Most of the world relies on electricity systems build around 50 years ago. These are inefficient and cannot offer an appropriate response to today´s urgent global challenges. The estimated investment requirements in energy infrastructure are $13 trillion for the next 20 years. This poses an eminent need and opportunity to shift towards a low carbon, efficient and clean energy system. Smart grids will be a strong enabler of this transition.
What is a smart grid?
A smart grid is an intelligent, digitized energy network delivering electricity in an optimal way from source to consumption. This is achieved by integrating information, telecommunication and power technologies with the existing electricity system. The benefits of a smart grid include:
improved efficiency and reliability of electricity supply;
integration of more renewable energy into existing networks;
support for the development of electric vehicles at scale;
new solutions for customers to optimize their electricity consumption;
reduction of carbon emissions.
Governments are increasingly recognizing the value of smart grids. For example, China aims at building a strong smart grid by 2020, the U.S. has dedicated $4.5bn of its fiscal stimulus package specifically for the purpose of funding smart grid development. Similar compelling initiatives are currently ongoing in Europe, Japan, Australia and South Korea.
Are smart grids insured to prevail?
A smart grid means adding sensors and software to an existing grid that will provide utilities and individuals with new information which will help them react to changes quickly.
For example, if a tree falls on a power line, an entire neighborhood loses power, and current grid utility employees need to manually reroute power, which takes time. With a smart grid, sensors and software would detect and promptly reroute the power around the problem, limiting the issue to fewer homes.
But there´s more. The price of electricity changes throughout the day, but this cannot be seen with current meters installed in households. Electricity may be expensive during peak hours and cheap late at night. With new smart meters, a washing machine, for example, could be set up to run at times when power is cheap. This gives more control over energy bills and helps avoid blackouts at peak hours.
The smart grid also means new ways of using renewable energy. Power generation can now be distributed across multiple sources, so the system is more stable and efficient. It´s this ability to communicate and manage electricity that makes the grid smarter and helps us avoid burning more fossil fuels in the future.
With the participation of informed consumers, the smart grid will replace the ageing infrastructure of today´s grid and utilities will be better able to communicate with clients in order to electricity demands.
Grid security challenges
Expanding smart grids at scale will be challenging, but successful pilot projects can set the direction. From debates and research in some of the 90 pilot projects underway worldwide, a series of lessons came up that can improve the effectiveness of existing and planned pilot programs and accelerate their transition to full scale roll-out.
But before moving forward, it is important to consider security threats, vulnerabilities and solutions for the smart grid.
The internet has brought the possibility of constant communication through computers, but it can also cause a lot of problems regarding privacy and financial security. Smart grids will depend upon the developing and deploying of considerable computer and communication frameworks that support significantly increased situational awareness and allow finer-grained command and control.
The core system is the Smart Grid communications network. It connects the various subsystems and enables bidirectional communication between them. Offering communication capacities to physical subsystems, they become exposed to attacks. The number of points from which someone could gain access to the Smart Grid network system increases.
Security in a large system has three aspects: integrity, availability and confidentiality.
Integrity refers to the reliability of data and resources. Its deficiency can lead to false data injection into the system.
Availability refers to the fact that the system must be accessible and available for monitoring and control at any time. Lack of availability can lead to Denial of Service attacks (DoS), and the deprivation of certain measurements can destabilize the system.
Confidentiality refers to the ability to keep information secure and to prevent unauthorized users.
Accordingly, there are different kinds of security issues. With respect to smart grid integrity: with the commissioning of Smart Grid systems, consumers will have access to intelligent measuring devices (smart meters) installed in their homes. The potential threat to which the power system operators are subject is the receipt of values lower than actual consumption. Changing measurement data provided to consumers, or even at the level of transmission or distribution can lead to errors in estimating the status and control structure of the energy system.
With respect to smart grid availability, the main target of attacks aimed at energy system availability is the consumer. A cyber-attack can occur in the software that runs the smart meter to a consumer´s home or business, resulting in a power outage. A particular type of cyber-attack aimed at smart grid availability is Denial of Service (DoS).
As far as smart grid privacy is concerned, in a modern energy system, privacy issues are related to security concerns of consumer data. Energy operators collect and store information about users, such as name, address and data on consumption.
Solutions
Some of the proposed security solutions for the smart grid are the following:
Vulnerability assessments must be performed at least annually to make sure that the elements that interface with the perimeter are secure.
Devices should support Virtual Private Network (VPN) architectures for secure communication.
From the huge amount of transferred data, utilities should only collect the data needed to achieve their goals.
One thing is for sure, the traditional power systems are moving towards a new era of digitally enabled smart grids that will upgrade communications, efficiency, improve reliability and reduce the cost of electricity services.
Although the smart meter (SM) technology was developed in the 1970s, the large-scale rollout of these devices (basically, an electronic meter that also monitors and records the energy consumption, while transmitting the data in almost real time to the utility company) took place only in the 2000s, following the cellphone networks’ maturity in most of the developed countries. SMs bring measurable benefits to consumers, utility companies, and the energy system as a whole, as well as indirect environmental benefits through energy efficiency gains and system integration of renewable energy sources.
