The Romanian Government presented the Parliament in September 2014 with a Decision to postpone gas market liberalization for households by two and a half years, until 1 July 2021.
The initial deadline of 31 December 2018 was agreed upon in 2012 by the first government of Prime Minister Victor Ponta along with the Troika of international lenders: the European Commission (EC), the International Money Fund and the World Bank.
The 2018 calendar was supposed to bring a 3% increase in household gas prices as of 1 October 2014, as a first step towards timely liberalization.In light of the burden that would have thus fallen on households ahead of presidential elections held in December, the Government, through its Department of Energy, requested this delay. The motivation given by the Energy Minister was that while the average salary has dropped 1% in the past two years, the price of gas has increased by 16% in the same timeframe.
Though the Parliament approved the move, what lacked was a written approval by the European Commission, despite the Energy Minister’s reassurance that it will be obtained, following discussions with former Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger at the end of August on the occasion of the inauguration of the Iaşi-Ungheni Interconnector. The conclusion of the talks was, however, only one-sidedly confirmed in a letter sent on September 4 by the Department for Energy to Mr. Oettinger.
De circa patru decenii – mai exact, de la șocurile petroliere ale anilor 1970 – s-a instaurat ideea că producţia de petrol este într-un declin inevitabil. Influenta lucrare a Clubului de la Roma, Limitele creșterii (1972), prezicea colapsul unui sistem industrial confruntat cu o creștere exponenţială a cererii de energie, cu suprapopulaţie și poluare crescândă. Doi ani mai târziu, National Geographic populariza teoria vârfului de producţie a petrolului (peak oil), a geologului american M. King Hubbert, care prognoza că vârful absolut al producţiei de petrol avea să fie atins în 1995, după care forme alternative de energie trebuiau să compenseze în mod obligatoriu declinul rapid al economiei bazate pe hidrocarburi.
Anul 2009 a marcat o schimbare profundă. Criza economică din 2008 redusese semnificativ consumul de energie în întreaga lume. În decembrie 2008, preţul ţiţeiului coborâse sub 40 de dolari/baril, deși avea să revină treptat la peste 100 de dolari în următorii trei ani. Dar mai profund și mai durabil s-a dovedit a fi impactul unor noi tehnologii în explorarea și producţia de ţiţei și gaze. În America de Nord, creșterea producţiei de gaze „de șist” a fost atât de puternică încât, în 2010, SUA au devenit cel mai mare producător de gaze al lumii, cu efecte tectonice în comerţul și geopolitica gazelor naturale. Totodată, proiectele de explorare și extracţie a hidrocarburilor din platourile continentale și din apele adânci au atras, la nivel global, investiţii de zeci de miliarde de dolari anual. Oil Market Intelligence anticipează că producţia de ţiţei din apele oceanice adânci va atinge 6,6 milioane barili/zi în 2020 – o creștere de 37,5% faţă de nivelul actual.
România are o veche și ilustră istorie a extracţiei ţiţeiului și gazelor, deși nu mai este astăzi un jucător de primă ligă la nivel mondial, așa cum era în perioada interbelică. Cu toate că are o dependenţă relativ mică de importuri de gaze (fapt semnificativ pe o piaţă regională monopolistă și într-un context geopolitic extrem de tensionat), ţara noastră are rezerve de hidrocarburi în scădere și o industrie care s-a adaptat forţelor pieţei prin diminuarea capacităţii industriale. Dar România are potenţialul de a beneficia de progresul tehnologic și de a dezvolta sustenabil surse noi de hidrocarburi, care să o propulseze din nou pe un loc de vârf la nivel european.
