Romanian energy topics for 2015
A few topics will continue to dominate the Romanian energy policy-making landscape. The deregulation of natural gas prices, for all the clear and indisputable nature of Bucharest´s international commitments, will likely continue to be subject to political interference. Indeed, the new leadership of the Energy Department decided to postpone until July 1 the first step of the price deregulation schedule for household consumers – a step that was initially set for October 1, 2014. Unsurprisingly, the Government plans to capitalize on the coming wave of cheaper gas and low household demand in the summer time. It remains to be seen whether the European Commission – which is yet to validate the delay proposed by the Government in September 2014 in the price liberalization calendar – will agree to yet another change that risks lending an erratic note to the entire process.
Another thing to watch on the topic of gas market liberalization is the transition for non-household consumers from the formerly regulated to a liberalized, unregulated market, as of January 1, 2015. On 6 November 2014, the National Authority for Energy Regulation (ANRE) made the decision that in the brief time left till the year´s end, the gas utilities were to negotiate with their regulated clients new contracts in free market terms, or the old contracts would otherwise simply be extended with gas prices set by suppliers. Yet such a precarious information and negotiation process was not a proper start into developing a workable unregulated market. The deregulation of natural gas prices will likely continue to be subject to political interference
The O&G fiscal regime is yet another piece of unfinished work of ample consequences. Announced as imminent for the end of 2014, a new royalties system was expected as of January 1, 2015. Instead, the Government procrastinated and referred the matter to the Parliament. The issue has been hyped in the public opinion mainly through the notion of too small a Government´s take, and accordingly used in contests of populist politics that capitalized on confusion and poor public information.
For instance, there is a widespread belief that the “old” royalties of the 2004´s Petroleum Law were due to expire at the end of 2014, yet this notion has rested on confusion about the 10-year stability clause in Petrom´s 2004 privatization contract. In effect, oil and gas royalties were fixed for 30 years as per the concession agreements closed by the title holding companies with the Romania Agency for Mineral Resources (ANRM). Therefore, new royalties can only apply to new concession agreements.
Another reason why the issue cannot just linger for yet another whole year is that ANRM announced its intention to open a new – the 11th – tender round for oil and gas perimeters this summer, hence any new fiscal O&G regime ought to enter in force before that date. Oil and gas companies are themselves interested in clarity and predictability in fiscal and regulatory matters, generally, so they are keen to see the royalties matter decided upon and stabilized for at least 20 years.
The fate of RES and their legal support scheme – Law 220/2008 – will also need clarification. Since 2013, the number of green certificates bestowed on each RES technology type was reduced by Government Ordinance, with the difference due to be paid as of April 1, 2017. Combined with the drastic price fall of green certificates and the diminished capacity of the National Transport System of electricity to take up growing volumes of intermittent power generation, the future of Romanian RES is uncertain. The problem is only compounded in a context of low oil and gas prices, in which investments in relatively expensive RES equipment are discouraged. By the same token, costly energy efficiency spending becomes harder to justify economically. Thus, the context does not really favor climate protection actions by means of RES, energy efficiency and capped carbon emissions.
Other than the policy making sector, some major energy development directions will mostly (though by no means exclusively) depend on geology. Shale gas prospects are a case in point. The results of Chevron´s exploration works in Vaslui county, finished in 2014, will define the future of shale energy in Romania. For the Black Sea offshore, a final investment decision is expected in 2015 and, there again, deep-water geology has to play along.
Finally, 2015 will be the year of new gas transport projects, which are to connect at regional level the Southern Gas Corridor to Central Europe´s North-South Corridor. Domestically, the Black Sea coast will have to be linked to the National Transport System. One such proposal is Transgaz´s Danube Pipeline, meant to link Giurgiu to Arad and to extend to Tuzla (Constan`E>a county). Another notable concept, Eastring, was proposed by Slovakia´s TSO, Eustream. Eastring endeavors to connect Romania´s Isaccea (Tulcea county) to Mediesu Aurit (Satu-Mare county) and go across 85 km of western Ukraine to Slovakia´s Velke Kapusany. In any event, one gas transport solution will have to be pinned down in the first months of 2015. All-in-all, 2015 can be a year of opportunity for Romania if its regional role is better understood and acted upon.
Radu Dudau is Director of Energy Policy Group and Associate Prof. at Bucharest University Copyright (c) 2014 Energy Policy Group Str. Buzesti 75-77, 011013 Bucuresti, Romania www.epg-thinktank.org office@epg-thinktank.org
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