Smart meters in Europe and Romania
In Romania, the National Energy Regulation Agency (ANRE) has so far approved 36 SM pilot projects in 2015 and 2016 for all eight distribution areas, targeting approximately 270.000 points of delivery out of a total of 7.18 million, which means less than 4% of the population, at a cost of 107.715.463 RON (23.5 million euros). A rough calculation based on this figure indicates about 625 million euros needed for full implementation. This figure does not account for the expected costefficiency gains that come with full deployment: discount rates for SMs’ procurement, decrease of technology costs over time, and competition between installation companies, which will push the costs down.
About a third of EU28+2’s electricity users have a smart meter at present, out of a total of 283 million points of delivery, while the expectations are that the rollout will reach 60% by 2020 – below the aimed target of 80%. 2 The most active European countries in this respect are Italy, France, Spain and the UK. Significant efforts are also made in Austria and the Netherlands, while Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway are planning a major installation process. Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Denmark have already deployed SMs to most users. Outside the EU, Montenegro has already achieved a substantial rollout, while Serbia began an ambitious one in 2015.
The Economy Ministry published in October the draft law for mineral, petroleum, and hydro-mineral resources. The document includes a much anticipated new royalties’ framework for the upstream O&G sector. Indeed, after three years of uncertainty caused by rumors and various attempts to change the royalties’ regime, and against the backdrop of politically hyped expectations that the government’s take from the extraction of oil and gas should raise, the draft law has brought investors a needed degree of clarity and closure.
Among other things, the National Agency for Mineral Resources (NAMR) will thus be able to organize a new call for concession tenders of new O&G perimeters – Round XI, nine years after the previous one.
On the face of it, the new royalties’ proposal is underwhelming and rather conservative. For oil and gas extracted onshore, the draft maintains the current legal provisions. Table 1 below presents them for natural gas. The sole changes are about the frequency of payment (monthly, as opposed to quarterly, as it is currently the case) and the reference price used to calculate the value of gross production – the international Brent benchmark for crude oil and, insidiously, the average gas price on the OPCOM trading platform (as yet still not operational). Importantly, the draft states that the existing petroleum agreements will not be affected by ulterior changes – that is to say, until titleholders apply for concessions’ extension, case in which the terms will come into force.
A significant novelty in the draft law is the introduction of a separate royalty framework for the offshore oil and gas production. Table 2 presents it for natural gas only, yet the structure is the same for oil as well.
The offshore framework consists of two royalty components: a fixed royalty that applies to the whole output of oil and gas, respectively – 8% for oil and 10% for natural gas – and a variable one, which increases stepwise along with the production level, applying beyond a defined threshold. Nonetheless, the sum of the fixed and variable royalties will not exceed the maximum quotas of the current framework: 13.5% for oil and 13% for gas.
Now, a few comments regarding the form and the content of the draft proposal. As to the form, the legislator’s conception has been to bring together within a single law all the royalties on mineral, petroleum and hydro-mineral resources. Yet a more user-friendly and transparent type of unification would have been to draw together under a single legal text all the elements that constitute the fiscal regime of upstream oil and gas. This includes, apart from royalties, the windfall tax for natural gas on profit resulting from the price liberalization. As a matter of fact, as shown in a 2017 Deloitte study, in Romania the level of effective upstream taxation increased in 2015 as compared to 2014 from 15% to 15,7% in the first half of the year and to 16.9% at the end of 2015, reaching 17.5% in 2016. On the other hand, on the back of depressed oil prices, the average royalty rates in EU member states decreased in 2015 to 10% from 11.7% in 2014. At the end of the day, a key question is how competitive is our overall fiscal framework in the O&G upstream compared to other potential investors’ destinations.
Regarding the characteristics of the proposed royalty framework, it is again obvious that a search for simplicity and uniform applicability comes at the cost of progressivity and differentiation. Progressivity means that the royalty rate ought to increase as the value of output increases, and to accordingly diminish as that value decreases – on the back of production volume and price. In practice, a fiscal system that is not progressive – hence it is regressive – will not encourage upstream investors to put money in an environment of low oil and gas prices, and will not offer a satisfying government’s take in case the prices high.
In the Romanian system, the royalty on gas production is the same at equal outputs, regardless of varying extraction costs over time. This leads the operator to reduce the level of investment as the prices fall – which has been in fact observed in the Romanian upstream over the last couple of years. Hence, taxing production or revenues is a regressive taxation, as higher cost/lower profit firms end up paying more relative to their profit than low-cost firms.
Differentiation means that the royalty framework ought to be tailored for the geological specifics of Romania and to draw meaningful distinctions, to ensure that the underground value of a field in efficiently extracted to the mutual interest of state and operator. Thus, while the onshore/offshore distinction is a step forward, more differentiation should have been put in place within each of these domains: deep water, shallow water, field maturity, enhanced recovery technology etc. A flat 10% royalty on offshore gas production regardless of the field’s characteristics will likely discourage operators to continue production as the field output starts to decrease after plateau and goes in the tail phase. Therefore, sizeable gas volumes risk being left underground.
As to the onshore, there are over 400 oil and gas fields in Romania and over 13,000 active wells. The country has one of the lowest production per well EU-wide: 21 boe/day/well, compared to 2,350 in Norway, 964 in Denmark, 363 in UK and 271 in Italy (Deloitte 2017). Besides, the Romanian fields have a high degree of fragmentation; more than 25% of oil is extracted with enhanced recovery, which is capital intensive (increasing reservoir pressure, deep drilling etc). Hence, it is in the Romanian state’s interest to offer fiscal incentives to operators of such fragmented and mature fields so that investment in more technology is made to access those hard-to-get hydrocarbons.