Apele adânci ale Mării Negre au atras interesul celei mai mari companii energetice private a lumii, ExxonMobil, iar potenţialul de gaze de șist a adus în România o altă companie de top, Chevron. OMV Petrom, liderul regional al industriei de ţiţei și gaze, investește semnificativ în redezvoltarea zăcămintelor mature, ca și Romgaz, cel mai mare producător autohton de gaze naturale. În plus, numeroase alte companii petroliere internaţionale, active în toate segmentele industriei (explorare și producţie, distribuţie, rafinare, retail, servicii petroliere și producţie de echipamente) au un aport de investiţii, tehnologie și know-how managerial. La orizontul anului 2020, cu perspectiva unor noi surse indigene de gaze și a unor noi surse regionale de import, precum și cu o interconectare crescută cu pieţele adiacente, România poate deveni un hub regional. Aceasta ar stimula competitivitatea industrială prin preţuri optime ale energiei, ar genera creștere economică și locuri de muncă. Dar interesul ţării și dezvoltarea durabilă să fie promovate concomitent cu crearea unui mediu de afaceri atractiv, în care Guvernul, agenţiile de reglementare și legiutorii trebuie să fie parteneri competenţi și statornici ai investitorilor.
The Iaşi-Ungheni Interconnector – the pipeline designed to connect the Republic of Moldova to the European gas markets – seems to have reached a rough patch in its way to finally becoming fully operational.
Though it was finalized and officially inaugurated this August, gas volumes are yet to be transported through the pipeline, mostly due to regulatory conundrums within the Republic of Moldova.
The Iaşi-Ungheni interconnector is a 43 km long pipeline meant to transport up to 1.5 bcm of gas per year from Romania to the Republic of Moldova, under the Prut River that constitutes the border between the two countries. Construction works only took one year, but they followed three years of talks between the two parties. Costs reached a total of €26.4m, most of which was covered by Brussels and Bucharest.
Romania produces around 11 bcm of natural gas per year through two main companies, OMV Petrom and Romgaz Mediaş. This covers about three quarters of Romania’s annual consumption, with the rest being imported from Russia. The Iaşi-Ungheni Interconnector is the first export route for Romanian gas before reverse flow is implemented on the Szeged-Arad interconnector and construction of the Bulgaria – Romania interconnector is finished.
Compared to oil products, natural gas is clean burning, with virtually no particle and sulphur emissions, close to no NOx emissions, and lower CO2 emissions. Increasingly, it is also more affordable, despite higher logistics costs.
Romania should follow the lead of many other countries around the world, and consider incentives for ship and truck owners to switch to natural gas.
What is LNG and what role does it play in the global gas market?
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) has recently marked its 50th anniversary, having become a key way to transport natural gas across large distances, in a flexible manner, where pipeline alternatives are not feasible. The solution is simple: cool down processed natural gas (methane and some ethane, after impurities are removed) to -162°C, until it becomes liquid. This reduces its size more than 600 times without requiring high pressures, and makes it easier to store/ transport in a tank, instead of using a traditional underground storage solution/ pipeline.
The key advantage is flexibility for both buyer and seller. LNG increases their bargaining power, since they are not stuck at either end of a pipeline, and can choose to enter into contracts with any other party who has LNG facilities. On the downside, cooling down natural gas to the required temperature, and holding it cool for a long time is energy intensive, hence expensive.
COP21 (The Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC) will be the event of this fall and end of the year in environmental diplomacy.
The intention is to achieve a “universal and legally binding agreement” to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) in order to keep global warming below 2° C from pre-industrial levels, beyond which it is presumed that the effects are irreversible.
Parties to the UNFCCC have been asked during the previous conference (Lima, 2014) to submit, by the end of 2015’s first quarter, national action plans to limit GHG emissions (intended nationally determined contributions, INDC), applicable after 2020 – that is, after the expiry of the “second commitment period” (2013-2020) of the Kyoto Protocol. By the time of updating this article (September 10, 2015), 59 countries (31 plus the EU, whose INDC covers 28 states) of the 196 UNFCCC members had submitted INDCs, covering 59.4% of global GHG emissions (climateactiontracker.org)
EU resumes in its collective INDC obligations under the climate change and energy strategy for 2030:
“The EU and Member States are committed to a binding target for the internal reduction of GHG emissions by at least 43% in 2030 compared to 1990, which will be jointly carried out.”
The document specifies that the target is aligned with the long-term goal of reducing emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990.