Conclusion: While the new royalties’ proposal is much less damaging than many have feared, it is certainly not a modern, progressive and differentiated one, able to offer a long-term win-win deal to the state and investors alike. It is a simple one, which may accommodate the weak institutional capacity of ANRM. But it is also regressive, likely to discourage investment in an environment of increasing operational costs.
Romania needs a more sophisticated O&G fiscal framework, well-adjusted to its geological reality and flexible enough to withstand the notorious volatility of oil and gas markets for at least the duration of an investment cycle in this industry (25-30 years). Otherwise, Romania will probably have to undergo the pain of renegotiating again the O&G fiscal regime in a decade at most.
The Energy Policy Group has outlined in a June 2015 policy paper the principles of a progressive, differentiated, and flexible royalties’ framework, available here.
Romania´s petroleum tax regime is under review, with lingering uncertainty about its future design. The article discusses strategic considerations of this review, in light of the country´s expected (but equally unclear and overdue) long-term energy strategy. It argues for stronger incentives for exploration and sustained levels of investment in field development, where the Norwegian incentive structure could be of inspiration.
Domestic production – the cornerstone of Romania´s supply security
Despite a relatively low degree of energy import dependence among European peers, Romania needs to strengthen its energy security, and this is likely to become the key focus of the country´s upcoming energy strategy. An unchallenged way to strengthen supply security is diversifying import routes and supply sources, as well as modernising the country´s ageing energy infrastructure. However, the dream of “energy independence” hinges rather on a combination of energy efficiency and growing domestic energy supply.
Energy efficiency makes most sense to pursue (economic competitiveness, lower environmental impact), but it is most difficult to achieve. Most EU member states struggle to meet their energy efficiency targets, even with good governance. Apart from low-hanging fruits in some energy-intensive industries, Romania is unlikely to improve its energy efficiency significantly, due to low project implementation capacity and subsidised energy prices for residential users. The recently approved national plan for energy efficiency is unambitious, vague, and makes for disappointing reading. Energy demand is likely to rise only slightly less than the economy.
This implies that energy self-sufficiency relies on new domestic energy supplies – both fossil and renewable. There is large potential in rising renewable energy supply, particularly biomass, but the last years´ boom was not sustainable and future medium-term additions are likely to be limited. Therefore, the key contribution to a sustained low degree of energy import dependence will have to come from domestic oil and gas production.
Tough task: production increase in mature provinces, in a low-price environment
All of Romania´s onshore oil and gas provinces are mature and resources in current fields nearly depleted. During the past decade, high oil prices barely triggered sufficient investment to stabilise production from many small old fields and to put into production a few new ones. Against the background of rapidly rising oil demand, particularly for transportation, imports increased considerably and the trend is likely to continue in the medium term.
Natural gas demand has been falling for many years, roughly in line with supply, as inefficient industry restructured to meet liberalised prices and residential demand for heating fell due to mild winters. There is limited scope for further reduction in demand as residential prices liberalise, and likely rising demand on the medium term, in industry and power generation (where it should contribute to replace old, inefficient and polluting coal-fired generation, much of which is to shut down over the next decade). Unless modern exploration reveals new domestic oil and gas resources, Romania will gradually join the ranks of its neighbours to import most of its energy needs.
At a time of relatively low global oil prices and falling gas prices, oil majors are slashing their exploration and development budgets and smaller producers find it difficult to finance new activity. All over the world, there is hardly any investment in small petroleum finds, in marginal or declining fields. Focus is on low-cost petroleum provinces, streamlining to develop the largest/cheapest discoveries and hoping to find new giant fields in new promising areas. Enhanced oil recovery from some existing fields is also on the agenda, but not in the terminal stages of field decline, which are often expensive.
From a global and even European perspective, Romania is not at all an attractive petroleum province anymore, not even with its tentative offshore discoveries. Currently, the only positive outlook is the gradual liberalisation of gas prices, which increases the profitability of gas producers, incentivising and financing their investments in stabilising, even increasing conventional gas output.
Attracting the necessary scale of investment in the Romanian oil and gas sector, i.e. exploration for new reserves and life-extension of existing fields, will be extremely difficult. State-owned companies do not have the necessary technology or capital to drive the process and there are few international major or even mid-sized companies interested in the Romanian plays. This is particularly true for unconventional resources.
In February 2015, Chevron announced its decision to pull out of Romania, after unsuccessful exploration for shale gas in the Vaslui and Constan`E>a counties. Exploration results are secret, so it is difficult to assess how much the decision is due to the quality of the reserves and how much to the international oil and gas price context. In any case, it is unlikely Chevron will come back anytime soon, and almost as unlikely that any major comes in their stead.
It remains to be seen whether ExxonMobil sticks to the appraisal-drilling programme for its offshore concessions in the Black Sea, or defers/drops these in the near future, as well. Prospec`E>iuni S.A., a leading exploration company with long experience in Romania, sees a stable pace of exploration in 2015, but markedly fewer orders from next year on. Should the oil prices remain only slightly above the current breakeven price in mature Romanian plays, estimated at about $50/barrel, it is unlikely this outlook changes.