The United States aim to reduce emissions by 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. On August 3, the White House and the Federal Agency for Environmental Protection announced the Clean Energy Plan, whereby emissions in the energy sector – 31% of the national total – are to be reduced by 32% since 2022. This plan has already sparked fierce opposition in the American political and corporate environment.
China’s INDC targets are to reach the peak of emissions in 2030, to reach a 20% share of the energy mix for “low-carbon sources” and to reduce by 2030 carbon emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65% compared to 2005 levels.
This is a slightly extended version of an article published in Energynomics, Issue 8, No. III (Fall 2015).
For INDCs to serve as a basis for achieving a global climate agreement post-2020, first of all there is a need for their “normalization” with respect to baseline data and calculation methodology, in order to be able to assess INDCs’ relative merits, suitability, and coherence.
Yet it would be no wonder if this revealed so much difference in the proposed policies and regulations as to render impractical a unique global institutional response. Besides, the political and administrative capacity of different member states, and also their level of ambition, can vary so much that the project of a universal, integrated system for preventing climate change is unfeasible. Rather, the pragmatic alternative would probably be a regime complex, to use the term of Robert Keohane and David Victor, by which different regional approaches are harmonized functionally and organizationally under the umbrella of common environmental objectives.
It is therefore likely that, for practical reasons, COP21’s outcome will fall short of the aspiration to “a universal and legally binding agreement.” On the other hand, however, the concept of negotiations in Paris is to build a flexible international framework of policies effective in combating global warming. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, it aims to involve not only industrialized countries, but also developing ones – even though the former will keep the responsibility of financing global climate policy. But it will be an adjustable framework: the EU in particular insists on establishing a quinquennial review of INDCs from 2020 on, in the light of best climate science data, so that the national commitments to reduce GHG emissions can be maximized.
Indeed, it will require much tact to align, beyond good intentions, the energy security needs of member states, international development cooperation, the interests of energy producers and utility companies, international financing and risk management mechanisms etc. In particular, it is a matter of industrial competitiveness for companies in countries with stringent climate regulations that these do not create an untenable competitive disadvantage compared to their main global competitors.
Among other things, as noted by Susanne Dröge and Oliver Geden in a recent study of the Foundation for Science and Politics in Germany, even the term “protocol,” interpreted as a legally binding instrument in international law, is inadequate and risky, given the unlikelihood that the US Congress will ratify such a treaty.
As this article is slated to come out just before the holiday season, it invites to a different kind of reflection American Energy Company Chevron announced, February 20, its decision to renounce shale gas exploration in Romania, in what was deemed by company representatives “a business decision” that follows evaluations of the Romanian project, which is at this point unable to compete with other more favorable investments in the company´s global portfolio. Chevron finalized exploratory drilling in 2014 in the Bârlad perimeter (Vaslui County, East Romania), as well as a 2-D geophysics study on two of its three Dobrogea region concessions, and had been analyzing the data since.
In 2013, the United States Energy Information Administration had estimated Romania´s shale gas potential at 51 tcf (1.4 bcm) of technically recoverable shale gas and 0.3 BBL of shale oil and condensate, with the figures raising high hopes both among investors and local officials and experts. However, the figures resulted from a theoretical model, based on structural comparison between North American and European shale geology and were, thus, just a rough estimation.
The news of Chevron´s exit did not come entirely as a surprise, and was somewhat expected after a statement last year by Prime Minister Victor Ponta during his presidential campaign, explicitly saying that there was no shale gas in Romania and all the fighting about it had been for nothing. Though at the time the statement could easily be interpreted as just a political message meant to take the contentious issue of shale gas off the campaign agenda, Ponta´s words now ring true – for all their disregard of Chevron´s own communication strategy.
Indeed, the story of shale gas in Romania has somewhat been that of a fight. Chevron has had to deal with public opposition and outright protests, including clashes with police; mis- and dis-information, and a lack of understanding about the fracking procedure and its risks; overwhelming bureaucracy and a highly volatile and confusing legal procedure when it comes to unconventional gas drilling in the country, even though no moratorium was ever officially instated, like in neighboring Bulgaria.