I turn now to the opportunity to use the petroleum tax review to boost domestic oil and gas production on the medium-to-long term.
Striking the right balance with the petroleum tax review
There may be a silver lining to the delayed petroleum tax review in Romania, which could have set in stone high taxation for the next decades, in line with a high price environment, and ring-fenced Romania against any significant petroleum investments once the prices fell. It is now possible to design a smarter, more flexible system, which incentivises exploration and development even in a low price scenario. Some lessons could be learnt from the Norwegian system, which is adapted for a mature province, despite considerable differences from the Romanian situation.
From the outset, it should be underlined that the current petroleum tax system is well suited for upholding production at the myriad of small old fields scattered around Romania. For current onshore fields, the system could remain largely unchanged, with regard to both the overall level of taxation and differentiation between fields according to their size, flow and age. There is discussion of different taxation regimes for onshore and offshore fields, but it may also be possible to design a hybrid system that works for fields both onshore and offshore.
Either way, it is necessary to incentivise exploration for new reserves. This can be achieved in several ways:
Use part of the additional income from the gas producers´ profits (perhaps in connection with the gas price liberalisation) to finance/contract initial oil and gas seismic exploration throughout the country, with the most advanced available technology and seeking higher depths, at a steady pace. At current oil prices, prospecting and drilling is more affordable, so it is a good time to use the global idle capacity while it is available. The results should be made publicly available for free, or against a low administrative fee. If there is potential in some plays, this should elicit sufficient interest for exploratory and appraisal wells from current and new licence holders. The remainder of the “windfall tax” should still be allocated to support vulnerable gas users weather the liberalisation.
Appraisal drilling is risky and expensive. To incentivise it, the petroleum tax review could provide for a partial reimbursement of exploration cost to companies in a non-taxable position (i.e. as long as they are running a loss, which is carried forward with interest at the risk-free rate). This should incentivise new players to enter Romania and drill for new resources in the most promising plays.
Once commercial reserves are found, the petroleum tax system could shorten the lead time to production and make marginal fields profitable. Again, inspired from Norway, this could be achieved in several ways:
Drop the royalties and shift to a profit tax at a higher level than the current corporate tax level. The higher level could be set in a similar way as the current royalty level, depending on the size, flow, age and location (onshore or offshore) of the field. The profit tax would apply to individual fields/plays, rather than the entire corporation, requiring more detailed accounting and hence a higher degree of transparency from all players. All expenses would have to be deductible to a high degree, so there is a risk of pushing up production cost level. However, companies would be less reluctant to invest if they can also deduct their expenses from the current “royalty” pot.
Allow for fast, uniform depreciation of all production equipment, such as Norway´s six-year straight-line method. Faster depreciation will incentivise a faster pace of large investments to take place, particularly offshore and at higher depths, where one requires expensive, advanced equipment.
The above suggestions should be modelled in a variety of price and finds scenarios, in order to stress test the impact on budget revenues from petroleum activity in Romania. Some of these incentives may prove too risky or expensive for the state, and it may be appropriate not to implement them. Nevertheless, the assessment should also include the cost of continuously falling domestic production and higher import dependence. Once oil and gas prices rebound as the cycle turns, which will certainly happen eventually, high import dependency for oil and gas would exact a high cost on Romania´s rate of growth, due to above average energy intensity.
While the world is still addicted to fossil fuels in the 21st century, Romania could design the petroleum tax system now to kick-start a domestic “golden age” of exploration. This would probably be a last dash for finding and potentially using up Romania´s oil and gas reserves, while there is still a market and a decent price for them. It is also possible to remain unaware of their existence, leave them in the ground, and import to cover domestic needs. With proper diversification, energy imports do not have to undermine security of supply, and may even keep the domestic environment pristine, but such a path would be expensive, damage trade balance and reduce employment in a traditional sector of the Romanian economy.
This paper traces the history of how states came to cooperate in the development of offshore cross-border oil or gas deposits. First, it explains the shift in how a state‘s offshore has come to be viewed from ―open to all‖ to sovereign rights over an exclusive economic zone and finally to cooperation in the interest of all parties concerned. Secondly, it discusses the types of agreements states signed and the problems these agreements solve. The types of agreements are exemplified in this second part, while international state practice of cooperation towards an efficient and fair exploitation of common deposits is explained in the third part.
Cooperation in the development of offshore cross-border deposits became state practice in two different parts of the world, at the same time. The third part of this paper explains how the states in the Persian Gulf came to cooperate in the development of their cross-border deposits.
Ever since Winston Churchill decided that the Imperial Navy switch from coal to oil, before World War I, crude oil has become a vital resource of modern economies and its exploitation turned from a commercial issue into a strategic one for all parties involved.
Thus, the industry was defined by parties‘ willingness to cooperate or by the results of different types of conflict. The development of offshore, cross-border deposits follows these patterns and presents two main types of problems. On one hand, due to physical characteristics of oil/gas deposits, exploitation based on the rule of capture is destined to result in conflicts between neighboring producers. On the other hand, offshore drilling is difficult and entails using advanced, expensive technologies which in turn require specialized know how.
Thus, cross-border cooperation for the development of cross-border, offshore deposits is all the more important as it is difficult to undergo. The moment the first barrel of oil from a common oil project is sold is the last stage of a time consuming process that turned into state practice after a decade‘s long evolution of concepts and international norms.