Romanian legislation does not differentiate between conventional and unconventional gas in terms of authorization procedures to be undertaken prior to operations. Instead, it grants the National Agency for Mineral Resources (ANRM) decision power over the schedule, technology and methods to be used in each drilling operation, on a case-by-case basis. In lack of comprehensive legislation which would take into account more than the few scenarios that the ANRM has grown accustomed to, the micro-management procedure at hand stalled the process and left it vulnerable to ad hoc interpretations.
Operations were further delayed by the bad reputation that shale gas and fracking quickly gained in Romania. This was favored by several factors. For one thing, shale gas was used as a political tool during the general elections of 2012, when some Social-Democrat candidates for Parliament promised to ban fracking should they be elected. However, it was precisely the Social-Democrat government of Victor Ponta that gave the green light for fracking just the next year, causing a lot of resentment and disappointment, even urging requests for his resignation.
Another factor to play a role was a stalled extractive project by a Canadian Company, Gabriel Resources, which had been faced with environmental protests for years on account of its intention to use cyanides in a gold-extraction project at RoA”Yia MontanÄf, in Romania´s Apuseni Mountains. The project was highly mediatized lately, although it has been dragging on for over a decade. No proper information campaign to reassure the population on safety procedures was ever undertaken by either the company or the government, and when the company finally started communicating with the public, it did so though an advertising campaign, talking about the benefits of gold extraction for the local community, instead of addressing safety concerns. The advertising campaign, in effect, was perceived as misleading and ended up causing more harm than good to the project´s image.
No public national information campaign was undertaken in regard to shale gas or fracking either – and it was not legally mandatory, either -, though a local one was eventually implemented by Chevron; however, only after protests had already begun, and only at a regional scale. The government chose to stay away from the issue, while think-tanks trying to inform the public had only limited reach, and definitely not in the rural areas where Chevron was operating.
There was much speculation about the origin of the protests and of the overall anti-shale gas campaign, whether they were local, or directed from the outside. Chevron encountered similar opposition in each of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries it operated in, which could lean the balance towards the explanation that protests were organized from the outside and were not just a product of domestic environmental activism (which, anyway, is hardly in its incipient stages in Romania overall).
However, with little proof publically available on either side, the more useful focus is on the fact that neither the government, nor the investor were sufficiently prepared to handle the public´s reaction, a weakness that both actors would do well to address. Though it has not been this opposition that was the driver of the company´s decision to pull out of either Romania, Poland (January 2015) or Lithuania (2014), it must have played a role in the company´s cost/benefit calculations, especially in the current bearish market environment caused by the oil price slump.
Though Chevron´s exit is not necessarily a verdict on the long-term potential of shale gas in the region, Romania included, it does prove right European shale gas sceptics, though not for the arguments they adamantly professed: population density, water supply, land ownership etc. The decision, instead, refers mainly to a lack of commercial volumes available for extraction with current Chevron technology, under the company´s current financial situation.
Chevron has had to cope globally with an increase in its failure rate in 2014, representing 30% of all drills last year, as opposed to just 18% in 2013, with profits also falling 30% y-on-y in Q4 of 2014 to $3.47bn, the lowest level of the past five years, because of the low oil prices. Overall 2014 net profits dipped 10.3% y-on-y to $19.2bn, with investments to be reduced 13% y-on-y in 2015, after a mere 3.7% cut in 2014 from 2013 levels.
With the decision having been based on Chevron´s specific financial calculations and on the geology of the CEE countries where drilling was undertaken, there is still hope for European shale gas development, albeit not in this region, at least not on the short term, and certainly not at the US level. The United Kingdom is now the flag bearer in this sense, with Germany also considering legislation to allow commercial shale gas fracking at depths of over 3,000 meters.
As for Romania, Chevron will release the results of proceedings to the ANRM, which are to remain confidential, in accordance with Romanian legislation. The details of the company´s exit remain to be worked out, including the fate of the licenses that Chevron was granted. It remains to be seen whether other companies will be interested in investing, with no such outlook as of yet. Shale gas hopefuls have continued drilling, for instance, In Poland, even after Chevron´s exist, however, with disappointing results (in February, Polish oil refiner and petrol retailer PKN Orlen and state-controlled oil and gas company PGNiG gave up one and four concessions, respectively, in their home country, citing technological and geological difficulties).