Hardly anything has been more emboldening in the ongoing “clean energy transition” than the solid learning curves of batteries and main renewable energy technologies over the past decade or so, as well as the upbeat forecasts of their continued expansion.
The prices of lithium-ion batteries have come down about 14% per year since 2007, as indicated in a 2015 paper in Nature, with a 6% to 9% price reduction for every doubling of production volume. According to a 2015 study by the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, the short-term learning rate for photovoltaic (PV) systems is 10% until a global PV capacity of 5,000 GW is reached, and is projected to increase to 19-23% on the long term (2050). For wind turbines, a 2017 study by Agora Energiewende quotes IRENA for a projected LCOE (levelized cost of electricity) reduction of 26% by 2025, while the 2014 assessment by KIC InnoEnergy is a more sobering 5,5% by 2025 for this technology.
Other studies have produced slightly different such numbers. Yet they all show exponential growths of clean energy technologies in the future. In so doing, such analyses typically focus on two main favorable cost drivers: regulations (including support schemes for renewable energy sources, RES, and electric vehicles, EVs) and finances (including cost of capital and local cost structure).
Wind turbines, PV panels and hi-power batteries are pillars of the transition to clean electricity generation and low-emission transports. Confidence in their future costs reductions is paramount for both investors and policy makers. But while such investments are expected to grow massively in the coming years, constraints of a different kind will have to be kept in mind.
Critical technology metals
After several years of stability, the spot price for lithium carbonate started to grow in 2015 and has more than doubled since then; it increased steeply from under $6,000/ton in 2015 to more than $13,000/ton in 2016 and spiked to no less than $17,000/ton in April 2017. In China, spot lithium carbonate prices exceeded briefly $20,000/ton on account of a shortage of spodumene (a pyroxene mineral that is one of the two major sources of lithium) imported from Australia. This has raised concerns about the near-term liquidity of China’s sport market.
Similarly, the price of cobalt increased from a relatively stable $25,000/ton in 2015 to about $60,000/ton in July 2017. Nickel, on the other hand, has seen decreasing prices from $20,000/ton in April 2014 to $9,200/ton in July 2017.
Lithium, cobalt, nickel and indium are widely used in batteries and renewable energy technologies. Likewise, rare earth elements, such as cerium, dysprosium, gadolinium, lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, scandium, and yttrium, are used in superconductors, special glasses, magnets, catalysts and separators, phosphors etc., which in turn are vital components of electric motors, batteries, thin films, lasers, NMR and X-ray machines, fuel cells, solid state and fluorescent lighting, PV cells, stainless steel, catalytic cracking in oil refineries and many others.
Basically, the entire modern world of electronic devices used in science, industry, medicine, military, as well as households rely essentially on the availability of rare earths and other so-called technology metals. These metals are vital for our technical capacity to efficiently generate, transmit, store, and consume energy. Rare earths elements along with indium, lithium, gallium, and tellurium, as well as precious metals such as platinum and silver, but also more common ones such as magnesium, nickel, molybdenum, cobalt, and tungsten constitute an indispensable material base of today’s global energy economy.
In a 2011 report, Caltech’s Resnik Institute advanced a useful definition of technology metals’ criticality, along two dimensions: that such metals have properties essential for the application’s performance, and that their supply faces a certain degree of risk. Usefully, the report plotted a “criticality matrix” for several technology metals, underscoring the criticality of a few elements that stand out with respect to both technological importance and supply risks: dysprosium, yttrium, neodymium, terbium, europium, indium.
Most rare earths are not actually rare in terms of their geological availability, yet minable concentrations are much less common than for other ores. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates total reserves worldwide at 130 million metric tons (mt), concentrated mostly in China (55mt), Russia (40mt), Brazil (22mt), Australia (3.2mt) and India (3.1mt). They are found in dilute concentrations and are often difficult to separate, making mining and processing laborious and capital intensive.
Some of the marketplace instability for rare earths results from the fact that most of them are mainly produced as byproducts from mining other metals: for example, indium is recovered in processing zinc ores, and most tellurium is recovered by processing copper ores. Unfortunately, for most coproduced technology metals, an increase in demand will hardly provide a strong enough economic incentive to increase the production of the base metal they are extracted with.
There are plenty of measures that can be taken along the value chain to increase security of supply. Reduction of waste, improved manufacturing efficiency, and recycling of end-of-life products can have a significant impact on increasing the supply of critical materials. Japan and the EU are frontrunners in developing recycling systems for technology metals, at significant capital costs.
To increase the cost efficiency of recycling, research and development (R&D) can contribute through optimized design of technology products to facilitate their recycling, as well as by advancing material substitutions, to reduce dependence on particularly critical metals. For example, platinum nanoparticles in fuel cells or catalytic converters can be substituted by nanoparticles of other platinum-coated elements, with sizeable reduction of platinum use in such applications. However, material substitutes tend to be less effective in most applications, so that a cost/performance trade-off is usually called.
Finally, in quite a few cases full-system substitution is doable, with significant reduction of critical materials demand. As pointed out by the Resnick Institute report, the substitution of light emitting diodes (LEDs) for fluorescent lights leads to substantial reduction of phosphor use. In another example, the shift from nickel-metal-hybrid (NiMH) to lithium-ion batteries results in diminished nickel demand, while increasing lithium use.
Cartel opportunities and geopolitical leverage
Today almost all mining, production and processing of rare earths takes place in China. Natural resources combined with lower labor costs and less strict environmental regulations have enabled the country to be the world’s predominant supplier of rare earths, accounting for about 95% of the currently supply. Besides, rare earths mined elsewhere are generally exported to China for processing and then reimported. As demand for RES continues to increase, countries are likely to hold rare earths in reserve for and compete for access to such resources.
As noted in a June 2017 joint report by Harvard’s Belfer Center, Columbia’s Center on Global Energy Policy and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy, “As the transition to renewable energy accelerates, cartels could develop around materials critical to renewable energy technologies. Even if these cartels are unable to achieve the kind of impact that OPEC did in the 1970s oil market, they might be able to exert influence over consumers of these materials.”
For those who find this far-fetched, it is instructive to recall the rare earths trade dispute that started in 2010 between China and Japan, in the context of tensions surrounding the territorial conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which then grew into a trade dispute with the U.S. and the EU. Beijing reduced its export quotas by 40%, sending the rare earths prices in the markets outside China soaring. The Chinese position was that the limitations were needed to protect the environment. In 2012, the American administration filed a case with the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, which in 2014 ruled against Beijing. The export quotas were dropped in 2015.
To counter such market dominance, rare earths importers will also have to support geological exploration and development of new sources in new geographical locations, thus creating more diversified international markets.
In effect, each technology metal in part has its own geological distribution, economics and market dynamics. Yet to epitomizes the challenges of technology metals in the era of clean energy expansion, let us take a closer at the case of lithium.
The international lithium markets
According to USGS, at the global level 35% of lithium is used in the production of ceramics and glass, 31% for batteries, 8% for lubricating greases, 6% for continuous casting mold flux powders, 6% for air treatment, 5% for polymer production, 1% for primary aluminum production, and 9% for other purposes.
Out of these sectors, batteries’ production is by far the most important growth segment. Tesla has launched its mass-market Model 3 electric car in July 2017, and plans to produce 500,000 cars per year by 2020. Volvo Cars has announced in July as well that by 2019 its entire production will be electric cars. Besides, the Chinese government offers public support for lithium-ion based EVs, especially buses. According to a recent UBS report, the battery capacity required by 2025 will be 12 times as big as presently.
Tesla is also planning to greatly expand its production of Powerwall batteries, as well as the grid support battery systems – such as the recently announced plan for the world’s largest lithium-ion battery in South Australia, a 100MW/129MWh Powerpack system for summertime peak load management. As noted by FT, at least three other companies stated they could deliver similar storage systems.
All in all, as calculated by Tam Hunt for Greentech Media in 2015, Tesla’s lithium demand by 2020 is expected to be at least 8,000 metric tons. According to USGS, worldwide lithium production capacity was 49,400 tons in 2015, with a production capacity utilization of 71% in 2016. Global lithium consumption in 2016 was 37,800 tons, up from 33,300 tons in 2015. Total estimated reserves in 2016 were about 14 million tons (mt).
Thus, at the current consumption level, the worldwide lithium reserves would suffice for 370 years. But a scenario of 50 million electric cars produced per year by 2040 (i.e. about half of the estimated total yearly car production) would take 100 Tesla Gigafactory-size plants, which would also add up to 200 times as much grid support batteries worldwide as presently. This, in a rough calculation, would require about 1 mt of lithium a year by 2040. At such a rate of demand, the current lithium reserves would cover merely 14 years of production. Other estimates are higher: quoted by FT, David Deak, chief technical officer at Lithium Americas, sees a global lithium demand of 3.1mt in 20 years’ time to fully electrify the world’s fleet of vehicles. Either way, the estimated demand increase is enormous.
Global production of lithium is concentrated in a small number of companies: Albemarle Corporation (U.S.), Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile (SQM), and Chinese companies Tianqi Lithium and Ganfeng Lithium.
Some analysts indicate the possibility of a “lithium supercycle,” similarly to the evolution in the iron ore market at the turn of the 21st century, when Chinese demand drove prices to record levels. Although lithium is relatively abundant, its criticality has to do rather with bottlenecks in mining and refining capacity. Besides, lithium extraction is costly and painstaking, so that rising prices may not immediately prompt an increase of supply.
There are two ways of production for lithium carbonate: (i) from subsurface brines, and (ii) from mining hard-rock ores (spodumene). The former became the main source of raw material for lithium carbonate in the 1990s. However, due to drastically increased demand in recent years, the spodumene-based lithium industry has kept growing and is likely to equal brine-based production by 2020.
The main brine operations are based in South America (Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina), while the main spodumene mines are in Australia, Canada, China and Finland.
The carbon footprint of spodumene mining and processing is about double as big as brine processing, in which lithium is extracted through water evaporation using sun energy. Besides, as observed by RobecoSAMs’ Francis Condon cited by FT, “We’re starting to see new sources being found and smaller mining companies and also non-mining companies getting involved. Some of these opportunities are arising where environmental codes are not as strong and social settings not as protective or inclusive. It’s a combination of risks.”
The entire value chain of batteries production must become less polluting in order to offset the environmental impact of lithium mining. In particular, the EVs industry must prepare to fully recycle its spent battery packs. A recent estimate by Canadian Li-Cycler, a recycler of companies, states that 11mt of spent lithium-ion batteries will be discarded until 2030. One challenge in this regard is to put in place sufficient recycling infrastructure before the first wave of EV batteries reaches its end of life. Absent sufficiently high utilization rates, such facilities are not likely to be economical without some form of public support.