Romania´s Vaslui County, where Chevron was drilling, and, for that matter, the country´s entire Eastern parts, are very poor, with little chance of economic growth in the foreseeable future. Chevron´s operations, therefore, would have been a real blessing, with the company already employing several locals at what was perceived as highly competitive salaries for the region. Chevron also temporarily revived local businesses by outsourcing many of its activities; moreover, it employed domestic drilling companies, which not only made a profit, but also benefited from the Chevron´s know-how. Chevron´s exit is also a loss for the country in general, since shale gas hopes had even managed to seriously put the idea of Romania becoming a regional gas hub on the political agenda.
However, the move might be a very welcomed wakeup call for the Romanian government and politicians in general in regards to the conditions that international investments require (transparency, speedy resolution of problems, political stability etc.). Moreover, it will hopefully focus their attention and efforts on the Black Sea offshore projects, where significant reserves are already proven, but where significant action is still necessary in order for them to become commercially viable: building the pipeline infrastructure to transport the gas into the national gas network and from there onwards to exporting points; deciding upon a reliable, profitable, yet commercially-attractive royalties system for oil and gas companies. Therefore, if losing Chevron will cause decision-makers to focus more on what they can do to help the investments in the Black Sea, surely the entire Chevron experience will not have been in vain.
Pe 12 iunie a.c., think-tank-ul Energy Policy Group a organizat, împreună cu Casa de avocatură Pachiu şi Asociaţii și compania PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), o masă rotundă cu tema Este necesară schimbarea legislației românești în domeniul petrolului și gazelor? Au participat reprezentanți ai Guvernului, ai ANRM, ai companiilor reprezentative din sectorul upstream (explorare și producție) și ai asociațiilor din domeniu.
Scopul dezbaterii a fost de a identifica principalele obstacole ce împiedică desfășurarea normală a operațiunilor petroliere (de prospecțiune, explorare, dezvoltare sau exploatare) în România. Prezentul policy paper se adresează în primul rând autorităților abilitate să inițieze și să implementeze remedii legislative și de reglementare, dar și publicului interesat.
Recentele modificări fiscale (de exemplu, introducerea impozitului pe construcții speciale) au avut un impact negativ asupra industriei, în special din pricina elementului de impredictibilitate. În anticiparea unor modificări în sistemul de redevențe începând cu ianuarie 2015, este necesară o abordare strategică de stimulare fiscală a investițiilor în acest sector, bazată pe potențialul real al diferitelor tipuri de zăcăminte. Este nevoie de un regim fiscal stabil, transparent, predictibil și competitiv pe termen lung.
The analysis of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict calls for a comprehensive approach which cannot rule out the energyequation. In line with the trends set forth by the petroleum crises that have marked the second half of the previous century, ever since the petroleum crisis in 1973, the beginning of the XXI century distinguishes itself by new coordinates assigned to energy matters, such as a more structured and coordinated feedback of energy-consuming, developed countries to the geopolitical challenges promoted by exporting-countries.
At global level it has become clear that the industrialized countries affected by the consequences of the world crisis are on the verge of an energy independence and energy security crusade, focusing on the identification and exploitation of domestic resources and on the consolidation of several profitable and secure supply routes. The shale gas “revolution” has pushed the United States a good deal forward in this regard and has had transformative effects upon Europe’s gas markets, as well. On the other hand, as China has emerged as a major energy consumer, the plot has thickened at geopolitical level. Because of distrust in the international markets’ capacity to ensure its energy security, Beijing has chosen to be directly involved through its national companies in the in Africa’s extractive industries.
Tema competitivității industriale a devenit una de prim ordin între politicile energetice ale UE, alături de cei trei piloni consacrați: liberalizarea piețelor de energie, securitatea energetică, protecția mediului și combaterea schimbărilor climatice.
Cadrul 2030 privind energia și schimbările climatice în intervalul 2020-2030 asumă reducerea emisiilor de gaze cu efect de seră în statele membre UE cu 40% față de 1990 și stabilirea unei ținte obligatorii pentru sursele de energie regenerabilă (SER) la nivelul UE de 27% din consumul total de energie.