Conclusion
Despite spectacular growth in recent years, RES currently represent under 4% of the global energy mix, while EVs account for less than 1% of the car market share worldwide. As the clean energy transition will get in full swing (i.e. these numbers will each exceed 10%), the extraction and processing of technology metals will have to be scaled-up massively. This adjustment process will constrain the overall speed of the clean energy transition. Growth there will be, and probably a robust one, but very likely less than exponential.
The market concentration and production bottlenecks in the upstream segment of technology metals has already opened opportunities for control and cartelization by a few multinational companies and nation states. Although improbable to replicate the influence that OPEC once had, the effectiveness of such cartels will also depend on the overall efficiency of multilateral organizations and initiatives for free trade and nondiscriminatory access to critical materials. The norms and rules of such institutions must also regulate international transfers of technology and capital for the green energy industries. Unfortunately, WTO does not deal with the energy sector as a whole, and the current trend of erosion of international cooperation is not conducive to an expansion of the organization’s scope.
It is, however, premature to carve out more precisely the outcome of such a complex interplay of market forces, geopolitical and cartel interests, and climate change policies.
On the one hand, assertive energy and climate policies by countries and municipalities to promote e-mobility, RES and grid-support battery systems etc., as well as policies to discourage or even forbid the use of fossil fuels, will certainly be a driver of the clean energy transition. At the same time, publicly supported R&D for the improvement of the entire value chain of the clean energy technologies – from more efficient extraction and nonpolluting processing of critical materials to development of substitutes for critical technology metals and to optimized product design and recycling systems – will enhance supply security.
On the other hand, there is a distinct possibility of slower than anticipated progress of some clean technologies. For example, dragging improvements of batteries’ energy density, charging times and durability would result in lower than expected commercial competitiveness of EVs, which could lead, among other things, to stranded assets.
In any event, it is doubtful that the global economy and the planet can withstand a process of one-on-one replacement of hundreds of millions of internal combustion cars with hundreds of millions of EVs, against the background of increasing demographics and dramatically rising purchasing power in the emerging countries. On the long-run, the world must also develop sustainable alternatives to the notion of personal passenger car.
Early September saw the beginning of a significant price increase for Brent, the international crude oil benchmark, which rose from $53/bbl to $59/bbl, the highest level since July 2015. As shown in the chart below, the growth has been almost 30% from June’s low-point of less than $46/bbl.
In an oil market analysis of April this year, I was wondering whether the OPEC agreement of November 2016 to cut supplies by 1.2 million barrels per day (mb/d) – to which Russia added an output cut of its own of 0.6 mb/d – would suffice to reign in the global oil glut that had built up and return the market to backwardation (i.e., a situation in which short-term delivery contracts are more expensive than longer-term futures).
Half a year later, the answer looks positive. There have been obvious effects of the output cut deal. Indeed, on October 5 (just a few weeks before the November 30 OPEC summit this year), Saudi Arabia responded with interest to the Russian proposal of extending the agreement until the end of 2018, while keeping the option of being “flexible.”
Yet other factors have also been active in driving up the oil market – both fundamental and contingent ones. The demand side has done most of the work. While one year ago concerns were expressed about oil demand from China and India, the recent months have seen robust (though gradually decreasing) imports from China, as Beijing has been building up strategic petroleum stocks in preparation for future market volatility.
More surprisingly and more consequential, though, are September figures from the IEA showing that shortly after the oil price collapse of the late 2014, oil consumption in the OECD countries started to grow solidly in the wake of whole decade of decline. OECD oil demand dropped from 50.4 mb/din 2005 to 45.4 mb/d in 2014 on account of high fuel prices, only to pick up in early 2015 at an average annual pace of about 400,000 b/d, as underscored by the FT.
For the whole 2017, IEA’s Oil Market Report for September estimates a “very strong growth year-on year” of 2.3 mb/d (2.4%), particularly in Europe and the U.S. In a condensed explanation, “OECD oil demand benefited from a rebound in economic activity and world trade, lower oil prices, and one-off elements boosting the year-on-year comparison.”
This will do away with much of the fuel demand reduction achieved in OECD since the 2008 economic crash – reduction partly driven by governmental policies aimed at energy efficiency targets – as consumer appetite for highly energy efficient cars lowers in a cheap oil context.
As to the contingent, “one-off elements” that added to the recent oil price increase, most widely mentioned was Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s warning of Iraqi Kurdistan, on September 24, that a declaration of independence on their part would be met with shutting off the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Kurdish region’s effective economic lifeline, which transports 550,000 b/d of crude to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Erdogan’s ominous words, “We have the tap. The moment we close the tap, then it’s done” is a stark reminder of the geopolitical risks surrounding international oil and gas pipelines.
Meanwhile, the devastating hurricane season of the late summer has caused a massive need for reconstruction on U.S.’s southern coast and in the Caribbean, which will surely result in increased petroleum demand.