Pe de altă parte, Comisia Europeană (CE) își propune ca producția industrială a UE să ajungă la 20% din PIB în 2020. Dar condițiile economice dificile și prețul ridicat al energiei în UE față de America de Nord și Orientul Mijlociu generează o tensiune între obiectivele industriale ale statelor membre și politicile privind mediul și schimbările climatice. Creșterea spectaculoasă a producției de gaze de șist în SUA a contribuit la ieftinirea gazelor și a cărbunelui pe piețele internționale.
În același timp, în UE, care este puternic dependentă de importuri de energie, operează un set stringent de reglementări ce limitează emisiile de carbon și susțin SER prin mecanisme naționale de promovare. Acestea ridică prețul energiei, cu efectul eroziunii competitivității industriale. Acesta este contextul în care Guvernul României caută măsuri de reducere a prețului energiei la consumatorul final și de protecție a intereselor industriei mari consumatoare de energie.
În dezbaterea publică din România pe tema energiei se vehiculează deseori doi termeni aparent interşanjabili – securitate şi independenţă energetică. Cele două concepte sunt însă diferite, iar înţelegerea diferenţelor este foarte importantă. Independenţa energetică presupune asigurarea necesarului de energie din surse proprii – potenţial autarhic. În schimb, securitatea energetică este un concept mult mai complex. Aceasta se referă la asigurarea aprovizionării cu energie în cantităţi suficiente, la preţuri accesibile, în mod eficient şi sustenabil.
Independenţa energetică poate contribui la securitatea energetică. Pentru a explica conceptul de securitate energetică, unul dintre cele mai bune puncte de plecare ar putea fi studiile lui Daniel Yergin, un reputat expert în domeniu. Yergin arată că pentru a-şi asigura securitatea energetică, statele trebuie să respecte patru principii fundamentale: diversificarea surselor de aprovizionare; menţinerea unei marje de siguranţă – însemnând capacităţi de producţie suplimentare şi rezerve care pot fi accesate în situaţii de urgenţă; interconectarea reţelelor energetice – autarhia nefiind o soluţie viabilă şi, nu în ultimul rând, necesitatea informaţiei de calitate despre modul de funcţionare a pieţelor de energie, care să prevină apariţia panicii în situaţii de criză.
Responsabilitatea protejării sistemului energetic nu mai poate fi lăsată exclusiv în seama statelor sau doar a mediului privat. Este nevoie de conlucrarea dintre acestea pentru a asigura stabilitatea sistemului, în beneficiul tuturor participanţilor pe piaţa energiei. Există evident un preţ al securităţii energetice care se reflectă atât în preţul resurselor, dar şi în cheltuielile pentru apărare şi ordine publică. Şi aceste costuri trebuie împărţite între sectorul public şi cel privat.
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Hurdles in the Path of Romanian Gas Market Liberalization
The Romanian Government presented the Parliament in September 2014 with a Decision to postpone gas market liberalization for households by two and a half years, until 1 July 2021.
The initial deadline of 31 December 2018 was agreed upon in 2012 by the first government of Prime Minister Victor Ponta along with the Troika of international lenders: the European Commission (EC), the International Money Fund and the World Bank.
The 2018 calendar was supposed to bring a 3% increase in household gas prices as of 1 October 2014, as a first step towards timely liberalization.In light of the burden that would have thus fallen on households ahead of presidential elections held in December, the Government, through its Department of Energy, requested this delay. The motivation given by the Energy Minister was that while the average salary has dropped 1% in the past two years, the price of gas has increased by 16% in the same timeframe.
Though the Parliament approved the move, what lacked was a written approval by the European Commission, despite the Energy Minister’s reassurance that it will be obtained, following discussions with former Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger at the end of August on the occasion of the inauguration of the Iaşi-Ungheni Interconnector. The conclusion of the talks was, however, only one-sidedly confirmed in a letter sent on September 4 by the Department for Energy to Mr. Oettinger.