On the supply side, the American shale producers were quick to lock in the latest oil price gains by means of options and swap contracts, given that $50 a barrel of WTI is deemed to be the breakeven price for most shale oil companies. According to FT, the selling positions in WTI crude totaled 473 mb by mid-September, the highest level of hedging since late 2014, and 86 mb more than at the end of August 2017. Thus, shale producers are in a good position to intensify drilling in the coming months. At the same time, though, too much short selling can bring the market back into contango, thus putting a break on the oil’s rallies.
All in all, as summed up by IEA, “analysis of the global balance shows that… for 2017 as a whole stocks will fall by 0.3 mb/d. This assumes OPEC crude oil production remaining at 32.5 mb/d. [W]e can clearly see a major reduction in floating storage, oil in transit, and stocks held in some independent areas. In the OECD, the five- year average stock overhang is now down to 170 mb from 318 mb at the end of January and stocks have fallen in months when they normally increase, offsetting net builds in China.”
Is this a turning point towards substantially higher oil prices? Most likely not. The same rebalancing mechanism of shale oil producers kicking in at higher crude prices will be prompted. However, we may well see a longer-lived equilibrium around $60 a barrel of Brent, which can make everyone happy for a couple of years.
Water, energy and food are inextricably linked. Therefore, a measure which affects one of these areas will inevitably have an impact on one or both of the remaining two.
The water-energy-food nexus has become a familiar a concept, on which numerous important studies and analyses gave become available, especially in the last five to ten years. Some of the most relevant papers were produced by important associations and institutions, such as the World Energy Council (WEC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and, of course, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
Most of these studies focus on the development of emerging economies and address the vulnerable populations typically located in African states. For this reason, such papers are often ignored in the usual literature of the energy industry. This is an unfortunate shortcoming.
This analysis neither addresses the agricultural aspect of the irrigation systems, nor does it attempt to dispute issues related to crop types, seasonality of cultures etc. However, from an energy standpoint, irrigations pose lots of interesting challenges. In Romania, most specialists admit that irrigations can bolster the energy industry and provide additional work for marginal energy producers, with measurable advantages to the economy as a whole. I only agree with the second part of the statement.
Natural gas is the most important form of energy in Romania’s the final consumption structure. In 2015, gas accounted for 29% of the total demand, followed by oil products with 26%, 19% renewable energy sources (RES) (including hydro), 17% coal and 9% nuclear energy.
Gas consumption is almost equally divided between the domestic and industrial sectors – in the latter gas is used primarily in the production of electricity and as raw material in petrochemistry.
The draft of the Energy Strategy 2016- 2030, with an Outlook to 2050 confers natural gas a prime role in the coming decades as well. In 2030, according to the projection made using the PRIMES model, gas will account for 26% of final energy demand which, despite a slight decrease compared to 2015, will still mean it is first. The relative decrease of 3% will be found in the increase of the RES share, which will reach 22%. By 2030, about 1800 MW of gas-powered generation capacity will have to be replaced, in order for the gas-based capacity pool to maintain its current size.
The Black Sea gas fields are a national project of strategic importance, for many reasons: to ensure energy security by maintaining a low level of dependence on imports, as shown also by the stress test carried out in the making of the new energy strategy; for the contribution in economic value, job creation, know-how and technology transfer, as well as for the overall regional importance of Romania as a potential exporter of energy. Undoubtedly, Romania can become a regional gas trading hub.
To achieve these strategic objectives, it is necessary to build the internal gas market by developing the needed infrastructure and creating a competitive, transparent and nondiscriminatory trading framework. In this respect, the Government Emergency Ordinance (GOE) No. 64/2016, which entered into force on April 1, 2017, brought about significant progress by liberalizing the wholesale segment of the gas market and by establishing a mandatory trading quota on the organized markets.
La mai bine de patru luni de la acordul din 30 noiembrie 2016 dintre OPEC și unsprezece producători non-OPEC de a reduce producția de petrol între 1 ianuarie și 30 iunie 2017, prețul ţiţeiului brut este încă blocat în jurul valorii de 50 de dolari pe baril. Reducerile de producție convenite au fost de 1,8 milioane de barili pe zi (mb/z), din care partea OPEC a fost de 1,2 mb/z. Din decembrie până în februarie, indicatorul Brent al ţiţeiului la nivel mondial a fluctuat între 55 și 57,5 de dolari pe baril, pentru a consemna o nouă scădere sub 51 de dolari pe baril la sfârșitul lunii martie, urmată apoi de o oarecare recuperare la 55 de dolari pe baril în prima săptămână a lunii aprilie.
Întrebarea este, poate fi redus excesul de ţiţei la nivel mondial prin reducerea producției OPEC? Fără îndoială, acordul din 30 noiembrie a produs rezultate semnificative. Înainte de acesta, prețurile petrolului coborau accelerat, amenințând să revină la cotele de la începutul anului 2016, atunci când cotațiile Brent erau sub de 30 de dolari pe baril.
După cum arată Agenția Internațională pentru Energie (AIE), țările OPEC au pierdut venituri din export de circa 450 miliarde de dolari în 2015, în scădere masivă faţă de 1.200 de miliarde de dolari în 2012. În plus, investiţiile în explorare şi producţie de petrol și gaze la nivel global au scăzut cu un sfert în 2015, după care a urma u nou declin de 25%, în 2016. Pe de altă parte, costurile pentru producția de ţiţei s-au redus puternic în ultimii doi ani – cu 15% în 2015 și cu 17% în 2016, conform estimărilor AIE.
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